In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:ext4: dax: fix overflowing extents beyond inode size when partially writingThe dax_iomap_rw() does two things in each iteration: map written blocksand copy user data to blocks. If the process is killed by user(See signalhandling in dax_iomap_iter()), the copied data will be returned and addedon inode size, which means that the length of written extents may exceedthe inode size, then fsck will fail. An example is given as:dd if=/dev/urandom of=file bs=4M count=1 dax_iomap_rw iomap_iter // round 1 ext4_iomap_begin ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 0~2M extents(written flag) dax_iomap_iter // copy 2M data iomap_iter // round 2 iomap_iter_advance iter->pos += iter->processed // iter->pos = 2M ext4_iomap_begin ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 2~4M extents(written flag) dax_iomap_iter fatal_signal_pending done = iter->pos - iocb->ki_pos // done = 2M ext4_handle_inode_extension ext4_update_inode_size // inode size = 2Mfsck reports: Inode 13, i_size is 2097152, should be 4194304. Fix?Fix the problem by truncating extents if the written length is smallerthan expected.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:ext4: dax: fix overflowing extents beyond inode size when partially writingThe dax_iomap_rw() does two things in each iteration: map written blocksand copy user data to blocks. If the process is killed by user(See signalhandling in dax_iomap_iter()), the copied data will be returned and addedon inode size, which means that the length of written extents may exceedthe inode size, then fsck will fail. An example is given as:dd if=/dev/urandom of=file bs=4M count=1 dax_iomap_rw iomap_iter // round 1 ext4_iomap_begin ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 0~2M extents(written flag) dax_iomap_iter // copy 2M data iomap_iter // round 2 iomap_iter_advance iter->pos += iter->processed // iter->pos = 2M ext4_iomap_begin ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 2~4M extents(written flag) dax_iomap_iter fatal_signal_pending done = iter->pos - iocb->ki_pos // done = 2M ext4_handle_inode_extension ext4_update_inode_size // inode size = 2Mfsck reports: Inode 13, i_size is 2097152, should be 4194304. Fix?Fix the problem by truncating extents if the written length is smallerthan expected.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:ext4: dax: fix overflowing extents beyond inode size when partially writingThe dax_iomap_rw() does two things in each iteration: map written blocksand copy user data to blocks. If the process is killed by user(See signalhandling in dax_iomap_iter()), the copied data will be returned and addedon inode size, which means that the length of written extents may exceedthe inode size, then fsck will fail. An example is given as:dd if=/dev/urandom of=file bs=4M count=1 dax_iomap_rw iomap_iter // round 1 ext4_iomap_begin ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 0~2M extents(written flag) dax_iomap_iter // copy 2M data iomap_iter // round 2 iomap_iter_advance iter->pos += iter->processed // iter->pos = 2M ext4_iomap_begin ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 2~4M extents(written flag) dax_iomap_iter fatal_signal_pending done = iter->pos - iocb->ki_pos // done = 2M ext4_handle_inode_extension ext4_update_inode_size // inode size = 2Mfsck reports: Inode 13, i_size is 2097152, should be 4194304. Fix?Fix the problem by truncating extents if the written length is smallerthan expected.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:ext4: dax: fix overflowing extents beyond inode size when partially writingThe dax_iomap_rw() does two things in each iteration: map written blocksand copy user data to blocks. If the process is killed by user(See signalhandling in dax_iomap_iter()), the copied data will be returned and addedon inode size, which means that the length of written extents may exceedthe inode size, then fsck will fail. An example is given as:dd if=/dev/urandom of=file bs=4M count=1 dax_iomap_rw iomap_iter // round 1 ext4_iomap_begin ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 0~2M extents(written flag) dax_iomap_iter // copy 2M data iomap_iter // round 2 iomap_iter_advance iter->pos += iter->processed // iter->pos = 2M ext4_iomap_begin ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 2~4M extents(written flag) dax_iomap_iter fatal_signal_pending done = iter->pos - iocb->ki_pos // done = 2M ext4_handle_inode_extension ext4_update_inode_size // inode size = 2Mfsck reports: Inode 13, i_size is 2097152, should be 4194304. Fix?Fix the problem by truncating extents if the written length is smallerthan expected.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:ext4: dax: fix overflowing extents beyond inode size when partially writingThe dax_iomap_rw() does two things in each iteration: map written blocksand copy user data to blocks. If the process is killed by user(See signalhandling in dax_iomap_iter()), the copied data will be returned and addedon inode size, which means that the length of written extents may exceedthe inode size, then fsck will fail. An example is given as:dd if=/dev/urandom of=file bs=4M count=1 dax_iomap_rw iomap_iter // round 1 ext4_iomap_begin ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 0~2M extents(written flag) dax_iomap_iter // copy 2M data iomap_iter // round 2 iomap_iter_advance iter->pos += iter->processed // iter->pos = 2M ext4_iomap_begin ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 2~4M extents(written flag) dax_iomap_iter fatal_signal_pending done = iter->pos - iocb->ki_pos // done = 2M ext4_handle_inode_extension ext4_update_inode_size // inode size = 2Mfsck reports: Inode 13, i_size is 2097152, should be 4194304. Fix?Fix the problem by truncating extents if the written length is smallerthan expected.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:ext4: dax: fix overflowing extents beyond inode size when partially writingThe dax_iomap_rw() does two things in each iteration: map written blocksand copy user data to blocks. If the process is killed by user(See signalhandling in dax_iomap_iter()), the copied data will be returned and addedon inode size, which means that the length of written extents may exceedthe inode size, then fsck will fail. An example is given as:dd if=/dev/urandom of=file bs=4M count=1 dax_iomap_rw iomap_iter // round 1 ext4_iomap_begin ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 0~2M extents(written flag) dax_iomap_iter // copy 2M data iomap_iter // round 2 iomap_iter_advance iter->pos += iter->processed // iter->pos = 2M ext4_iomap_begin ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 2~4M extents(written flag) dax_iomap_iter fatal_signal_pending done = iter->pos - iocb->ki_pos // done = 2M ext4_handle_inode_extension ext4_update_inode_size // inode size = 2Mfsck reports: Inode 13, i_size is 2097152, should be 4194304. Fix?Fix the problem by truncating extents if the written length is smallerthan expected.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:ext4: dax: fix overflowing extents beyond inode size when partially writingThe dax_iomap_rw() does two things in each iteration: map written blocksand copy user data to blocks. If the process is killed by user(See signalhandling in dax_iomap_iter()), the copied data will be returned and addedon inode size, which means that the length of written extents may exceedthe inode size, then fsck will fail. An example is given as:dd if=/dev/urandom of=file bs=4M count=1 dax_iomap_rw iomap_iter // round 1 ext4_iomap_begin ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 0~2M extents(written flag) dax_iomap_iter // copy 2M data iomap_iter // round 2 iomap_iter_advance iter->pos += iter->processed // iter->pos = 2M ext4_iomap_begin ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 2~4M extents(written flag) dax_iomap_iter fatal_signal_pending done = iter->pos - iocb->ki_pos // done = 2M ext4_handle_inode_extension ext4_update_inode_size // inode size = 2Mfsck reports: Inode 13, i_size is 2097152, should be 4194304. Fix?Fix the problem by truncating extents if the written length is smallerthan expected.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:ext4: dax: fix overflowing extents beyond inode size when partially writingThe dax_iomap_rw() does two things in each iteration: map written blocksand copy user data to blocks. If the process is killed by user(See signalhandling in dax_iomap_iter()), the copied data will be returned and addedon inode size, which means that the length of written extents may exceedthe inode size, then fsck will fail. An example is given as:dd if=/dev/urandom of=file bs=4M count=1 dax_iomap_rw iomap_iter // round 1 ext4_iomap_begin ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 0~2M extents(written flag) dax_iomap_iter // copy 2M data iomap_iter // round 2 iomap_iter_advance iter->pos += iter->processed // iter->pos = 2M ext4_iomap_begin ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 2~4M extents(written flag) dax_iomap_iter fatal_signal_pending done = iter->pos - iocb->ki_pos // done = 2M ext4_handle_inode_extension ext4_update_inode_size // inode size = 2Mfsck reports: Inode 13, i_size is 2097152, should be 4194304. Fix?Fix the problem by truncating extents if the written length is smallerthan expected.
Inthe Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:ext4: dax: fixoverflowing extents beyond inode size when partially writingThe dax_iomap_rw() does two things in each iteration: map written blocksand copy user data to blocks. If the process is killed by user(See signalhandling in dax_iomap_iter()), the copied data will be returned and addedon inode size, which means that the length of written extents may exceedthe inode size, then fsck will fail. An example is given as:dd if=/dev/urandom of=file bs=4M count=1 dax_iomap_rw iomap_iter // round 1 ext4_iomap_begin ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 0~2M extents(written flag) dax_iomap_iter // copy 2M data iomap_iter // round 2 iomap_iter_advance iter->pos += iter->processed // iter->pos = 2M ext4_iomap_begin ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 2~4M extents(written flag) dax_iomap_iter fatal_signal_pending done = iter->pos - iocb->ki_pos // done = 2M ext4_handle_inode_extension ext4_update_inode_size // inode size = 2Mfsck reports: Inode 13, i_size is 2097152, should be 4194304. Fix?Fix the problem by truncating extents if the written length is smallerthan expected.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:ext4: dax: fix overflowing extents beyond inode size when partially writingThe dax_iomap_rw() does two things in each iteration: map written blocksand copy user data to blocks. If the process is killed by user(See signalhandling in dax_iomap_iter()), the copied data will be returned and addedon inode size, which means that the length of written extents may exceedthe inode size, then fsck will fail. An example is given as:dd if=/dev/urandom of=file bs=4M count=1 dax_iomap_rw iomap_iter // round 1 ext4_iomap_begin ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 0~2M extents(written flag) dax_iomap_iter // copy 2M data iomap_iter // round 2 iomap_iter_advance iter->pos += iter->processed // iter->pos = 2M ext4_iomap_begin ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 2~4M extents(written flag) dax_iomap_iter fatal_signal_pending done = iter->pos - iocb->ki_pos // done = 2M ext4_handle_inode_extension ext4_update_inode_size // inode size = 2Mfsck reports: Inode 13, i_size is 2097152, should be 4194304. Fix?Fix the problem by truncating extents if the written length is smallerthan expected.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:ext4: dax: fix overflowing extents beyond inode size when partially writingThe dax_iomap_rw() does two things in each iteration: map written blocksand copy user data to blocks. If the process is killed by user(See signalhandling in dax_iomap_iter()), the copied data will be returned and addedon inode size, which means that the length of written extents may exceedthe inode size, then fsck will fail. An example is given as:dd if=/dev/urandom of=file bs=4M count=1 dax_iomap_rw iomap_iter // round 1 ext4_iomap_begin ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 0~2M extents(written flag) dax_iomap_iter // copy 2M data iomap_iter // round 2 iomap_iter_advance iter->pos += iter->processed // iter->pos = 2M ext4_iomap_begin ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 2~4M extents(written flag) dax_iomap_iter fatal_signal_pending done = iter->pos - iocb->ki_pos // done = 2M ext4_handle_inode_extension ext4_update_inode_size // inode size = 2Mfsck reports: Inode 13, i_size is 2097152, should be 4194304. Fix?Fix the problem by truncating extents if the written length is smallerthan expected.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:ext4: dax: fix overflowing extents beyond inode size when partially writingThe dax_iomap_rw() does two things in each iteration: map written blocksand copy user data to blocks. If the process is killed by user(See signalhandling in dax_iomap_iter()), the copied data will be returned and addedon inode size, which means that the length of written extents may exceedthe inode size, then fsck will fail. An example is given as:dd if=/dev/urandom of=file bs=4M count=1 dax_iomap_rw iomap_iter // round 1 ext4_iomap_begin ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 0~2M extents(written flag) dax_iomap_iter // copy 2M data iomap_iter // round 2 iomap_iter_advance iter->pos += iter->processed // iter->pos = 2M ext4_iomap_begin ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 2~4M extents(written flag) dax_iomap_iter fatal_signal_pending done = iter->pos - iocb->ki_pos // done = 2M ext4_handle_inode_extension ext4_update_inode_size // inode size = 2Mfsck reports: Inode 13, i_size is 2097152, should be 4194304. Fix?Fix the problem by truncating extents if the written length is smallerthan expected.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:ext4: dax: fix overflowing extents beyond inode size when partially writingThe dax_iomap_rw() does two things in each iteration: map written blocksand copy user data to blocks. If the process is killed by user(See signalhandling in dax_iomap_iter()), the copied data will be returned and addedon inode size, which means that the length of written extents may exceedthe inode size, then fsck will fail. An example is given as:dd if=/dev/urandom of=file bs=4M count=1 dax_iomap_rw iomap_iter // round 1 ext4_iomap_begin ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 0~2M extents(written flag) dax_iomap_iter // copy 2M data iomap_iter // round 2 iomap_iter_advance iter->pos += iter->processed // iter->pos = 2M ext4_iomap_begin ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 2~4M extents(written flag) dax_iomap_iter fatal_signal_pending done = iter->pos - iocb->ki_pos // done = 2M ext4_handle_inode_extension ext4_update_inode_size // inode size = 2Mfsck reports: Inode 13, i_size is 2097152, should be 4194304. Fix?Fix the problem by truncating extents if the written length is smallerthan expected.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:ext4: dax: fix overflowing extents beyond inode size when partially writingThe dax_iomap_rw() does two things in each iteration: map written blocksand copy user data to blocks. If the process is killed by user(See signalhandling in dax_iomap_iter()), the copied data will be returned and addedon inode size, which means that the length of written extents may exceedthe inode size, then fsck will fail. An example is given as:dd if=/dev/urandom of=file bs=4M count=1 dax_iomap_rw iomap_iter // round 1 ext4_iomap_begin ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 0~2M extents(written flag) dax_iomap_iter // copy 2M data iomap_iter // round 2 iomap_iter_advance iter->pos += iter->processed // iter->pos = 2M ext4_iomap_begin ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 2~4M extents(written flag) dax_iomap_iter fatal_signal_pending done = iter->pos - iocb->ki_pos // done = 2M ext4_handle_inode_extension ext4_update_inode_size // inode size = 2Mfsck reports: Inode 13, i_size is 2097152, should be 4194304. Fix?Fix the problem by truncating extents if the written length is smallerthan expected.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:ext4: dax: fix overflowing extents beyond inode size when partially writingThe dax_iomap_rw() does two things in each iteration: map written blocksand copy user data to blocks. If the process is killed by user(See signalhandling in dax_iomap_iter()), the copied data will be returned and addedon inode size, which means that the length of written extents may exceedthe inode size, then fsck will fail. An example is given as:dd if=/dev/urandom of=file bs=4M count=1 dax_iomap_rw iomap_iter // round 1 ext4_iomap_begin ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 0~2M extents(written flag) dax_iomap_iter // copy 2M data iomap_iter // round 2 iomap_iter_advance iter->pos += iter->processed // iter->pos = 2M ext4_iomap_begin ext4_iomap_alloc // allocate 2~4M extents(written flag) dax_iomap_iter fatal_signal_pending done = iter->pos - iocb->ki_pos // done = 2M ext4_handle_inode_extension ext4_update_inode_size // inode size = 2Mfsck reports: Inode 13, i_size is 2097152, should be 4194304. Fix?Fix the problem by truncating extents if the written length is smallerthan expected.
