A flawwas found in bind9. By flooding a DNSSEC resolver withresponses coming from a DNSEC-signed zone using NSEC3, an attacker can lead the targeted resolver to a CPU exhaustion further leading to a Denial of Service on the targeted host.
A flaw was found in bind9. By flooding a DNSSEC resolver with responses coming from aDNSEC-signed zone using NSEC3, anattacker can lead the targeted resolver to a CPU exhaustion further leading to a Denial of Service on the targeted host.
A flaw was found in bind9. By flooding a DNSSEC resolver with responses coming from aDNSEC-signed zone using NSEC3, anattacker can lead the targeted resolver to a CPU exhaustion, further leading to a Denial of Service on the targeted host.
A flaw was found in bind9. By flooding a DNSSEC resolver with responses coming from a DNSEC-signed zone using NSEC3, an attacker can lead the targeted resolver to a CPU exhaustion, further leading to a Denial of Service on the targeted host.
A flaw was found in bind9. By flooding a DNSSEC resolver with responses coming from a DNSEC-signed zone using NSEC3, an attacker can lead the targeted resolver to a CPU exhaustion, further leading to a Denial of Service on the targeted host.
A flaw was found in bind9.By flooding a DNSSEC resolver withresponsescoming from a DNSEC-signed zone using NSEC3, an attacker can lead the targeted resolverto a CPU exhaustion, further leading toa Denial of Serviceon the targeted host.
The Closest Encloser Proofaspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC5155 whenRFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPUconsumption for SHA-1 computations) viaDNSSEC responses ina random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the NSEC3 issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.