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Description: Fix for CVE-2021-3580 - potential crash on invalid input to the RSA decryption functions.
Origin: upstream, https://git.lysator.liu.se/nettle/nettle/-/compare/7a5f86321f4c67d7219aa87ea4e2ddca677d7378...0ad0b5df315665250dfdaa4a1e087f4799edaefe
Bug-RedHat: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2021-3580
--- a/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c
+++ b/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c
@@ -64,7 +64,9 @@ _pkcs1_sec_decrypt (size_t length, uint8
volatile int ok;
size_t i, t;
- assert (padded_message_length >= length);
+ /* Message independent branch */
+ if (length + 11 > padded_message_length)
+ return 0;
t = padded_message_length - length - 1;
--- a/rsa-decrypt-tr.c
+++ b/rsa-decrypt-tr.c
@@ -52,14 +52,17 @@ rsa_decrypt_tr(const struct rsa_public_k
mp_size_t key_limb_size;
int res;
- key_limb_size = NETTLE_OCTET_SIZE_TO_LIMB_SIZE(key->size);
+ /* First check that input is in range. */
+ if (mpz_sgn (gibberish) < 0 || mpz_cmp (gibberish, pub->n) >= 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ key_limb_size = mpz_size(pub->n);
TMP_GMP_ALLOC (m, key_limb_size);
TMP_GMP_ALLOC (em, key->size);
+ mpz_limbs_copy(m, gibberish, key_limb_size);
- res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m,
- mpz_limbs_read(gibberish),
- mpz_size(gibberish));
+ res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m, m);
mpn_get_base256 (em, key->size, m, key_limb_size);
--- a/rsa-decrypt.c
+++ b/rsa-decrypt.c
@@ -48,6 +48,16 @@ rsa_decrypt(const struct rsa_private_key
int res;
mpz_init(m);
+
+ /* First check that input is in range. Since we don't have the
+ public key available here, we need to reconstruct n. */
+ mpz_mul (m, key->p, key->q);
+ if (mpz_sgn (gibberish) < 0 || mpz_cmp (gibberish, m) >= 0)
+ {
+ mpz_clear (m);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
rsa_compute_root(key, m, gibberish);
res = pkcs1_decrypt (key->size, m, length, message);
--- a/rsa-internal.h
+++ b/rsa-internal.h
@@ -53,11 +53,11 @@ _rsa_sec_compute_root(const struct rsa_p
mp_limb_t *scratch);
/* Safe side-channel silent variant, using RSA blinding, and checking the
- * result after CRT. */
+ * result after CRT. In-place calls, with x == m, is allowed. */
int
_rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
const struct rsa_private_key *key,
void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random,
- mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m, size_t mn);
+ mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m);
#endif /* NETTLE_RSA_INTERNAL_H_INCLUDED */
--- a/rsa-sec-decrypt.c
+++ b/rsa-sec-decrypt.c
@@ -54,12 +54,19 @@ rsa_sec_decrypt(const struct rsa_public_
TMP_GMP_DECL (em, uint8_t);
int res;
+ /* First check that input is in range. */
+ if (mpz_sgn (gibberish) < 0 || mpz_cmp (gibberish, pub->n) >= 0)
+ return 0;
+
TMP_GMP_ALLOC (m, mpz_size(pub->n));
TMP_GMP_ALLOC (em, key->size);
- res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m,
- mpz_limbs_read(gibberish),
- mpz_size(gibberish));
+ /* We need a copy because m can be shorter than key_size,
+ * but _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr expect all inputs to be
+ * normalized to a key_size long buffer length */
+ mpz_limbs_copy(m, gibberish, mpz_size(pub->n));
+
+ res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m, m);
mpn_get_base256 (em, key->size, m, mpz_size(pub->n));
--- a/rsa-sign-tr.c
+++ b/rsa-sign-tr.c
@@ -131,35 +131,34 @@ int
_rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
const struct rsa_private_key *key,
void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random,
- mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m, size_t mn)
+ mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m)
{
+ mp_size_t nn;
mpz_t mz;
mpz_t xz;
int res;
- mpz_init(mz);
mpz_init(xz);
- mpn_copyi(mpz_limbs_write(mz, mn), m, mn);
- mpz_limbs_finish(mz, mn);
+ nn = mpz_size (pub->n);
- res = rsa_compute_root_tr(pub, key, random_ctx, random, xz, mz);
+ res = rsa_compute_root_tr(pub, key, random_ctx, random, xz,
+ mpz_roinit_n(mz, m, nn));
if (res)
- mpz_limbs_copy(x, xz, mpz_size(pub->n));
+ mpz_limbs_copy(x, xz, nn);
- mpz_clear(mz);
mpz_clear(xz);
return res;
}
#else
/* Blinds m, by computing c = m r^e (mod n), for a random r. Also
- returns the inverse (ri), for use by rsa_unblind. */
+ returns the inverse (ri), for use by rsa_unblind. Must have c != m,
+ no in-place operation.*/
static void
rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random,
- mp_limb_t *c, mp_limb_t *ri, const mp_limb_t *m,
- mp_size_t mn)
+ mp_limb_t *c, mp_limb_t *ri, const mp_limb_t *m)
{
const mp_limb_t *ep = mpz_limbs_read (pub->e);
const mp_limb_t *np = mpz_limbs_read (pub->n);
@@ -177,15 +176,15 @@ rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_k
/* c = m*(r^e) mod n */
itch = mpn_sec_powm_itch(nn, ebn, nn);
- i2 = mpn_sec_mul_itch(nn, mn);
+ i2 = mpn_sec_mul_itch(nn, nn);
itch = MAX(itch, i2);
- i2 = mpn_sec_div_r_itch(nn + mn, nn);
+ i2 = mpn_sec_div_r_itch(2*nn, nn);
itch = MAX(itch, i2);
i2 = mpn_sec_invert_itch(nn);
itch = MAX(itch, i2);
- TMP_GMP_ALLOC (tp, nn + mn + itch);
- scratch = tp + nn + mn;
+ TMP_GMP_ALLOC (tp, 2*nn + itch);
+ scratch = tp + 2*nn;
/* ri = r^(-1) */
do
@@ -198,9 +197,8 @@ rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_k
while (!mpn_sec_invert (ri, tp, np, nn, 2 * nn * GMP_NUMB_BITS, scratch));
mpn_sec_powm (c, rp, nn, ep, ebn, np, nn, scratch);
- /* normally mn == nn, but m can be smaller in some cases */
- mpn_sec_mul (tp, c, nn, m, mn, scratch);
- mpn_sec_div_r (tp, nn + mn, np, nn, scratch);
+ mpn_sec_mul (tp, c, nn, m, nn, scratch);
+ mpn_sec_div_r (tp, 2*nn, np, nn, scratch);
mpn_copyi(c, tp, nn);
TMP_GMP_FREE (r);
@@ -208,7 +206,7 @@ rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_k
TMP_GMP_FREE (tp);
}
-/* m = c ri mod n */
+/* m = c ri mod n. Allows x == c. */
static void
rsa_sec_unblind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
mp_limb_t *x, mp_limb_t *ri, const mp_limb_t *c)
@@ -298,7 +296,7 @@ int
_rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
const struct rsa_private_key *key,
void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random,
- mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m, size_t mn)
+ mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m)
{
TMP_GMP_DECL (c, mp_limb_t);
TMP_GMP_DECL (ri, mp_limb_t);
@@ -306,7 +304,7 @@ _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rs
size_t key_limb_size;
int ret;
- key_limb_size = NETTLE_OCTET_SIZE_TO_LIMB_SIZE(key->size);
+ key_limb_size = mpz_size(pub->n);
/* mpz_powm_sec handles only odd moduli. If p, q or n is even, the
key is invalid and rejected by rsa_private_key_prepare. However,
@@ -320,19 +318,18 @@ _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rs
}
assert(mpz_size(pub->n) == key_limb_size);
- assert(mn <= key_limb_size);
TMP_GMP_ALLOC (c, key_limb_size);
TMP_GMP_ALLOC (ri, key_limb_size);
TMP_GMP_ALLOC (scratch, _rsa_sec_compute_root_itch(key));
- rsa_sec_blind (pub, random_ctx, random, x, ri, m, mn);
+ rsa_sec_blind (pub, random_ctx, random, c, ri, m);
- _rsa_sec_compute_root(key, c, x, scratch);
+ _rsa_sec_compute_root(key, x, c, scratch);
- ret = rsa_sec_check_root(pub, c, x);
+ ret = rsa_sec_check_root(pub, x, c);
- rsa_sec_unblind(pub, x, ri, c);
+ rsa_sec_unblind(pub, x, ri, x);
cnd_mpn_zero(1 - ret, x, key_limb_size);
@@ -356,17 +353,17 @@ rsa_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_pub
mpz_t x, const mpz_t m)
{
TMP_GMP_DECL (l, mp_limb_t);
+ mp_size_t nn = mpz_size(pub->n);
int res;
- mp_size_t l_size = NETTLE_OCTET_SIZE_TO_LIMB_SIZE(key->size);
- TMP_GMP_ALLOC (l, l_size);
+ TMP_GMP_ALLOC (l, nn);
+ mpz_limbs_copy(l, m, nn);
- res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, l,
- mpz_limbs_read(m), mpz_size(m));
+ res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, l, l);
if (res) {
- mp_limb_t *xp = mpz_limbs_write (x, l_size);
- mpn_copyi (xp, l, l_size);
- mpz_limbs_finish (x, l_size);
+ mp_limb_t *xp = mpz_limbs_write (x, nn);
+ mpn_copyi (xp, l, nn);
+ mpz_limbs_finish (x, nn);
}
TMP_GMP_FREE (l);
--- a/rsa.h
+++ b/rsa.h
@@ -433,13 +433,14 @@ rsa_sec_decrypt(const struct rsa_public_
size_t length, uint8_t *message,
const mpz_t gibberish);
-/* Compute x, the e:th root of m. Calling it with x == m is allowed. */
+/* Compute x, the e:th root of m. Calling it with x == m is allowed.
+ It is required that 0 <= m < n. */
void
rsa_compute_root(const struct rsa_private_key *key,
mpz_t x, const mpz_t m);
/* Safer variant, using RSA blinding, and checking the result after
- CRT. */
+ CRT. It is required that 0 <= m < n. */
int
rsa_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
const struct rsa_private_key *key,
--- a/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c
+++ b/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c
@@ -19,10 +19,12 @@ test_main(void)
uint8_t after;
mpz_t gibberish;
+ mpz_t bad_input;
rsa_private_key_init(&key);
rsa_public_key_init(&pub);
mpz_init(gibberish);
+ mpz_init(bad_input);
knuth_lfib_init(&lfib, 17);
@@ -101,6 +103,42 @@ test_main(void)
ASSERT(decrypted[decrypted_length] == after);
ASSERT(decrypted[0] == 'A');
+ /* Test zero input. */
+ mpz_set_ui (bad_input, 0);
+ decrypted_length = msg_length;
+ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt(&key, &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
+ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt_tr(&pub, &key,
+ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
+ &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
+ ASSERT(!rsa_sec_decrypt(&pub, &key,
+ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
+ decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
+ ASSERT(decrypted_length == msg_length);
+
+ /* Test input that is slightly larger than n */
+ mpz_add(bad_input, gibberish, pub.n);
+ decrypted_length = msg_length;
+ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt(&key, &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
+ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt_tr(&pub, &key,
+ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
+ &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
+ ASSERT(!rsa_sec_decrypt(&pub, &key,
+ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
+ decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
+ ASSERT(decrypted_length == msg_length);
+
+ /* Test input that is considerably larger than n */
+ mpz_mul_2exp (bad_input, pub.n, 100);
+ mpz_add (bad_input, bad_input, gibberish);
+ decrypted_length = msg_length;
+ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt(&key, &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
+ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt_tr(&pub, &key,
+ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
+ &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
+ ASSERT(!rsa_sec_decrypt(&pub, &key,
+ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
+ decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
+ ASSERT(decrypted_length == msg_length);
/* Test invalid key. */
mpz_add_ui (key.q, key.q, 2);
@@ -112,6 +150,6 @@ test_main(void)
rsa_private_key_clear(&key);
rsa_public_key_clear(&pub);
mpz_clear(gibberish);
+ mpz_clear(bad_input);
free(decrypted);
}
-
--- a/testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c
+++ b/testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ rsa_decrypt_for_test(const struct rsa_pu
#endif
#define PAYLOAD_SIZE 50
+#define DECRYPTED_SIZE 256
void
test_main(void)
{
@@ -63,7 +64,7 @@ test_main(void)
struct knuth_lfib_ctx random_ctx;
uint8_t plaintext[PAYLOAD_SIZE];
- uint8_t decrypted[PAYLOAD_SIZE];
+ uint8_t decrypted[DECRYPTED_SIZE];
uint8_t verifybad[PAYLOAD_SIZE];
unsigned n_size = 1024;
mpz_t gibberish;
@@ -98,6 +99,20 @@ test_main(void)
PAYLOAD_SIZE, decrypted, gibberish) == 1);
ASSERT (MEMEQ (PAYLOAD_SIZE, plaintext, decrypted));
+ ASSERT (pub.size > 10);
+ ASSERT (pub.size <= DECRYPTED_SIZE);
+
+ /* Check that too large message length is rejected, largest
+ valid size is pub.size - 11. */
+ ASSERT (!rsa_decrypt_for_test (&pub, &key, &random_ctx,
+ (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
+ pub.size - 10, decrypted, gibberish));
+
+ /* This case used to result in arithmetic underflow and a crash. */
+ ASSERT (!rsa_decrypt_for_test (&pub, &key, &random_ctx,
+ (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
+ pub.size, decrypted, gibberish));
+
/* bad one */
memcpy(decrypted, verifybad, PAYLOAD_SIZE);
nettle_mpz_random_size(garbage, &random_ctx,
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