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From e1c52ac05a9ff505d2e5eac2f1ece4e95844ee71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2022 17:38:55 +1200
Subject: [PATCH 13/15] CVE-2022-32743 dsdb/modules/acl: Allow simultaneous
sAMAccountName, dNSHostName, and servicePrincipalName change
If the message changes the sAMAccountName, we'll check dNSHostName and
servicePrincipalName values against the new value of sAMAccountName,
rather than the account's current value. Similarly, if the message
changes the dNSHostName, we'll check servicePrincipalName values against
the new dNSHostName. This allows setting more than one of these
attributes simultaneously with validated write rights.
We now pass 'struct ldb_val' to acl_validate_spn_value() instead of
simple strings. Previously, we were relying on the data inside 'struct
ldb_val' having a terminating zero byte, even though this is not
guaranteed.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14833
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
---
selftest/knownfail.d/netlogon-dns-host-name | 2 -
selftest/knownfail.d/validated-dns-host-name | 3 -
source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++-------
3 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 selftest/knownfail.d/netlogon-dns-host-name
delete mode 100644 selftest/knownfail.d/validated-dns-host-name
diff --git a/selftest/knownfail.d/netlogon-dns-host-name b/selftest/knownfail.d/netlogon-dns-host-name
deleted file mode 100644
index 3eca0cd..0000000
--- a/selftest/knownfail.d/netlogon-dns-host-name
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-^samba.tests.py_credentials.samba.tests.py_credentials.PyCredentialsTests.test_set_dns_hostname_valid\(
-^samba.tests.py_credentials.samba.tests.py_credentials.PyCredentialsTests.test_set_dns_hostname_valid_denied\(
diff --git a/selftest/knownfail.d/validated-dns-host-name b/selftest/knownfail.d/validated-dns-host-name
deleted file mode 100644
index 4b61658..0000000
--- a/selftest/knownfail.d/validated-dns-host-name
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-^samba4.ldap.acl.python.*__main__.AclModifyTests.test_modify_dns_host_name_spn\(
-^samba4.ldap.acl.python.*__main__.AclModifyTests.test_modify_dns_host_name_spn_matching_account_name_new\(
-^samba4.ldap.acl.python.*__main__.AclModifyTests.test_modify_spn_matching_dns_host_name_invalid\(
diff --git a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c
index 82f6ec3..4098ae2 100644
--- a/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c
+++ b/source4/dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/acl.c
@@ -529,10 +529,10 @@ static int acl_sDRightsEffective(struct ldb_module *module,
static int acl_validate_spn_value(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct ldb_context *ldb,
- const char *spn_value,
+ const struct ldb_val *spn_value,
uint32_t userAccountControl,
- const char *samAccountName,
- const char *dnsHostName,
+ const struct ldb_val *samAccountName,
+ const struct ldb_val *dnsHostName,
const char *netbios_name,
const char *ntds_guid)
{
@@ -543,6 +543,7 @@ static int acl_validate_spn_value(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
char *instanceName;
char *serviceType;
char *serviceName;
+ const char *spn_value_str = NULL;
size_t account_name_len;
const char *forest_name = samdb_forest_name(ldb, mem_ctx);
const char *base_domain = samdb_default_domain_name(ldb, mem_ctx);
@@ -551,7 +552,18 @@ static int acl_validate_spn_value(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
bool is_dc = (userAccountControl & UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT) ||
(userAccountControl & UF_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT);
- if (strcasecmp_m(spn_value, samAccountName) == 0) {
+ spn_value_str = talloc_strndup(mem_ctx,
+ (const char *)spn_value->data,
+ spn_value->length);
+ if (spn_value_str == NULL) {
+ return ldb_oom(ldb);
+ }
+
+ if (spn_value->length == samAccountName->length &&
+ strncasecmp((const char *)spn_value->data,
+ (const char *)samAccountName->data,
+ spn_value->length) == 0)
+ {
/* MacOS X sets this value, and setting an SPN of your
* own samAccountName is both pointless and safe */
return LDB_SUCCESS;
@@ -565,7 +577,7 @@ static int acl_validate_spn_value(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
"Could not initialize kerberos context.");
}
- ret = krb5_parse_name(krb_ctx, spn_value, &principal);
+ ret = krb5_parse_name(krb_ctx, spn_value_str, &principal);
if (ret) {
krb5_free_context(krb_ctx);
return LDB_ERR_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION;
@@ -618,8 +630,10 @@ static int acl_validate_spn_value(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
}
}
- account_name_len = strlen(samAccountName);
- if (account_name_len && samAccountName[account_name_len - 1] == '$') {
+ account_name_len = samAccountName->length;
+ if (account_name_len &&
+ samAccountName->data[account_name_len - 1] == '$')
+ {
/* Account for the '$' character. */
--account_name_len;
}
@@ -627,12 +641,18 @@ static int acl_validate_spn_value(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
/* instanceName can be samAccountName without $ or dnsHostName
* or "ntds_guid._msdcs.forest_domain for DC objects */
if (strlen(instanceName) == account_name_len
- && strncasecmp(instanceName, samAccountName,
- account_name_len) == 0) {
+ && strncasecmp(instanceName,
+ (const char *)samAccountName->data,
+ account_name_len) == 0)
+ {
goto success;
}
if ((dnsHostName != NULL) &&
- (strcasecmp(instanceName, dnsHostName) == 0)) {
+ strlen(instanceName) == dnsHostName->length &&
+ (strncasecmp(instanceName,
+ (const char *)dnsHostName->data,
+ dnsHostName->length) == 0))
+ {
goto success;
}
if (is_dc) {
@@ -650,10 +670,13 @@ fail:
krb5_free_context(krb_ctx);
ldb_debug_set(ldb, LDB_DEBUG_WARNING,
"acl: spn validation failed for "
- "spn[%s] uac[0x%x] account[%s] hostname[%s] "
+ "spn[%.*s] uac[0x%x] account[%.*s] hostname[%.*s] "
"nbname[%s] ntds[%s] forest[%s] domain[%s]\n",
- spn_value, (unsigned)userAccountControl,
- samAccountName, dnsHostName,
+ (int)spn_value->length, spn_value->data,
+ (unsigned)userAccountControl,
+ (int)samAccountName->length, samAccountName->data,
+ dnsHostName != NULL ? (int)dnsHostName->length : 0,
+ dnsHostName != NULL ? (const char *)dnsHostName->data : "",
netbios_name, ntds_guid,
forest_name, base_domain);
return LDB_ERR_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION;
@@ -686,9 +709,9 @@ static int acl_check_spn(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct ldb_result *netbios_res;
struct ldb_dn *partitions_dn = samdb_partitions_dn(ldb, tmp_ctx);
uint32_t userAccountControl;
- const char *samAccountName;
- const char *dnsHostName;
const char *netbios_name;
+ const struct ldb_val *dns_host_name_val = NULL;
+ const struct ldb_val *sam_account_name_val = NULL;
struct GUID ntds;
char *ntds_guid = NULL;
@@ -773,9 +796,31 @@ static int acl_check_spn(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
return ret;
}
+ dns_host_name_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(acl_res->msgs[0], "dNSHostName");
+
+ ret = dsdb_msg_get_single_value(req->op.mod.message,
+ "dNSHostName",
+ dns_host_name_val,
+ &dns_host_name_val,
+ req->operation);
+ if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
+ talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(acl_res->msgs[0], "userAccountControl", 0);
- dnsHostName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(acl_res->msgs[0], "dnsHostName", NULL);
- samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(acl_res->msgs[0], "samAccountName", NULL);
+
+ sam_account_name_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(acl_res->msgs[0], "sAMAccountName");
+
+ ret = dsdb_msg_get_single_value(req->op.mod.message,
+ "sAMAccountName",
+ sam_account_name_val,
+ &sam_account_name_val,
+ req->operation);
+ if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
+ talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+ return ret;
+ }
ret = dsdb_module_search(module, tmp_ctx,
&netbios_res, partitions_dn,
@@ -806,10 +851,10 @@ static int acl_check_spn(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
for (i=0; i < el->num_values; i++) {
ret = acl_validate_spn_value(tmp_ctx,
ldb,
- (char *)el->values[i].data,
+ &el->values[i],
userAccountControl,
- samAccountName,
- dnsHostName,
+ sam_account_name_val,
+ dns_host_name_val,
netbios_name,
ntds_guid);
if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
--
1.8.3.1
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